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1 Contextualizing the Troubles
Investigating Deeply Divided Societies through Social 
Movements Research
Lorenzo Bosi and Gianluca De Fazio1
The sheer scale and duration of Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’, with 3530 
people killed (1840 civilians) and 47,500 injured, between 1969 and 1998, 
make this conflict as one of the most lethal episodes of contention in post-
war Western Europe. This volume relies on social movement research to 
challenge the exceptional character that has been often attributed to this 
conflict in the past. At the same time, it asks how research on the Troubles 
might inform future research on social movements beyond the North-
ern Ireland case. Despite the increasing importance of ethnonationalist 
conflicts in the post-Cold War period (Wimmer 2013; Muro 2015), social 
movement scholars have paid little attention to deeply divided societies 
(notable exceptions include: Cirulli and Conversi 2010; Cowell-Meyers 2014; 
Demirel-Pegg, forthcoming; Gorenburg 2003; Khawaja 1995; Martheu 2009; 
Melucci and Diani 1992; Norwich 2015; Olzak and Olivier 1998; Seidman 
2000, 2011; Touquet 2015; Vladisavljevic 2002; Watts 2006), preferring instead 
to focus on ‘stable’, Western democracies (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). 
This book aims to at least partially address this gap by presenting state-
of-the-art social movement research on the Northern Ireland’s Troubles.
All societies are traversed by divisions, whether based on ethnicity, 
religion, race, class, or any combination of these and other factors. These 
fractures tend to exhibit varying degrees of intensity, resiliency, and 
politicization and are subject to historical and geographical f luctuations. 
Deeply divided societies are characterized by cleavages that are not paci-
f ied, as well as by the widespread belief that the state is actively taking 
the side of one of the parts in conflict. Regardless of its accuracy, this 
interpretation of the state acting in favour of a portion of society, rather 
than for all its citizenry, creates the potential for sociopolitical conflict 
and deepens its latent virulence, since the legitimacy of the state is ulti-
mately questioned. In this dynamic, the dominant group ‘appropriates 
1 We would like to thank Devrashee Gupta, James Jasper, Niall Ó Dochartaigh, Joseph Ruane, 
Lee Smithey, Jennifer Todd, and Robert White, as well as the AUP reviewers, for their thoughtful 
comments on a previous draft of this chapter.
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the state apparatus and shapes the political system, public institutions, 
geography, economy and culture’ (Yiftachel and Ghanem 2004: 650). Thus, 
in deeply divided societies, subcultural divisions based on antagonized 
sociopolitical cleavages lead to regimes lacking full legitimacy, a propen-
sity to widespread political violence, and state repression (Nordlinger 1972; 
Guelke 2012). The Northern Ireland case is a prototypical example of a 
society deeply divided along an ethnonational cleavage, similar to cases 
like Cyprus, South Africa, Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, Sudan, Congo, Pakistan, 
and the former Yugoslavia, among many others. This volume addresses 
this under-researched domain of cases by focusing on a number of key 
related questions: How does non-violent mobilization emerge and persist 
in deeply divided societies? What are the trajectories of participation 
in violent groups in these societies? What is the relationship between 
overt mobilization, clandestine operations, and protests among politi-
cal prisoners? What is the role of media coverage and identity politics? 
Can there be non-sectarian collective mobilization in deeply divided 
societies? The answers to these questions do not merely try to explain 
contentious politics in Northern Ireland; instead, they tackle key issues 
in contemporary social movement scholarship debates.
In this introduction, we f irst discuss the main theoretical approach 
typically used to study deeply divided societies and then suggest how 
social movement studies may enrich and complement our understanding 
of the dynamics of contentious politics in these contexts. We examine the 
existing social movement scholarship on this case and then provide a brief 
discussion of Northern Ireland’s historical context. Finally, we situate each 
chapter of the volume within the social movement f ield and emphasize 
their unique contributions to the Northern Ireland case.
Contentious Politics in Deeply Divided Societies
While not all deeply divided societies are split along ethnic or national 
cleavages, the ethnonational perspective has been the most prominent 
one applied to these cases. The ethnonationalism approach argues that, 
when in a single territory competing ethnic communities ‘want their state 
to be ruled by their nation, or […] want what they perceive as ‘their’ state 
to protect their nation’ (McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 354), ethnonational 
conflict is likely. Ethnonational communities and their political organiza-
tions (violent or non-violent) are at the core of ethnic conflict and the main 
source of political violence and antagonism.
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For all its descriptive power, however, the ethnonationalist perspective 
suffers from its reductionist view of what constitutes ethnic communities. 
Sociologists like Rogers Brubaker have warned against ‘the seemingly obvi-
ous and uncontroversial point that ethnic conflict involves conflict between 
ethnic groups’ (2002: 166). By interpreting ethnonationalist conflict as a 
conflict between ethnonationalist groups, scholars have in fact fallen into 
the trap of ‘groupism’, or the reif ication of ethnonationalist groups as if 
they were monolithic collective actors with distinct, undisputed interests 
and agency, which statically respond to environmental stimuli (Brubaker 
2002: 164-167).2 This reduces choice in the face of structural and historical 
inexorability. The ethnonational approach claims that f ixed ethnic identi-
ties and ethnic antagonism are the main cause of ethnic violence (i.e. initial 
conditions). Yet, this is a static and over-deterministic account of conflict, 
in that it mainly indicates the pre-existing conditions for ethnic contention, 
but not how and when violence deemed as ethnic-based erupts in certain 
contingent historical contexts. This has led scholars to underemphasize some 
specif ic characteristics of mobilization: 1) the trajectory of ethnonationalist 
mobilizations, their emergence, development, and decline; 2) the intra-
movement competition and conflict within heterogeneous ethnonationalist 
groups; and 3) the emergence of new groups and identities that transcend 
hardened ethnonationalist boundaries.
To understand and explain episodes of ethnic conflict and violence, like 
the outbreak and trajectory of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, it is thus 
necessary to theoretically unpack historical processes of popular mobiliza-
tion and state reactions (Tilly 1978, 2003). It is through these collective 
processes that certain social boundaries and identities can be created and/
or activated and transformed, leading conflict and political violence to be 
framed as ethnic (or ethnonational) (Tilly 2004). Ethnonational categories 
were certainly central in Northern Ireland’s own foundation in 1920. Thus, 
when in the late 1960s mass protests demanding civil rights against unionist 
discriminatory rule were met by violent loyalist counter-protests and heavy 
state repression, all of this re-activated these pre-existing categories as 
the most salient organizing principle of Northern Ireland’s contentious 
politics. The magnif ication of ethnonational identities solidif ied the deep 
divisions between the different factions appealing to opposite ethnona-
tional claims, ultimately radicalizing their repertoires of contention (De 
Fazio 2013). As Brubaker and Laitin (1998: 426) pointed out, ‘even where 
2 For a critique of the ‘essentialist’ tendencies of ethnonational interpretations of the Troubles, 
see Ruane and Todd (2004).
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violence is clearly rooted in preexisting conflict, it should not be treated 
as a natural, self-explanatory outgrowth of such conflict, something that 
occurs automatically when the conflict reaches a certain intensity’. The 
transition from structural causes to effects is not automatic and we need 
to take into account agency as well.
Undeniably, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had attempted, since the 
Partition, to overthrow the unionist government through several armed 
insurgencies (1942-1944; 1956-1962). Nevertheless, these insurgent cam-
paigns were routinely crushed by police repression and lack of support by 
the Irish Catholic minority, the alleged ethnonational community that the 
IRA intended to vindicate. Conversely, soon after the Troubles erupted, the 
IRA was able to garner signif icant political and social support among many 
Irish Catholics in vast areas of Northern Ireland. Rather than assuming 
that the popular support of radical ethnonational claims and repertoires 
was the obvious and direct product of ethnonational identities, we have to 
explain why radical contentious claims and repertoires gained support at 
a particular juncture in Northern Ireland history (for instance, see English 
2009: 85-86; White 1989). If the civil rights movement had not gone down 
to streets politics, or if the unionist establishment had provided a concrete 
answer to the civil rights demands, then the Troubles might have never 
happened. Current interpretations of the Troubles as an ethnonationalist 
conflict are static descriptions that cannot explain why an ethnonational 
conflict breaks out in a certain historical moment (if it emerges at all), or 
why the conflict follow the trajectory it does.
In this volume, we argue that recent developments in social movement 
theories (entailing an actor-based approach and the contextualization of 
contentious politics) provide a dynamic theoretical framework able to look 
at the Troubles and, more generally, at conflicts in deeply divided societies 
as the result of ongoing relational processes. The social movement f ield 
has grown rapidly over the last 40 years in both empirical research and 
theoretical analysis (Snow, Klandermans, and Soule 2004; Della Porta and 
Diani 2015). As Della Porta and Diani have suggested, this f ield of stud-
ies has focused ‘around four main sets of questions, concerning (a) the 
relationship between structural change and transformations in patterns of 
social conflict; (b) the role of cultural representations in enabling collective 
action; (c) the mechanisms that render it rational to mobilize on collective 
goals; and (d) the effects of the political and institutional context on social 
movements development and evolution’ (Della Porta and Diani 2015: 4).
Contemporary social movement research emerged, in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, in reaction to collective behaviour approaches, which described 
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contentious politics as irrational, unorganized, spontaneous, mainly violent, 
and resulting as a consequence of important structural changes, such as 
modernization. Following such approaches, individuals who share grievanc-
es and generalized beliefs are driven into mobilization rather than willing to 
mobilize for their purposes. Resource mobilization theory challenged these 
early socio-psychological approaches and focused on rational actors, at their 
organizational capacities and resources (material, social-organizational, 
moral, human, and cultural), moving away from deprivation and grievances. 
Where social movement organizations are seen as enterprises, individuals 
are understood then as rational actors who strategically weigh the costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of action and choose the course of action 
deemed as most likely to maximize their concrete goals and interests. In 
the 1980s, new social movement scholars in Europe challenged collective 
behaviour studies through a social-constructivist perspective by focusing 
on identity, lifestyles, meanings, and beliefs as possible explanations for 
understanding social movements. Whereas resource mobilization theory 
was seeking to answer how collective action emerges, the new social move-
ment approach looked to explain why mobilization happened. Meanwhile, 
in the United States, social-constructivists scholars started to investigate 
framing processes: how movements offer solutions to grievances and how 
movements provide the rationale needed to motivate support for collective 
action. This approach particularly focused on the role of cognitive, affective, 
and ideational roots of contention.
In the early 1980s, political process theories rapidly took an almost he-
gemonic position in the f ield, stressing that social movements are political 
rather than psychological phenomena, and that the political context of 
collective action and the political opportunities it provides (increased 
access to political decision-making power, instability in the alignment 
of ruling elites, access to elite allies, declining capacity and propensity of 
the state to repress dissent) are capable of mobilizing activism as well as 
decreasing it. These approaches, which have been criticized for being overly 
structural and static, have been joined by more dynamic ones: contentious 
politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), strategic 
interactions (Jasper 2007; Jasper and Duyvendak 2015; Duyvendak and Jasper 
2015), and field theories (Fligstein and McAdam 2012), among others. While 
different schools of thought in the f ield exist, with competing concepts, 
paradigms, and priorities, it is important not to overstate such differences 
as the work of scholars who are usually associated with one or the other 
approach are in reality more complex and richer than assumed (Buechler 
2011).
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Recent social movement theories challenge overly structural assumptions 
by recognizing the agency of all political actors participating to contention, 
from paramilitaries to state authorities and political parties, within their 
complex organizational f ields, emphasizing their shifting strategies as they 
interact with each other and adapt to their context (Jasper 2004; Maney, 
McCarthy, and Yukich 2012; Jasper and Duyvendak 2015; Duyvendak and 
Jasper 2015). It is through the untangling of the ever-changing relation-
ships between the main actors in the conflict, the transformation of their 
identities, goals, priorities, and tactics, that we can make sense of episodes 
of violent contention, such as the Troubles. Following this perspective, 
conflicts in deeply divided societies become de-exceptionalized and de-
essentialized, without the willingness to equate conflicts in deeply divided 
societies with conflicts in other types of societies. In looking for agency, 
social movement approaches are not arguing against structural explana-
tions, but consider the complex interactions between agency and structure 
and are better able to underline the importance of societal structures in 
deeply divided societies, constraining and shaping players’ choices. We 
believe that deeply divided societies are capable of showing more clearly 
how agency may unfold within certain historical structures/institutions/
conditions, and how this relationship changes across time and space (Bosi 
and Davis, forthcoming; Ruane and Todd, in this volume).
Our goal with this book is to advance our understanding of the Troubles, 
while also opening new avenues of research for social movement scholars 
interested in exploring conflict in deeply divided societies from a fresh 
perspective. We argue that the interactions between social movement ac-
tors and other political actors should be at the centre stage of contentious 
politics (Tilly 2008), and propose a perspective that contextualizes the 
emergence of political violence, the groups that embrace it, and those that 
eventually disengage from it (Bosi, Demetriou, and Malthaner 2014; Bosi, 
Ó Dochartaigh, and Pisoiu 2015). In bringing the analytical power of this 
perspective to a case of a deeply divided society, we believe that this volume 
looks as well at a future challenge that we have only started to address thus 
far. Recognizing that we can use social movement theories to study conten-
tious politics in deeply divided societies, we are compelled to ask what are 
some of the unique challenges social movements face in these contexts.
Collective movements challenging political authorities, as well as struc-
tures of authority, assume a different meaning when they occur in deeply 
divided societies. In these societies the legitimacy of the political system 
and the rules of the game are contested, if not openly rejected, by a section 
of the polity. At the same time, structures of authority alternative to the 
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state can be founded within ethnonationalist communities, as these rep-
resent ‘composite emergent products of a long historical process whereby 
past successes in organising division lay the foundation for subsequent 
reproduction of community solidarity and identity’ (Ruane and Todd, in 
this volume). Moreover, the emergence of antagonistic countermovements 
is far more likely in contexts where competing ethnic or national identities 
can be activated and made salient in a short period of time (Bob 2012). 
Political authorities do not have the luxury of ignoring these challenges, as 
might be the case in traditional liberal democracies; nor, can they simply 
act as neutral arbiter between conflicting movements. The opposite options 
of either granting concessions to challengers, or showing intransigence 
towards them, are both costly strategies for governments (Luders 2010), 
with outcomes that are hard to predict. In fact, political authorities in 
deeply divided societies are less likely to repress against the majority 
community if they need their support in order to maintain the status quo 
and stay in off ice (White 1999). Similarly, the policing of protest is not 
a routine, neutral public order task in a divided society; in the context 
of a state perceived as partial, if not outright hostile to certain groups, 
the impartiality and legitimacy of police as representative and enforcer 
of that state is intrinsically called into question (De Fazio 2007; Guelke 
2012). Under certain political, social, and historical conditions, political 
violence is an option not too far removed from the realm of possibilities 
in deeply divided societies, where institutional mechanisms for accom-
modating grievances are missing or underdeveloped. In deeply divided 
societies, the establishment may oppose the inclusion of certain groups 
(not necessarily a minority group, as the case of South Africa’s apartheid 
suggests) and do not provide legitimate channels for regime opponents 
to voice their discontent in non-violent ways. Once political violence, be 
it state-sanctioned, coming from clandestine organizations, protesters, 
or vigilante groups, enters into the equation of contentious politics, the 
search for peaceful solutions becomes increasingly more diff icult. Where 
mobilization does not directly confront the political authorities, but is 
instead willing to counter deeply entrenched divisions and sectarianism, 
what is indirectly challenged are the structures of authority on which 
different players are drawing their legitimacy (this was the case of the 
Peace People in Northern Ireland, see Smithey, in this volume). These types 
of mobilizations are capable of generating cross-cutting solidarities and 
divisions across well-established cleavages (Diani 2000); some movements 
may be directly attempting to radically transform ethnonational identities, 
while others embrace pluralist politics to emphasize non-ethnic claims, 
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such as LGBT rights (see Nagle’s chapter on these types of mobilizations 
in Northern Ireland and Lebanon).
The Northern Ireland Context and the Troubles
When Great Britain partitioned Ireland into two separate entities, six 
counties in the north-eastern historical region of Ulster remained under 
British rule (Northern Ireland), while the Irish Free State was established 
in the south. The new province of Northern Ireland was created so that 
the Protestants loyal to the British Crown, about two-thirds of the local 
population, could retain their political and cultural union with the United 
Kingdom. The remaining one-third of the population, the Irish Catholics, 
instead identif ied politically and culturally with what would later become 
the Republic of Ireland in the south. Northern Ireland was thus established 
as a semi-autonomous province within the United Kingdom, with its own 
parliament (Stormont), local government, judicial system, and, most impor-
tantly, full responsibility for internal security and public order.
Stormont represented the symbolic site where unionist domination over 
the Irish Catholic minority was created, reproduced, and executed (Ruane 
and Todd 1996). The Northern Ireland regime basically embodied a confes-
sional state with institutionalized partiality, without the necessary checks 
and balances to limit systemic excesses and biases and no oversight from 
the central British government. The latter, in fact, rarely showed interest 
towards Northern Ireland politics and avoided interfering with what was 
perceived as a peripheral and troublesome region of the United Kingdom 
(Rose 1971).
In the aftermath of World War II and with the expansion of the British 
welfare state, a group of activists in the mid-1960s decided to tackle housing, 
job, and electoral practice discrimination in Northern Ireland by borrow-
ing the rhetoric of the Civil Right Movement in the United States, but, at 
least initially, not its direct action approach. The reformist goals of the 
Northern Ireland civil rights movement (CRM) was to outlaw institutional 
discrimination through a political and legal campaign geared to highlight 
the unfairness of the political system in the region, especially in comparison 
with the democratic standards adopted in the rest of the United Kingdom. 
One of the tactics of the CRM was to provoke Westminster to intervene 
by pressuring Stormont to put an end to widespread discrimination. In 
1968, the growing frustration with the inability of the unionist govern-
ment to deliver signif icant reforms, the encouraging example of the civil 
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rights mobilization in the United States, and the closed channels for legal 
mobilization f inally convinced some within the CRM leadership to redirect 
their efforts towards direct action. Transgressive tactics of non-violent civil 
disobedience and demonstrations were deemed as more effective weapons 
in the struggle for civil rights (Purdie 1990).
On 5 October 1968, the unionist Minister of Home Affairs banned a 
civil rights march planned to take place in Derry, claiming public order 
reasons; the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) eagerly enforced the ban with 
excessive and indiscriminate use of force against peaceful marchers as well 
as bystanders. Police violence against the CRM transformed an otherwise 
minor protest into a ‘transformative event’; the images of police brutality, 
reminiscent of tactics used against civil rights demonstrations in the US 
South, rapidly spread throughout the world. A wave of mass civil rights 
demonstrations had just started, immediately colliding with the dominant 
majority community and ‘its’ institutions. In a few months, this sociopoliti-
cal crisis opened up the space, f irst, for extreme communal violence during 
the summer of 1969; second, for the deployment of the British Army in the 
streets of Belfast and Derry to restore law and order; third, for the emergence 
of the Provisional IRA at the end of 1969, as an answer to loyalist mobs and to 
the degeneration in the relationship between the British Army and the local 
residents in Catholic working-class neighbourhoods (Ó Dochartaigh 2005). 
The deterioration of the situation brought to an end the Stormont regime in 
March 1972, when Westminster instituted Direct Rule, but violence did not 
stop for another quarter of a century. In the mid-1970s, a peace movement 
brought together Catholic and Protestant moderates, but with no success.
The decline of the armed conflict option originated in the early 1980s, 
when the eff icacy of the armed struggle was f irst questioned and little 
by little progressed in the next two decades, following the decision of 
the Provisional IRA leadership, through the role played by Sinn Féin, to 
participate in the peace process (Bean 2007). After the failures of the Sun-
ningdale experiment (1973) – brought down by the loyalist workers’ strike of 
1974 – and of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), the Good Friday Agreement 
(1998) f inally created a devolved government in a power-sharing executive 
supported from both communities (Ó Dochartaigh 2016). However, this 
has not signif ied a complete solution to the conflict, as some dissident 
republican militant groups have not accepted the agreement and refuse to 
abandon the armed struggle (Evans and Tonge 2012), as well as was the case 
with the flag dispute in 2012 and the role of loyalist fringes (Ruane 2017). 
The recent vote of the United Kingdom to exit the European Union, with the 
majority of Scotland and Northern Ireland voting to remain, might trigger 
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a new resurgence of contention over Irish unity, which might destabilize 
the young post-agreement institutions.
Social Movement Research in Northern Ireland
Before the turn of the millennium, relatively few scholars engaged with 
social movement theories to study the Troubles in Northern Ireland. In 1985, 
John Hannigan’s research investigated dilemmas of strategy and ideology 
within the Provisional IRA, using resource mobilization theories and a 
political process approach, probably one of the earliest social movement 
pieces on the Troubles. However, it was Robert W. White who systematically 
brought social movement theories into his research on the Irish republican 
movement (1989, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2007, 2010). In more than 20 years of 
academic research on the subject, White adopted the analytical tools typi-
cally used to study peaceful protest to investigate the micro-mobilization, 
commitment, and post-recruitment activism of the republican movement 
in Northern Ireland, reconstructing its contentious history and evolution 
over the course of the conflict. He did so by relying on resource mobilization 
and political process theories (1989, 1992, 1993), as well as identity theories 
(2007, 2010), by conducting numerous intensive interviews with militant 
activists during and after the conflict. Moreover, he collected and analysed 
quantitative data on the victims and perpetrators of political violence, 
including state authorities, thus disaggregating the multiple factors behind 
the strategies of the various actors in the conflict. White’s use of these 
original sources and social movement theories has provided alternative 
interpretations of the republican armed struggle campaign, in which 
the outbreak of the violent conflict is contextualized in the interaction 
between social movements, countermovements and the state. During the 
1990s, two further authors adopted social movement theories to study the 
Northern Ireland Troubles, both from a comparative perspective. Cynthia 
Irvin (1999) innovatively used social movement theories to compare how 
armed groups change strategies and engage in institutionalized politics, 
in the often compared cases of the IRA in Northern Ireland and ETA in 
the Basque country. Diarmuid Maguire (1993) has instead compared the 
consequences of protest in Northern Ireland and Italy between 1967 and 
1992, challenging the unexceptional character of the ethnonationalist 
conflict. Well before the growing interest in disengagement processes in the 
literature on political violence, Irvin’s empirically rich work has investigated 
the strategic and organizational dilemmas faced by clandestine groups to 
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give up armed struggle for participating in political institutions and has 
connected these shifts to a model which links the internal dynamics of the 
respective clandestine groups with changes in their external environment. 
Maguire’s work has instead used the Northern Ireland case to challenge 
the naïve assumption that ‘greater citizen protest lead inevitably to the 
introduction of reforms and the expansion of democracy’ (1993: 103).
In the past f ifteen years, a number of social movement scholars have used 
the Northern Ireland Trouble as a ‘hard case’ (Lijphart 1971) to investigate 
un-explored topics, or to challenge existing ones within the social movement 
f ield: the need to investigate transnational networks (Maney 2000); how 
social movements develop across time (Bosi 2006, 2011); paths from armed 
rebellion to peaceful activisms and vice versa (Maney 2007); pathways of 
activists mobilization across time (Bosi 2007, 2012; Bosi and Della Porta 2012; 
Bosi 2016c); the interaction between mobilization and repression (De Fazio 
2007, 2009); new social movements in deeply divided societies (Nagle 2008, 
2015; Hayes and Nagle 2016); territoriality and collective action (Ó Dochar-
taigh and Bosi 2010); countermovement mobilization in deeply divided 
societies (Smithey 2009, 2011; Smithey and Young 2010); relational dynamics 
and processes of radicalization (Alimi, Bosi, and Demetriou 2012; De Fazio 
2013); legal opportunity and social movement strategy (De Fazio 2012); 
determinants of political violence against civilians (Maney, McCarthy, and 
Yukich 2012); within-movement competition (Maney 2012a; De Fazio 2014; 
Bosi and Davis, forthcoming); the paradox of reforms and processes of social 
movements institutionalization (Maney 2012b; Bosi 2016a); disengagement 
processes (Bosi 2013; Duhart 2016; Clubb 2016); and the contextualization 
of biographical outcomes (Bosi 2016b, 2016c, forthcoming).
While these scholars have used the Northern Ireland case to qualita-
tively extend social movement scholarship, the analytical power of this 
perspective also influenced other scholars outside of this circle, as they 
have increasingly adopted these frameworks to investigate the Troubles. 
For example, Graham Ellison and Greg Martin (2000) have questioned the 
assumptions contained in social movement research on policing, seeking 
their applicability to a deeply divided society such as Northern Ireland. 
Denis O’Hearn’s study (2009) of protest by republican prisoners underlines 
how the dynamic interaction between protest and repression transformed 
political prisoners’ culture, further investigating the key role of protest 
leaders in this process. Kevin Bean (2007) has studied the trajectory of the 
republican movement over the 30 years of conflict, relying on the social 
movement literature on processes of institutionalization. Christopher 
Farrington (2008) adopted a contentious politics approach to examine the 
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role of unionist counter-mobilization and its interaction with the Northern 
Ireland state in facilitating the outbreak of the Troubles. Kevin Grisham 
(2014) compares the Provisional IRA with the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia and the Abu Sayyaf Group, studying their transformation 
processes through a social movement analytical approach.
Another sign of the relative success of social movement scholarship in 
shaping the academic debate about Northern Ireland and the Troubles can 
be seen among several historians. The pioneering work by political historian 
Bob Purdie and his book Politics in the Streets (1990) put in the foreground 
the role of the civil rights movement, its strategies, allies, and antagonists 
in setting in motion the events leading to the Troubles. While not directly 
engaging with social movement theories, his rigorous scholarship and 
analytical focus on the emergence of the CRM and its unprecedented direct 
action campaign, prompted a new interest in the study of mass mobilization 
during the early years of the Troubles. There is hardly a social movement 
scholar studying Northern Ireland who does not hold an intellectual debt 
towards Bob Purdie and his endeavour to position processes of collective 
mobilization and the ‘politics in the streets’ of the late 1960s at the heart 
of our understanding of Troubles. Later on, political historians like Niall Ó 
Dochartaigh and Richard English have more explicitly engaged with the 
social movement literature on mobilization and political violence. In their 
histories of local conflict in Derry (Ó Dochartaigh 2005) and the interaction 
between non-violent and violent politics in Northern Ireland (English 2009), 
they grapple with social movement concepts and scholarship, injecting key 
theoretical insights into their rich historical analyses.
Volume Structure
This volume explores the intersection of social movement scholarship 
and research on divided societies by inspecting the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland. It is divided into four sections, each one devoted to investigate from 
different theoretical and methodological perspectives a specif ic aspect of 
the Troubles, from the early years of the conflict, to the post-Good Friday 
Agreement period. In particular, the four sections will examine: 1) the civil 
rights years, with a focus on the civil rights movement and its political 
context; 2) unionist and loyalist contention, dealing with both peaceful 
collective action and violent strategies inside the Protestant community; 3) 
the republican movement, analysing its trajectory, from the recruitment and 
mobilization inside prisons, to the emergence of feminist republicanism; 
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and 4) non-sectarian mobilizations, in which movements that do not and 
did not align with the ethnonational cleavage are examined. The chapters 
in the book have important theoretical and substantive implications for 
future research on social movements in divided societies and beyond.
The f irst section of the volume presents three chapters from Niall Ó 
Dochartaigh, Erin-Beth Turner and Gianluca De Fazio, and Gregory Maney. 
These opening chapters examine the relationship between the CRM and 
its larger political and media context. They grapple with how the evolution 
of the conflict shaped the movement goals, its logic of actions and policy 
impact, as well as with how the media representation of the movement 
frames affected the reputation and effectiveness of the movement. These 
chapters address key debates in social movement research on the formation 
of social movements, as well as their strategic interactions with authorities 
and the media. In Chapter 2, Ó Dochartaigh shows how, as the contentious 
context of the late 1960s was shifting, so were the goals of the CRM. Adopt-
ing a contentious politics approach, Ó Dochartaigh examines protest and 
violence as being part of a continuum of contention, each one deeply related 
to the other. In particular, Ó Dochartaigh discusses the failure by the union-
ist government to implement its reform package promised in late 1968 as the 
catalyst for increased radicalization and potential for political violence. The 
very same Five-Point Reform package proposed by the unionist government 
is one of the main focuses of Erin-Beth Turner and Gianluca De Fazio’s 
Chapter 3. Here they adopt Joseph Luders’ (2010) lucid theoretical framework 
on the logic of social change, based on the rational calculation of disruption 
and concession costs by the targets of social movement actions, and apply 
it to the context of Northern Ireland. They show how, following a rational 
cost-evaluation by O’Neill’s unionist government, only limited reforms 
could have been granted at that particular historical moment. At the same 
time, they also highlight some of the limitations of Luders framework and 
call for a more careful inspection of the role of ideology and emotions in the 
rational evaluations of policy formulations by social movement targets. In 
Chapter 4, Maney adds another important arena in the political equation 
of the civil rights years: mainstream international media. In particular, 
Maney explores the role of international coverage of the CRM in affecting its 
outcomes and the strategic responses by the unionist government, inserting 
another layer of complexity to the relational f ield.
The second section of the volume addresses a longstanding gap in the 
social movement scholarship on the Troubles: Protestant mobilization. 
While scholarship on the CRM in Northern Ireland has thrived in the last 
couple of decades, social movement research has paid only minor attention 
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to unionist and loyalist mobilization. More generally, these chapters enrich 
the growing literature on the conditions for the emergence of countermove-
ments and on disengagement from political violence. In Chapter 5, Sarah 
Campbell addresses this gap by looking at the role collective memory and 
collective identity played in facilitating and galvanizing collective action 
in the Protestant community. In particular, Campbell traces the trajectory 
of Protestant mobilization from the reaction to the CRM in the late 1960s, 
through the Ulster Workers’ Council strike in 1974 that paralyzed Northern 
Ireland, up to the (ultimately failed) ‘Ulster Says No!’ campaign against the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. In Chapter 6, Neil Ferguson and James W. 
McAuley explore the role of collective identity among loyalists in joining 
and later abandoning political violence. They analyse the narratives former 
loyalist paramilitaries exposed during in-depth qualitative interviews, in 
which they recount how they joined those organizations.
The third section of the volume zooms into the Irish republican move-
ment from different historical and theoretical perspectives. In their respec-
tive chapters, Robert W. White and Tijen Demirel-Pegg, Denis O’Hearn, 
and Theresa O’Keefe examine the internal dynamics of the movement, 
as they deal with issues of recruitment from a longitudinal angle (White 
and Demirel-Pegg), the development of mobilization in the H-Block prison 
(O’Hearn), and the emergence and impact of radical feminism within re-
publicanism in Northern Ireland (O’Keefe). All these chapters contribute 
to our understanding of the internal functioning of high-risk movements, 
from activists’ differential motivations for participation, to conflicts over 
strategy and agenda setting. In Chapter 7, White and Demirel-Pegg dissect 
the issue of recruitment within the larger republican movement through in-
depth interviews with activists who have joined the movement at different 
historical stages, some of them participating in the armed struggle. They 
explain the transformation of the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin during 
the Troubles, as well as the emergence of post-Good Friday Agreement 
republican dissidents who refused to abandon political violence. In Chapter 
8, O’Hearn explores the relationship between republican prisoners and 
the outside republican movement. In particular, O’Hearn explores how 
solitary confinement in the infamous H-Blocks produced solidarity and 
facilitated the unlikely emergence of protest within a total institution such 
as prison. The analysis focuses specif ically on the interaction between 
the successes of protest inside the H-Blocks (especially the ‘blanketmen’ 
protests against prison authorities) and the mobilizing capabilities of the 
movement outside (and vice versa). It also investigates the conflict inside 
the republican movement, as the external leadership tried to control and 
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direct the protests inside the H-Block, without success. In Chapter 9, O’Keefe 
inspects an overlooked aspect of the republican movement: republican 
feminism. O’Keefe describes how the experience of conflict and violence 
among some republican women generated a unique, even radical form 
of feminism. In-depth interviews with women active in the republican 
movement, including some who engaged in political violence, detail how 
these women developed a feminist sense of self and a collective feminist 
identity. This collective identity nurtured a subversive politics of feminist 
resistance that challenged patriarchy both within republicanism and the 
wider Irish society.
The fourth and last section of the volume deals with movements that do 
not align with the traditional ethnonational divisions, thus operating from 
a non-sectarian platform. The two chapters from John Nagle and Lee A. 
Smithey directly address the issue of how the construction, maintenance, 
and transformation of collective identity affect social movements and 
their political context. In Chapter 10, Nagle compares non-sectarian social 
movements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, two emblematic divided 
societies. Ethnic identities are obviously central organizing principles for 
contentious politics in these divided societies; however, activists’ efforts to 
challenge these identities and provide alternative sources of mobilization 
are an extremely signif icant subject of study. Two types of non-sectarian 
mobilizations can be identif ied: transformationist movements that seek to 
transform ethnic identities, and pluralist ones that strive to make the society 
more receptive to alternative identities. Nagle argues that the power-sharing 
agreements that rule Northern Ireland and Lebanon are the main factors 
determining the predominance of one type of movement over the other. 
Chapter 11 by Smithey focuses on an explicitly non-sectarian movement 
active in Northern Ireland in the late 1970s: the Peace People movement. 
The study of the Peace People movement allows the investigation of the life 
cycle of a non-sectarian movement and the unique challenges it has to face 
by operating in the context of a deeply divided society. Contrarily to loyalist 
and republican movements, the Peace People movement adopted non-
violent praxes, countering all political violence and inciting the emergence 
of a non-sectarian, unifying identity for all Northern Ireland people.
All the chapters in this volume share the goal to explore the multifaceted 
nature of the Troubles through a social movement perspective. The analyti-
cal payoff of this rich theoretical perspective is to dissect the ethnonational 
divide in Northern Ireland, the societal structure within which contentious 
politics developed into the Troubles, while focusing on its actors, their 
strategies, identities, interactions, motivation, conflicts, and outcomes. 
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Differently positioned within (or consciously outside) the ethnonational 
cleavage and its organizations and institutions, political actors at the micro, 
meso, and macro level interpreted their situations, estimated opportunities, 
threats, acted on them, while transforming themselves and the political 
system. Also, in this perspective political violence is not an intrinsic fea-
ture of certain groups or the inexorable product of social structures, but 
is a contested strategic option that can be perceived as palatable or even 
inevitable according to changing temporal or spatial circumstances. The 
ultimate contribution of the social movement approach, and we hope of 
this volume, is to illuminate how these messy and contradictory processes 
can unfold and inform contentious politics in Northern Ireland, as well as 
other intricate divided political contexts.
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2 What Did the Civil Rights Movement 
Want?
Changing Goals and Underlying Continuities in the 
Transition from Protest to Violence
Niall Ó Dochartaigh
Introduction
Early social movement research tended to draw a sharp distinction between 
peaceful protest and armed conflict. One consequence of this was that 
social movement researchers tended to focus on stable democratic societies 
rather than divided societies where political violence was an important part 
of the repertoire of contention. This sharp distinction between protest and 
political violence has been strongly challenged over the past two decades by 
research that locates both forms of contention within a broader continuum 
of contentious politics and explores the strong links and continuities 
between them. Della Porta’s groundbreaking work on the transition from 
protest to violence in 1970s Germany and Italy (1995) was one of the f irst 
studies to show just how intimately they were interrelated. Robert White’s 
work on the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (1989) was one of the 
earliest social movement analyses of these links in the Irish context. The 
development of the contentious politics frame (see, for example, McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2007) has reinforced this 
understanding. As Tilly (2003: 238) puts it:
[C]ollective violence […] emerges from the ebb and f low of collective 
claim making and struggles for power. It interweaves incessantly with 
nonviolent politics […] and changes as a consequence of essentially the 
same causes that operate in the nonviolent zones of collective political 
life.
A growing body of work in recent years demonstrates the very close links 
between protest and subsequent outbreaks of violence, the persistence of 
peaceful protest tactics alongside the use of violence, and the important 
continuities in terms of social relations and political dynamics (for a review, 
see Bosi and Malthaner 2015).
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Despite this, the literature continues to see a sharp distinction between 
protests and political violence in certain respects. Political violence seems 
to be accompanied by radically different aims and goals. Protests seeking 
reform and amelioration of grievances within existing structures give 
way to violent groups with strong ideologies and demands for dramatic 
territorial and constitutional change. This argument has frequently been 
made in analyses of the shift from civil rights protest to republican armed 
struggle in Northern Ireland after 1969. Modest demands for reform in 
housing allocation, the franchise and employment discrimination were 
replaced by the aim of reunifying Ireland and expelling the British state 
from Northern Ireland. Armed organizations might have emerged from a 
context of peaceful protest but their goals seemed to indicate a sharp break 
rather than continuity with the goals of protestors.
This chapter re-examines and reassesses the aims and goals of the civil 
rights movement and f inds surprising continuities in goals between these 
two different phases of contention. It argues that these continuities are 
directly related to the distinctive political dynamics at work in divided 
societies where differential access to state power and institutions is at the 
heart of political disagreement and conflict.
The chapter begins by outlining contemporary debates on the character, 
sincerity, and material basis of the movement’s goals and aims and the way 
in which those debates were linked to wider struggles over the allocation of 
political responsibility for the turn to violence. These debates shaped the 
f irst wave of academic analysis of the civil rights movement’s goals. The 
chapter outlines how this f irst wave of scholarship on movement aims has 
been augmented in recent years by a large body of new work within the 
social movement tradition. This more recent work emphasizes political 
process and the dynamic and contested character of movement goals. The 
chapter then examines the importance of two major continuities in the 
goals of the movement, relating to repression and to the institutionaliza-
tion of the power of the minority. It examines the extent to which these 
goals were present before mass mobilization and continued to be central to 
the programmes of armed republican organizations after the outbreak of 
violence. It explains the failure of reform and the transition to violence as 
the result, in part, of the failure of the movement to achieve these underlying 
goals. Finally, it looks at the way in which Provisional IRA negotiating 
positions during the conflict show surprisingly strong continuity with key 
underlying aims of the civil rights movement.
The chapter is based on extensive empirical research by the author 
over the course of more than two decades, including interviews with civil 
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rights activists, former IRA members, unionist and nationalist politicians 
and intermediaries; newspaper coverage in local newspapers; the private 
papers of republican leaders and intermediaries; and a wide range of 
ephemeral primary sources. This includes an exhaustive study of coverage 
of the civil rights campaign and the escalation of violence (1968-1972) in 
two local newspapers in Derry, the capital city of the civil rights campaign. 
These two local newspapers, the Derry Journal and the Londonderry 
Sentinel, catered to nationalist and unionist audiences respectively and 
act as an important check on each other. Primary sources that inform the 
chapter also include documentation on the IRA’s goals and negotiating 
positions over the course of the conflict drawn from private papers and 
state archives. Sources are described in more detail in Ó Dochartaigh 
(1999, 2005, 2011, 2015).
Debating the Goals of the Movement
As the civil rights movement reached the peak of its inf luence in late 
1968 questions about its goals were posed with increasing urgency. What 
would satisfy the protestors? What would bring an end to the agitation 
and restore order and stability? The argument that the movement had 
secured its goals and that the primary responsibility of its leadership was 
to secure demobilization and work to stabilize a reformed Northern Ireland 
emerged at a very early stage. After the f irst reforms in November 1968, for 
example, the liberal Church of Ireland Bishop of Derry Charles Tyndall was 
‘quite happy [that] everything seems to have come to a peaceful conclusion’ 
and ‘hoped it would stay that way’ (Derry Journal 1968). When protests 
continued into 1969, and were increasingly associated with violent rioting, 
liberal unionists argued that the demands of the movement had now been 
met and that there remained no legitimate cause for complaint. After the 
deployment of British troops and the direct involvement of the British 
government in August 1969 a more far-reaching reform programme was 
introduced. When the IRA subsequently re-emerged as a major force, the 
British government moved closer to the unionist position that the goals of 
the civil rights movement had been met.
The liberal unionist and British government argument that the goals 
of the movement were limited and reformist, seeking only to remedy 
egregious abuses, found a strange echo at the other end of the political 
spectrum. Republicans who subsequently launched an armed campaign to 
end British rule also argued that protestors had only been ‘looking for their 
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rights’, seeking an end to discrimination and exclusion. The repression 
of the civil rights movement and resistance to its limited demands were 
used by republicans as evidence that peaceful protest was not effective 
and to justify the IRA campaign. As Gerry Adams puts it: ‘The civil rights 
movement had been looking for democratisation of the state, but the 
state had made abundantly clear the fact that it would not and could 
not implement democratic reforms’ (Adams 1986: 34). According to this 
version the protestors were seeking only universal rights but were beaten 
off the streets. The reforms that did come were too little too late. When 
the British Army was deployed it became implicated in this repression, 
upholding the power of a sectarian state. Where liberal unionists and 
British ministers characterized repression as regrettable and responsive, 
republicans focused on repression as the arena in which civil liberties were 
f louted most egregiously and f lagrantly. The anti-internment marches 
by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) in late 1971 
and early 1972 are seen from this perspective as fully continuous with 
the early civil rights mobilization. And the killing of thirteen civilians 
by British soldiers at the NICRA march on Bloody Sunday in 1972 is seen 
as the apotheosis of the state’s repressive response to mass civil rights 
mobilization.
Liberal unionists and the British government disagreed with republicans 
on the relationship between the civil rights agenda and the subsequent 
violence but they shared the same view of the movement’s initial goals and 
aims. A quite different view of these aims was expressed in the contem-
porary loyalist placards proclaiming ‘IRA = CRA’. Unionist right-wingers 
argued that civil rights was a front for the IRA and viewed the movement as 
dishonest and deceitful. As one prominent unionist put it: ‘[T]he civil rights 
movement was seen as a Trojan horse or stalking horse for Republicanism’ 
(Clifford Smyth, quoted in Maney 2007: 22).
They argued that the movement’s true goals, to weaken the Unionist gov-
ernment, destroy Northern Ireland, and reunify Ireland, were deliberately 
concealed. The fact that violence escalated despite reform was confirmation 
of this insincerity.
This view f inds a strange echo at the far end of the spectrum, from 
left-wing radicals such as Eamonn McCann who emphasized far-reaching 
goals of social transformation and deliberately sought to provoke a repres-
sive state reaction in order to radicalize people (McCann 1993). These 
contrasting contemporary analyses of the movement’s goals, as limited 
and reformist or covertly radical, set the terms for subsequent academic 
debate.
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From Conspiracy Theory to Political Process Theory
Scholarly debate on the goals of the movement moved through two distinct 
phases. The f irst phase began with Paul Arthur’s 1974 study The People’s 
Democracy and was subsequently dominated by John Whyte’s key article on 
discrimination (1983) and exchanges between Hewitt (1981, 1983), O’Hearn 
(1983), and Kovalcheck (1987) in the British Journal of Sociology. Debates 
centred on the sincerity and the substance of the movement’s declared 
aims. Hewitt argued that demands for reform masked a nationalist agenda:
Since many nationalists believed that a separate ‘Six County’ state could 
not survive if Catholics ‘got their rights’ we can explain why they joined 
the civil rights movement. They were not implicitly accepting partition 
by demanding civil rights but instead confident that this was the strategy 
which would end partition. (Hewitt 1981: 374)
Hewitt argued too that the grievances the movement articulated were 
unfounded or grossly exaggerated: ‘one must abandon the position that 
Catholics were severely discriminated against in Northern Ireland’ (1981: 
368). O’Hearn’s reply focused accordingly on the question of whether 
discrimination did indeed take place, an issue addressed too in Whyte’s 
(1983) ‘How Much Discrimination Was There under the Unionist Regime?’ 
Whyte concluded in his f irmly understated way that serious discrimination 
had indeed taken place, but that it was concentrated in Unionist-controlled 
local authority areas west of the Bann.
The second element in this debate – the sincerity of the movement’s 
stated aims – was f irst addressed forensically in Bob Purdie’s 1988 article 
‘Was the Civil Rights Campaign a Republican/Communist Conspiracy?’ The 
question of the ‘real’ goals of the movement and their relationship to the 
subsequent IRA campaign were dealt with at greater length in his Politics 
in the Streets (1990). Purdie was the f irst to systematically and convincingly 
demonstrate the extent of republican involvement. More recently, Maney’s 
analysis of more than 200 civil rights events has established that republicans 
were involved in organizing almost 80 per cent of them (2007: 20). These 
f indings are unsettling for those who seek to put clear blue water between 
the civil rights movement and the IRA. Purdie also found, however, that 
republicans did not see the movement as a means to prepare the ground 
for an armed campaign by the IRA (1990: 129-130). In fact, for many of the 
Marxist republican enthusiasts for civil rights it was conceived as part of 
a broader shift away from militarism and towards broad-based political 
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activism, even if they still aimed for the reunif ication of Ireland in the 
long-term.
Although radical forces were involved and never abandoned their long-
term aims, their immediate ambitions for the movement were quite limited 
and reformist. Brian Hanley has recently brought to light an important new 
source of information on IRA thinking during this period, a report of a meet-
ing in County Tipperary in August 1967 of 25 IRA off icers, ‘including almost 
all the IRA’s leading f igures’ (Hanley 2013). One of them, Liam McMillen, 
was actually a member of the NICRA executive but the civil rights campaign 
was not even discussed at the meeting. There is little sense in these minutes 
that the IRA leaders regarded the civil rights movement as a particularly 
promising or important initiative or that they felt they were on the verge of 
a major political transformation. And there is no indication that the civil 
rights association formed any signif icant part of their military thinking.
This f irst phase in the academic debate concluded therefore that there 
was at least some substance to the grievances and goals of the movement. 
It demonstrated that republicans were more deeply involved than was 
acknowledged at the time but this did not mean that their support for 
the reformist goals of the movement was insincere or that reform was not 
significant and important to them in its own right. In confirming the extent 
of republican involvement in the movement, it did, however, undermine 
the argument that these two phases of contention – civil rights and the IRA 
campaign – were separate and distinct phenomena.
The last ten to f ifteen years has seen a second wave of scholarship on the 
civil rights movement (Bosi 2006, 2007, 2008, 2016; De Fazio 2007; Hancock 
2014; Maney 2000, 2007, 2012a, 2012b; Ó Dochartaigh 1999, 2005; Ó Dochar-
taigh and Bosi 2010; Prince 2007; Prince and Warner 2012). Much of this 
work focuses on key debates in the social movement literature, analysing 
the dynamics of mobilization, the diffusion of repertoires of contention, and 
looking at the relationship between protest and political violence. It includes 
comparative work on the US Civil Rights Movement which provides a kind 
of academic echo of the political comparisons made at the time (Dooley 
1998; De Fazio 2009).
This work is characterized by a focus on process and on the dynamic and 
shifting character of the movement. It demonstrates that there were shifts in 
the composition of the leadership and in grass-roots support but there were 
shifts too in the movement’s demands and goals. Bosi (2006: 83), for example, 
argues that a shift in structural conditions after the Second World War 
‘created conditions in which the CRM’s initial reformist message (1960-1968) 
was able to resonate with selected segments of Northern Irish society’ but 
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that ‘sectarian cleavages in Northern Ireland reasserted themselves, and 
this led to the privileging of an antisystem master frame’ by 1968. Maney, 
similarly references political process theory and emphasizes the changing 
political opportunity structure, arguing that: ‘trajectories of contention alter 
the stated objectives and forms of collective action of insurgents’ (2007: 5).
This work stresses that the civil rights movement was a site of struggle 
between political actors with competing agendas. The formal goals of the 
movement reflected a compromise between competing political forces, a 
product of complexity and struggle rather than conspiracy or insincerity. 
Bosi puts it clearly:
[I]deologically diverse groups of activists began to forge new ties and 
relationships that spanned several groups in order to ‘symbolically pro-
duce’ a reformist mobilizing message of civil rights, social justice, and 
progressive politics, rather than getting mired in time-worn discussions 
about partition. (2006: 86)
In these circumstances we would not expect the stated goals to reflect the 
full extent of the political aims of those involved in the movement. They 
were a lowest common denominator around which all could unite. From 
this perspective, violence emerged as part of an unpredictably unfolding 
process in which expectations, demands, goals and political priorities all 
changed in response to circumstances. As violence and confrontation with 
the RUC and loyalists escalated through 1969, the movement’s supporters 
and leaders focused increasingly on the issue of repression and Unionist 
political control. As Bosi puts it:
Mobilizing messages […] are social constructions reflecting complex in-
teractions between signif icant actors in the political system. They do not 
simply exist a priori in a condition of stasis but they change repeatedly, 
generating identity shifts, collective redef initions of opportunities, new 
alliance structures, strategy changes, and goal transformations. (2006: 83)
Bosi et al. (2014) identify movement-state interaction as one of the four 
processes that are crucial in radicalization and the transition from protest to 
political violence. It was direct confrontation with the unionist government 
and with state forces on the streets that brought the issues of repression 
and unionist political control to the fore.
This process was further intensif ied by loyalist counterdemonstrations 
which greatly increased the opportunities for violent confrontation. On 
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several occasions the security forces were seen to facilitate loyalist violence 
or even to work in tandem with loyalist civilians, at Burntollet in January 
1969 and in Derry in August 1969, for example. De Fazio, who emphasizes the 
importance of interaction with counter-movement activists in radicaliza-
tion, argues that these confrontations ‘prompted an object shift among activ-
ists, as loyalist violence on civil rights demonstrations helped to displace 
the initial reformist agenda of the CRM’ (2013: 484; emphasis in original).
The focus on repression and political control rather than discrimination 
and voting rights was the direct outcome of interaction with the state during 
the process of mobilization. But although these issues took on a new urgency 
and prominence during the campaign, they were not entirely new issues and 
the continuities here are just as important as the changes. The following 
sections trace the continuities in the aims of the civil rights movement as 
they related to those two key issues of state repression and the exclusion 
of the minority from political power.
Challenging Repression
At the peak of its influence the civil right movement was identif ied with 
two main goals: reform of the franchise (‘one man one vote’) and an end 
to discrimination in housing and employment. The NICRA constitution of 
1967 makes no explicit mention of either voting rights or discrimination, 
however. Its f ive objectives were stated in rather general terms:
(1) To defend the basic freedoms of all citizens. (2) To protect the rights of 
the individual. (3) To highlight all possible abuses of power. (4) To demand 
guarantees for freedom of speech, assembly and association. (5) To inform 
the public of their lawful rights. (Purdie 1990: 133)
We might reasonably argue that discrimination and the franchise were 
implicit in NICRA’s aims of ‘highlighting all possible abuses of power’ and 
‘protecting the rights of individuals’ but it is striking nonetheless that the 
word ‘discrimination’ is not used once. One demand is, however, spelled out 
in quite specif ic terms – for ‘freedom of speech, assembly and association’. 
While there is a tendency sometimes to pass quickly over this, it indicates 
that repression and state restrictions on protest were a central issue even 
before the marching campaign began.
The Unionist government enjoyed extensive repressive powers under the 
Special Powers Act, including internment and the power to ban assemblies, 
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marches, publications, and parties. These powers had a freezing effect that 
was combined with occasional violent repression to control and restrict 
oppositional protest. Successful state repression of nationalist and repub-
lican demonstrations and protests in the 1950s and 1960s closed down the 
space for the opposition to exert pressure outside the formal parliamentary 
system. When the Nationalist Party tried to march in Derry city centre in 
1952, for example, the march was banned and then broken up violently 
by an RUC baton charge (Derry Journal 1952). One consequence of such 
demonstrations of police force was a great reluctance to defy these bans. 
The next march to defy a ban in Derry was the civil rights march of October 
1968 whose violent dispersal marked the beginning of the conflict.
Republican parades took place at Easter every year throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s but were banned from urban centres and often hedged about by 
restrictions on the display of symbols and on the routes they could follow. 
Sometimes they were banned outright, as in 1967 when Stormont banned 
the centenary commemorations of the Fenian Rising of 1867 (Purdie 1990: 
134). The official history of NICRA states that the association began to realise 
in early 1968 ‘that a ban on demonstrations was an effective government 
weapon against political protest’ and that marches would provide a more 
effective way of exerting political pressure than letter-writing (Purdie 1990: 
135). The importance attached to challenging restrictions on protest was 
emphasized in spring 1968, a few months before NICRA organized its f irst 
march. In April 1968, republicans successfully defied a Unionist government 
ban on the annual Easter parade in Armagh. At around the same time 
republicans pressed for NICRA to begin a campaign of protest marches 
(Hanley 2013). The marching campaign was aimed in part at pushing back 
against state limitations on protest and asserting the right to protest. The 
banning of marches and the def iance of such bans were not therefore 
incidental to the campaign for civil rights. Challenging the restrictions on 
protest and clearing the political space for the use of mass mobilization to 
exert political pressure was one of the key goals of many of those within 
the civil rights movement. It was explicitly stated in that NICRA aim of 
‘freedom of speech, assembly and association’.
From the moment that the RUC baton-charged the march in Derry in 
October 1968 repression of protest became the central mobilizing issue (Ó 
Dochartaigh 2005: 291-292). Grievances surrounding discrimination and 
the franchise had mobilized very small numbers of activists in the previous 
years. The baton charge, however, immediately sparked off large-scale street 
rioting in the Bogside and spurred thousands of people to turn up at public 
meetings and join subsequent protests. The issue of repression, of how the 
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state treated oppositional forces associated with the minority community, 
generated mass mobilization in a way that no other issue could. It generated 
‘moral outrage’ (Wood 2003) in a much more immediate and visceral way 
than the obscure workings of the franchise and housing discrimination.
By 1969, a grudging start had been made in addressing the franchise 
and housing discrimination, but the problem of state repression had been 
exacerbated immeasurably. The breakdown of order, the failure of police 
reform, and the militarization of policing in nationalist areas preceded the 
IRA campaign and the failure to resolve these issues opened up the political 
space for that campaign.
Now that repression had been placed at the heart of the political debate 
and its effectiveness eroded through mass mobilization by the minority 
population, how was order to be maintained? Those who argued that de-
mands had been met and that protest should be ended provided one answer 
– renewed quiescence. This brings us to the second of those continuities in 
the goals of the movement.
Institutionalizing Oppositional Power
The argument that the civil rights movement aspired to relatively minor 
adjustments to Unionist rule obscures one of its most important goals. 
The various wings of the civil rights movement had different visions of the 
future, different strategic priorities, and different ideological preferences 
but for all of them a central element in that vision of transformation was 
the ending of the Unionist Party’s 50-year monopoly of political power in 
Northern Ireland. Ending that domination, rather than simply presenting 
a fleeting challenge to it, would require some kind of institutionalization 
of oppositional power.
The civil rights movement stretched well beyond nationalists and 
republicans. Northern Ireland Labour Party and Liberal Party activists 
played a prominent role along with Marxists of several different varieties, 
from both Catholic and Protestant backgrounds. It was not a nationalist 
movement but it was nonetheless a movement that challenged unionist 
domination and the unionist monopoly on political power. This was one 
of the main reasons why even liberal unionists steered clear of it. There 
was a Young Unionist Party member on the f irst NICRA executive but not 
on any subsequent executive, and there were no Unionist Party members 
in the Derry activist groups or the Campaign for Social Justice. Protestant 
activists in the movement such as Ivan Cooper of the Labour Party or Claude 
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Wilton of the Liberals belonged to a broader unionist cultural community 
but they were anti-unionist in the sense that the Unionist Party was their 
primary political opponent. Although the different wings of the movement 
envisaged different paths by which the Unionist Party’s monopoly on power 
might be broken, this aim nonetheless provided a unifying focus for almost 
all of those involved.
One possible route was through the building of an anti-unionist electoral 
coalition. This was precisely the role that some Marxist republicans saw 
for the civil rights movement and social agitation in general. Protestants 
would unite with Catholics on social issues and eventually form an anti-
Unionist majority in parliament. Unionist domination would be ended and 
oppositional power institutionalized through the electoral system. This was 
not a narrow nationalist vision but a vision of Catholic and Protestant unity 
based on a shared goal of social transformation. The ending of Unionist 
Party domination was nonetheless at its centre.
The alliance of republicans and left-wing activists in Derry from the 
early 1960s focused on a variety of social issues and their agenda looked 
quite different to that of NICRA. They invoked the rhetoric of civil rights 
as early as 1963 and 1964 but their primary concerns were poor housing 
and high unemployment and they were driven by much broader goals of 
social transformation.
These activists asserted their independence from communal loyalties 
by stressing that they opposed both ‘Green’ and ‘Orange’ Tories, both the 
Nationalist Party and the Unionists. But the ‘Green Tories’ were a perma-
nently marginalized, ineffectual, and demoralized opposition party with 
no power whatsoever. Ending ‘Tory’ power meant above all ending Unionist 
Party domination of government and politics. While Labour Marxists and 
republican Marxists differed in their views on the relative importance 
and signif icance of Irish reunif ication in this process, neither faction was 
seeking simply to end the most egregious abuses of the system. They sought 
a much broader social transformation, central to which was the ending of 
the frozen politics of the North and the domination of the Unionist Party.
As violence escalated the various forces that had united in the civil 
rights movement began to reformulate their goals. After British troops 
were deployed in August 1969, local defence committees demanded the 
abolition of the Stormont parliament as a condition for the removal of the 
barricades. By the early 1970s both the SDLP and Provisional republicans 
were demanding an end to unionist domination through the transformation 
of structures of government. The SDLP worked towards power-sharing 
arrangements that would guarantee the representation of the Catholic 
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minority in the North’s government along with all-Ireland structures that 
would give a role to the Irish government. Provisional republicans also 
sought the abolition of the Unionist-controlled parliament at Stormont. 
They wanted to institutionalize oppositional power and the position of the 
nationalist minority through a reunif ication of Ireland that would make 
Northern Catholics once again part of an all-Ireland nationalist majority. 
From the perspective of many unionists this shift from a demand for the 
ending of discrimination to demands for institutional transformation was 
evidence that the movement had concealed its true goals. These shifts took 
place in response to rapidly changing and dramatic events. But they also 
reflect deep underlying continuities. From the beginning forces within 
the civil rights movement sought to bring an end to Unionist one-party 
domination.
The Failure of Institutionalization
The f irst reform programme was announced by the Unionist government 
in November 1968 under intense pressure from the British Prime Minister, 
Harold Wilson. Key reforms included the abolition of Derry Corporation, 
the end of restrictions on the franchise for elections to Stormont, and the 
introduction of a points system for housing (see Turner and De Fazio, in 
this volume).
One major problem with these changes was that the Unionist Party 
remained securely in control of government with only one significant threat 
to its parliamentary majority – the threat from the unionist right. This 
dynamic ensured that reforms were minimized for fear of losing right-wing 
unionist support. For example, the reforms included a points system for 
allocating public housing but left it up to local authorities to devise their 
own systems. Most importantly, this package did not end the restricted 
franchise in local government and included no measures that would actu-
ally guarantee the end of unionist control of districts where nationalists 
were a majority, except for Derry where a development commission was to 
take charge. The second diff iculty was reversibility. All of the important 
levers of power remained in the hands of the Unionist Party. When local 
government was re-organized, when new ward boundaries were drawn, 
when decisions were made on how much power local authorities would 
have, Stormont would decide. If opposition parties won control of more local 
authorities the Unionist Party could ensure that important powers were 
moved to Stormont where oppositional forces were a permanent minority. 
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This would be diff icult if there was intense scrutiny and direct pressure 
from the British government of the kind that was applied during the civil 
rights campaign. But this was a big if. The British government had breached 
the convention that Westminster should not interfere but this change was 
not put on any f irm institutional footing. British involvement would only 
be assured if there was continuing disorder and pressure from oppositional 
forces in the North.
McAdam points out that the key problem facing actors outside the politi-
cal system ‘is to devise some way to overcome the basic powerlessness’ of 
their position. Mass mobilization can do this but it is very difficult to sustain 
over the long term and for a movement to survive ‘it must either parlay its 
initial successes into positions of institutionalized power […] or continue to 
experiment with non-institutional forms of protest’ (McAdam 1983: 735). If 
the campaign subsided now before there were major changes to the system 
of government it could prove extremely diff icult to get the British govern-
ment to intervene in a similarly decisive way in the future. And if sections 
of the movement were co-opted through a limited institutionalization 
of their power that left existing power structures intact it could split the 
movement and remove the more moderate voices.
The most important way in which the power of the civil rights movement 
was institutionalized was through the setting up of the Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP) in 1970. It was set up by civil rights leaders such 
as John Hume and Ivan Cooper who had been elected to the Stormont 
parliament in 1969 along with other MPs who had supported the movement. 
But the limits of parliamentary power were illustrated at a very early stage. 
In spring 1969 Hume and Cooper announced that they no longer supported 
street protest due to the increasing likelihood of violence. Instead, they 
would move their activism into the parliamentary arena. Their f irst major 
stand in parliament was to oppose the Unionist government’s new public 
order bill which outlawed a range of protest tactics, including sit-downs. But 
the unionist government had the same secure majority that it had enjoyed 
for the previous half century and the bill passed. The failure of parliamen-
tary opposition in this case indicated that without a transformation of 
political structures, or ongoing pressure on the streets, unionist power could 
be restored and reinforced. It made clear the limits of British willingness to 
intervene on behalf of the nationalist minority. The power of the moderates 
within the civil rights movement had been institutionalized in parliament. 
But because this process was not accompanied by institutional change it 
served mainly to highlight the limits of this form of institutionalization. 
This form of co-optation separated moderates from more radical sections 
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of the movement rather than providing the basis for the co-optation of the 
movement as a whole (Bosi 2016).
The subsequent escalation was a consequence in part of what Maney 
(2012b) has called the ‘paradox of reform’ whereby reforms that are slowly 
and reluctantly conceded serve to demobilize moderate elements within a 
protest movement. But because reforms are limited, potentially reversible, 
slowly implemented, and accompanied by a violent counter-movement back-
lash, those who remain active are more likely to be convinced of the value 
of armed action. Turner and De Fazio (in this volume) further illuminate 
this dialectic between reform, counter-movement violence, and escalation. 
They describe how the Unionist government attempted ‘to navigate high 
disruption and concession costs by alternating limited concessions and 
repression […] a rational response to a very vulnerable political situation’.
This f irst wave of reforms did nothing to address the issue of repression 
and in fact intensif ied the restrictions on protest. The next major wave of 
reforms would address this issue directly, however. In August 1969 the Un-
ionist government requested the deployment of British troops on the streets 
to restore order because their own coercive capacity had been exhausted. 
The price of assistance was a major reform package, including reform of 
policing. It also saw a strengthening of the British government’s role in 
Northern Ireland with the appointment of a UK representative to liaise with 
the Unionist government. This was reinforced by the appointment of senior 
British off icials to oversee police reform and of an English policeman, Sir 
Arthur Young, as Chief Constable of the RUC. The UK representative Oliver 
Wright now began to consult regularly with Cardinal Conway, the Armagh-
based Primate of All Ireland, thus opening up a channel of communication 
with elements of the Catholic minority (Patterson 2008).
In the face of unionist and loyalist resistance, however, the British 
government retreated from its ambitious programme of change, allow-
ing Stormont to reverse the effect of some of the most important reforms 
(Ó Dochartaigh 2016; Maney 2007: 17-18). The impact of the single most 
important reform – the disarming of the RUC – was entirely nullif ied by 
the intensif ied militarization of policing through deployment of the British 
Army in nationalist areas. Minority political influence remained very weak 
after these reforms, even as repression, the primary mobilizing issue of the 
civil rights movement, became an ever more urgent issue. The Sunningdale 
power-sharing initiative in 1973-1974 failed due to unionist and loyalist 
opposition and continued IRA violence and it would take almost 30 years 
before a system that gave institutionalized political power to the Catholic 
minority was established on a f irm footing (Bosi 2016: 354-355).
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The Civil Rights Movement and the Goals of the IRA
On the face of it, the Provisional IRA, which escalated its violence from 1970 
onwards, had completely different aims to the civil rights movement, seek-
ing to expel the British state by force and reunite Ireland as an independent 
republic. But while these ultimate aims served to keep the movement united 
and to motivate armed activists, the negotiating positions the republican 
leadership adopted during the conflict show very strong continuities with 
the underlying concerns that had driven the civil rights mobilization. One 
striking illustration of this is the front page of An Phoblacht, the weekly 
newspaper of the movement, on 24 December 1972. At the height of the IRA’s 
violence, the paper chose to blazon across its front page four preconditions 
for the end of the IRA campaign:
WE DEMAND
Abolition of Repressive Legislation
British Troops be Withdrawn
Release of All Political Prisoners
Full Support for Civil Rights
Then – and only then – will we have a true and lasting peace in Ireland. 
(An Phoblacht 1972)
There is no mention here of Irish unif ication, of self-determination, or of 
core republican ideological positions. It does not mean that the movement 
had abandoned its goals of Irish unity and sovereignty. The republican 
leadership was seeking to provide space for a negotiated settlement with the 
British government in which they would have to compromise on ideologi-
cal goals. But it is striking that in formulating their negotiating position 
they stripped it back to a set of issues that resonated very strongly with 
the original concerns of the civil rights movement and its focus on state 
repression. None of the demands directly involved Irish self-determination. 
These limited bargaining positions co-existed with strongly ideological and 
uncompromising rhetoric that suggested that the movement did indeed 
have completely different aims to those that underlay the civil rights 
mobilization. But this strong rhetoric had multiple functions. It was used 
to keep the movement united and ideologically coherent, to sustain morale 
and support, and to strengthen its bargaining position with the British 
state by presenting the movement as strong and confident. In a situation 
of violent conflict where people are risking their lives to pursue political 
goals, an ambitious transformative political programme is important in 
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motivating activists. But the fact that the IRA’s bargaining position was so 
dominated by key issues that motivated the civil rights mobilization show 
that the highly ideological rhetoric of the IRA obscured deep continuities 
in goals and aims with the civil rights mobilization that preceded it.
Conclusion
The debate on the goals of the civil rights movement is connected to much 
broader questions in the social movement literature about the relationship 
between peaceful protest and political violence in cycles of contention. For 
many who seek to assert the peacefulness and legitimacy of the civil rights 
movement it has been important to draw a sharp distinction between 
these two phases. The way in which the goals of the civil rights movement 
developed and changed as confrontation intensified demonstrates, however, 
just how tightly and intimately linked these two phases were, as does the 
negotiating position the IRA adopted during its armed campaign.
It is widely agreed now in the social movement literature that protest 
and political violence can usefully be analysed as part of a continuum of 
contention. In understanding the transition from one phase to the next the 
discussion of movement aims and goals tends to focus primarily on change. 
Demands for reform are displaced by calls for revolutionary transformation. 
Interaction with the state, and with counter-movement forces as well as intra-
party competition are important in understanding why new demands emerge 
and radicalization is defined in part by that transformation of goals and aims.
But given that the concept of continuum emphasizes the links between 
these different phases, a more systematic exploration of the continuities in 
goals and aims that run through these different phases of contention might 
enrich our understanding of this process of change. In the course of the civil 
rights campaign in Northern Ireland demands relating to discrimination 
and the restricted suffrage were superseded by the issues of repression 
and unionist political control. But these latter two issues had provided the 
deep underlying motivation for many of the movement’s founders, before 
the dramatic confrontations that brought them to the centre of debate. 
These two issues were to the fore as well in the bargaining positions the 
IRA leadership adopted in the early 1970s when it engaged directly with 
the British state.
As well as identifying the importance of these issues in the initial 
emergence of the civil rights movement we can also trace them forward 
through the following 30 years to the peace settlement of 1998. That 
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settlement rested on two pillars. The f irst was new political institutions 
which included guaranteed representation of all signif icant parties in the 
Northern Ireland government. It f irmly institutionalized the power of 
oppositional forces. The second was conflict resolution measures, including 
major reforms of policing and the withdrawal of troops from the streets. 
That is, the settlement secured an end to violent conflict by addressing 
two major issue areas that had been important to the establishment of the 
civil rights movement in the f irst place and that had become its primary 
focus by 1969.
Given how important these issues were in the settlement that brought 
a negotiated end to violence, the continuities in movement goals and de-
mands may be as important as the changes. These continuities are directly 
related to the distinctive political dynamics at work in divided societies 
where differential access to state power and institutions, and control of the 
means of legitimate coercion, are at the heart of political disagreement and 
conflict. When the legitimacy of the state is contested it calls into question 
its right to monopolise the forces of coercion. In these circumstances politi-
cal mobilization of a minority through peaceful protest is much more likely 
to be superseded by violent conflict. While violent conflict brings with it 
an escalation of demands, partly because of the intensif ied need to sustain 
morale, solidarity, and commitment in very diff icult circumstances, the 
key goals that motivated the initial protests and dominated the peaceful 
phase of contention may well remain at the heart of armed groups’ goals 
and aims, even if intensif ied rhetoric can obscure this. In excavating and 
tracing continuities in goals and aims from the earliest stages of mobiliza-
tion through the most intense phase of radicalization we might ask which 
of these goals armed militants retain from the early stages of mobilization 
and which they abandon. Research should focus especially on the negotiat-
ing positions adopted. It is only here that goals and aims crystallize in a 
way that allows us to clearly trace the continuities with previous peaceful 
phases of contention. Bargaining positions, even if they are communicated 
indirectly, and even if negotiations are tacit, provide a crucial site at which 
to understand strategic interactions between challengers and targets and to 
‘unpack the decision-making processes within movements and authorities 
alike’ (Turner and De Fazio, in this volume). Tracing these continuities might 
help to identify the underlying issues that run through all of these phases 
of mobilization, that help to power a violent challenge to the state but 
that were also present in the reformist phase and are therefore susceptible 
to resolution through negotiated compromise rather than revolutionary 
transformation.
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3 Vacillators or Resisters?
The Unionist Government Responses to the Civil Rights 
Movement in Northern Ireland
Erin-Beth Turner and Gianluca De Fazio
Introduction
How do authorities respond to social movement tactics, campaigns, and 
demands? Early research on social movement outcomes typically focused 
on the characteristics of the challengers (e.g. the size of protests, the number 
and type of tactics adopted, the goals and ideologies of protest campaigns, 
etc.) to address this key question. This strand of research aimed to analyse 
the strategies adopted by authorities to deal with protesters, from sym-
bolic concession and co-optation to resistance and outright repression, 
by examining mostly movement-centric variables (for an early review of 
this literature, see Giugni 1998). This relatively static and reactive view 
of states responses, however, has been recently challenged by various 
scholars (see Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016). A growing wealth of scholarship 
is now inspecting the strategic interactions between social movements and 
systems of authority (e.g. Duyvendak and Jasper 2015; for a review, see Bosi 
and Uba 2016), attempting to unpack the decision-making processes within 
movements and authorities alike. In The Civil Rights Movement and the Logic 
of Social Change, Joseph Luders further expanded on how to assess social 
movement outcomes by focusing on target action motivations. While not 
the f irst scholar to note the lack of target-centric theorizing (e.g. Burstein 
and Linton 2002; Andrews 2004), Luders was the f irst one to explicitly detail 
how to analyse targets’ role. Examining the Civil Rights Movement in the 
United States in the 1960s, he argued that social movement success could 
be predicted by estimating target perception of disruption and concession 
costs (Luders 2010: 1-5). He contended that both movements and third 
parties, like countermovements and the media, should be examined to 
determine the perception of costs by movement targets, differentiating 
between movement demands. Based on these assessments, targets are 
predicted to act according to one of four ideal typical responses (detailed 
below).
In this chapter, we apply Luders’ model of rational disruption and conces-
sion costs to analyse the unionist government responses to the civil rights 
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movement (CRM) in Northern Ireland. More specif ically, we adopt Luders’ 
analytic design and adapt it to the Northern Ireland context to examine 
the evolution of the Five-Point Plan put forth by Prime Minister Terence 
O’Neill in November 1968. We estimate disruption and concession costs 
of the Unionist cabinet relative to two specif ic civil rights demands (fair 
access to housing and universal suffrage), to test the empirical validity 
of the framework. Close readings of historical documents and primary 
sources unveil the decision-making process of the targets of the CRM in 
Northern Ireland.
This chapter thus transposes the analytical framework proposed by 
Luders into the novel setting of Northern Ireland. This case study raises 
important theoretical and empirical questions: was rational cost evaluation 
the primary mechanism behind target responses in Northern Ireland? 
In the context of a society riven by an ethnonational divide, are target 
decisions still mostly based on a conscious calculation of concession and 
disruption costs? Does the activation of competing ethnonational identi-
ties and claims alter the perceptions of political threats and therefore the 
ideological/emotional evaluation of concession and disruption costs by 
various state actors?
Luders’ focus on targets agenda, motivations, and rational evaluations 
represents an innovative way of looking at social movement outcomes. As 
far as we know, this chapter is the f irst attempt to inspect the consequences 
of the CRM in Northern Ireland from this original theoretical perspective. 
We believe that Luders’ framework is very promising in proposing better 
explanations of social movement outcomes, even though it requires some 
modif ications to broaden its analytical power. In particular, we will argue 
that emotional and ideological costs need to be recognized and factored 
in the decision-making processes to provide a fuller account of movement-
authorities strategic interactions.
Theoretical Framework
Luders (2006, 2010) contends that target action is motivated not by ideol-
ogy or emotion, but by a rational assessment of potential disruption and 
concession costs of different courses of action. Disruption costs are those 
directly caused by a movement: whether stemming directly or indirectly 
from social movement actions, the movement causes these costs. This 
variable measures the amount of leverage a movement has, or the amount 
of pressure it can exert on its targets. Concession costs are the ‘actual or 
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anticipated losses resulting from acceding to movement demands’ (Lud-
ers 2010: 3). The degree of vulnerability of a target is also a key factor to 
understand its calculation of costs, which explains why identical tactics 
from the same movement may affect different targets in different ways 
(Luders 2010: 7). The interactions between disruption and concession costs 
are summarized in the target classif ication matrix shown below. This table 
predicts target response, and therefore movement success, through targets’ 
perception of costs.
Table 3.1  Predicted Responses to Movement Actions
Low Concession Costs High Concession Costs
Low disruption costs Conformers: Target will 
conform to local customs.
Resisters: Target will offer 
solid resistance to move-
ment goals.
high disruption costs Accommodators: Target will 
concede to movement.
Vacillators: Target will 
oscillate between token 
concessions, negotiation 
and repression.
Source: adapted from Luders 2010: 5
Depending on the targets evaluation of concessions and disruption costs, 
four different types of responses can be predicted: Conformers, Accommo-
dators, Resisters, and Vacillators. Luders used in-depth qualitative analysis 
(internal documents, interviews, newspaper articles) to understand what 
weighs on targets in regard to specific movement demands. He analysed the 
CRM in the United States to show how different targets – be they political 
authorities (Luders 2010) or businesses (Luders 2006) – acted upon these 
costs evaluations in the decision-making process.
In his efforts to maintain target decision-making as rational, Luders, 
however, underestimates the emotional and ideological contributions to 
target actions. He aims to illustrate that targets are not monolithic politi-
cal or economic structures acting only as the system allows, nor are they 
‘irrational’ actors responding solely to prejudiced beliefs. While we agree 
that targets are comprised of a set of rational players, in much the same way 
as social movements are, to deny the ideological or emotional connections 
to or against a cause is to limit the theory’s applicability. The introduction 
of cost-benefit reasoning is necessary for understanding target reactions to 
movement tactics and, thus, predicting movement success; yet, neglecting 
the effect of ideological or emotional ties substantially weakens the model’s 
effectiveness.
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Social movement research has abundantly showed the role of emotions 
(e.g. Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2009; Flam and King 2007) and ideology 
(e.g. Oliver and Johnston 2000; Zald 2000) in movement decision-making 
processes. In fact, emotions ‘are a core part of action and decisions, which we 
analysts ignore at our peril. Actions, whether consciously made as choices 
or not, come with long lists of potential risks, costs, and benefits. We need 
to include the emotional risks, costs, and benefits because these help shape 
actions and choices’ (Jasper 2011: 298). While research applies these lenses 
almost exclusively to social movement actors, in this chapter we propose 
to examine the emotional/ideological cost of actions and decisions to state 
actors too. Rather than taking away rationality from target decision-making, 
this additional analytic dimension acknowledges that real-world decisions 
are not absolute processes, but often the result of an interactive compromise 
between ‘rational’ costs evaluations and emotional and ideological beliefs, 
thus broadening the applicability of Luders’ approach.
Methodology
The f irst step in testing a theory’s applicability is a ‘most similar’ case study 
research design (Gerring 2007). If the theory works in the new environment, 
then further stepwise-dissimilar case studies can advance the realm of its 
empirical validity (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Northern Ireland and the 
southern United States have been consistently compared within a ‘most 
similar’ case research design (see De Fazio 2009, 2012; Rose 1976), due to their 
being divided along ethnic or racial lines, respectively, making this case 
study an apt one to assess Luders’ theory. Moreover, this case is a good test 
of the analytical power of this framework, as the Five-Point Plan, the main 
object of this study, was itself the result of negotiations and concessions 
between the Stormont and Westminster cabinets. According to this and 
other perspectives emphasizing agency and strategic interaction, state 
actors should be analytically treated as ‘players’, as well as ‘arenas’ where 
conflicts and compromises are central features of the decision-making 
process (Duyvendak and Jasper 2015: 9-11). This study thus further explores 
the actor-based approach embraced in this volume, as it also tries to contex-
tualize the power dynamics behind state responses to contentious politics.
The guiding methodology for analysis in this project involves process-
tracing (Bennett 2010). Process-tracing focuses on the mechanisms of 
change within a case, herein policy reform. Using a variety of in-depth 
sources, and temporal sequencing within a clearly def ined model like 
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Luders’, process-tracing can successfully assess case variables. Typically, it 
examines intervening variables to identify a causal mechanism. However, 
this chapter applies Luders’ model to the Northern Ireland case, hence using 
process-tracing to corroborate Luders’ hypothesized causal mechanisms of 
decision-making and evaluate its strength and limitations (Bennett 2010). 
A close reading of historical documents, including cabinet documents, 
internal letters, and concurrent interviews aims to unveil the rational 
motivation behind targets’ decision-making processes and cost estimation, 
ascertaining the sources of different and countervailing pressures, and how 
reluctant government off icials perceived and acted on them. Furthermore, 
the documents and interviews demonstrate how it is the interplay of conces-
sion and disruptions costs, together with the vulnerability of the targets, 
which will determine what category the target falls into. By considering the 
interplay of pressure and relief offered to targets, a picture of each decision’s 
price in the target’s eyes will emerge.
Analysis: The Five-Point Reform Package
As Luders (2010: 7) points out, rather than viewing movements as single-goal 
monolithic entities, it is important to recognize their separate goals to properly 
estimate the specific costs perceived by targets for each movement demand. 
When it emerged in the late summer of 1968, the CRM in Northern Ireland 
had three main objectives: ending discrimination in employment, equalizing 
access to public housing for the Irish Catholic minority, and universal suffrage 
(see Ó Dochartaigh, in this volume). Here, we specifically examine the latter 
two goals, as they were strictly related. Local voting in Northern Ireland 
was ratepayer-based, thus unbiased housing allocation was vital to proper 
representation in government (Campaign for Social Justice 1969: 13).
The Civil Rights Movement Campaign
The civil rights march on 5 October 1968 and the subsequent formation of 
People’s Democracy (PD) were particularly influential in the Five-Point 
Plan’s passage. The 5 October march in Derry is commonly recognized as 
the key event in the civil rights campaign against the injustices in housing 
allocation, employment, and enfranchisement (Purdie 1990: 159). Those 
attending the march included three British Labour and Stormont MPs and 
an RTÉ television crew. Organized by the Derry Housing Action Committee 
(DHAC) and supported by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association 
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(NICRA), the march was promised retaliation by the loyalist organization 
of the Apprentice Boys of Derry (Deutsch and Magowan 1973: 10). This tactic 
was common for loyalists, as it provided the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(RUC), the police force in Northern Ireland, a reasonable prediction of 
public disruption, violence, and property damage (Farrington 2008: 529). 
For example, a civil rights march planned on 24 August 1968 was rerouted 
by the RUC and banned from entrance in most of the city of Dungannon 
(Sterritt 1968). Though billed as maintaining order,1 the CRM accused the 
RUC tactic of banning, or carefully rerouting, their marches as purposefully 
stifling the civil rights campaign.2
In a move typifying future governmental actions, on 3 October, Minister 
of Home Affairs William Craig had announced a parade ban in Derry’s 
Waterside area and city centre, utilizing the public disorder threat as a 
justif ication. NICRA and DHAC chose to continue as planned, encountering 
RUC blockades. However, what separated this interaction from a simple 
reroute were the RUC baton-charging the civil rights marchers, captured by 
the Irish RTÉ television, leading to international news coverage. The police 
brutality left several protesters injured, including MPs, and resulted in two 
days of rioting between the RUC and Derry’s Catholic residents (Deutsch 
and Magowan 1973: 10-11). International news coverage increased pressure 
on Westminster (see Maney, in this volume), and that escalating pressure 
factored prominently into the reform package’s creation and passage.
Only four days later, the student-organized PD formed in Belfast (Arthur 
1974). About 2000 students from Queen’s University of Belfast organized a 
march in response to the recent police brutality. Ian Paisley and his loyal-
ist supporters forced the already-rerouted march away from Shaftesbury 
Square, but a three-hour sit-in occurred when students met the police be-
hind City Hall, at which point Paisley also moved to City Hall. Most students 
returned to campus and decided to form PD. This increased peaceful, radical 
mobilization placed further stress on Stormont, trapped between their 
loyalist voter bloc and the movement’s ever-increasing disruption costs.3 
This latter cost would soon intensify, as the CRM proved to be capable to 
compel Westminster into action.
1 ‘Public order was kept due to the civil rights march being re-routed, a step taken solely in 
the interests of law and order […] Police intervention was based solely on their duty to keep the 
peace and not in any way on party or sectarian grounds’ (PRONI 1968c).
2 Martin Melaugh, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/crights/chron.htm. 
3 As Ó Dochartaigh noted, the civil rights ‘campaign proved impossible to repress or ignore. 
It exerted pressure on the Unionist government of Northern Ireland […] The pressure operated 
on the ground, and also via media coverage, through Westminster and Dublin’ (2005: 19). 
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As a response to the wave of civil rights contention, on 22 November 1968, 
Prime Minister O’Neill released a Five-Point Plan aiming to improve equal-
ity in housing allocation, introduce an ombudsman to deal with complaints, 
and review the Special Powers Act. The plan contained a very limited voting 
reform, as it eliminated the company vote, but failed to grant universal 
suffrage in local elections, one of the most important requests of the CRM. 
The Five-Point Plan thus sidestepped the issue of full enfranchisement, 
while allowing Stormont to claim formal support for voter equality. The 
content of these proposed reforms is also interesting because the release 
of the plan divided the CRM, emphasizing the ideological and tactical rift 
between PD and other civil rights organizations. While moderate groups 
like NICRA responded to the plan by calling a truce, PD planned a contro-
versial march (Purdie 1990: 212-213) that would contribute to radicalizing 
the political situation in Northern Ireland (De Fazio 2013, 2014; Bosi and 
Davis, forthcoming).
The Five-Point Plan: Origins and Development
On 13 November 1968, Craig announced a ban on all non-customary marches 
and parades in Derry for one month. Excluding ‘customary’ marches pro-
tected loyalist parades, thus ensuring recently established CRM marches re-
mained the true target of the ban. A later letter by the RUC’s Chief Inspector 
detailed the meeting between senior RUC officers and government officials, 
including Craig, to determine the ban’s extent. Initially, the Londonderry 
police off icers argued that ‘the march [organized by NICRA in Derry to 
take place on 16 November] should be permitted to proceed along the full 
route’ proposed by the organizers, but Craig responded with letters from 
loyalist groups warning of retaliation should the march proceed as planned 
(Kennedy 1968a). This spurred the police to re-route the march. Craig then 
went on to ‘initiate a discussion on the question of a ban of all processions 
and meetings’. The Chief Inspector reminded Craig that ‘it is clear that 
the police did not advise you to impose a ban or, indeed, to interfere with the 
marchers at all’ (Kennedy 1968a; emphasis added). The ban on civil rights 
marches was thus largely inspired by a single cabinet member, Craig, rather 
than derived organically from the RUC.
In a meeting at 10 Downing Street on 4 November 1968 among several 
Stormont and Westminster cabinet members, just nine days before the 
meeting with the senior RUC off icials, Craig had expounded on the 
importance of the Special Powers Act at the time, citing potential IRA 
involvement in the movement. The meeting was attended by O’Neill and 
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various Stormont cabinet members, as well as by British Prime Minister 
Wilson. Meeting minutes report that Craig argued that:
If circumstances were normal most of the various regulations under 
the Acts could have been put into cold storage, but, unfortunately, 
some disquieting news about I.R.A. policy had come to light which 
gave grounds for thinking that a new campaign of violence might be 
mounted […] Mr. Craig gave other details of I.R.A. activities in Northern 
Ireland to illustrate the need for retaining the Special Powers legisla-
tion, which he considered indispensable in present circumstances. 
(PRONI 1968b)
Later, the British Minister of State, Education and Science, Alice Bacon, 
stressed that:
In Great Britain there was today, thanks to the television coverage of the 
Londonderry Riot, a strong feeling supporting the demand for ‘one man 
– one vote’ […] She had diff iculty in understanding Mr. Craig’s argument 
about ‘dust bin’ functions; if in fact local authorities were to be given such 
exiguous duties surely there could be no objection to allowing everybody 
to vote in Council elections. (PRONI 1968b)
She reiterated the pressure put on the issue earlier in the meeting by Wilson, 
exacerbated by Great Britain’s popular support for the issue, pushing for 
full enfranchisement. Craig retorted that power should be taken away from 
local government and transferred to Stormont:
The emphasis so far had been on reducing numbers [of local government 
representatives] but must now be switched to a consideration of the 
functions which it was proper to ask Local Government to carry out in 
the future. There were arguments [made by Craig] for transferring the 
responsibility for some of the more important functions to the Northern 
Ireland Government leaving local authorities with such minor services 
as street-lighting and refuse collection. (PRONI 1968b)
Craig aimed not just to reduce the number of locally elected off icials, but, 
more importantly, to reduce their overall power. Thus, even if the CRM had 
gained its equal voting demand, Craig’s proposal would have essentially 
rendered the local vote less consequential. He then established a timetable 
for this project, vis-à-vis ‘one man, one vote’:
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The aim was to complete the Local Government investigation within a 
period of three years […] [Craig] found it diff icult to speculate on what 
the franchise should be in the new conditions after re-shaping. If, for 
example, the new local authorities were to be entrusted with only the 
simplest functions, such as refuse collection, capable of being f inanced 
entirely out of the rates there could clearly be a case for a ratepayers’ 
franchise. Northern Ireland was accused of resisting a move towards one 
man – one vote but it should be realized that as more and more houses 
were built the discrepancy between the size of the two franchises was 
always diminishing […] [Craig] thought that when the re-distribution of 
functions as between Stormont and the local authorities was settled the 
matter could be re-examined – particularly if Stormont were seen to be 
taking over functions from local councils. (PRONI 1968b)
It is clear that, even when openly criticized before Wilson and O’Neill, Craig 
maintained that there was little difference between ‘one man, one vote’ 
and ratepayer/company votes, wherein housing determines voting abilities 
and landlords are granted more voting power than tenants. Craig held that 
power should be removed from local government over the next three years, 
at which time the issue of enfranchisement may be raised again.
Up to this point, Craig can still f it within Luders’ cost assessment model. 
He may aim to gain power by transferring local government’s responsibili-
ties to Stormont. Considering his future actions makes this motivation less 
likely, however, and Craig emerges as a potential contradiction of Luders’ 
prediction. His refusal to concede to the CRM even when his position would 
suffer as a result, and his lifelong opposition to the movement despite 
high disruption and concession costs over time, fall outside of the model’s 
predictions. Craig’s outspoken resistance led to his dismissal and subse-
quent power loss. However, he gained notoriety outside Stormont. Once 
dismissed, he led the Ulster Loyalist Association. In 1972, when Stormont 
was suspended leaving Northern Ireland under direct British rule, he left 
the Ulster Unionists to form the Vanguard Unionists. Craig not only offered 
‘durable resistance’ to the CRM while in off ice, eventually losing his cabinet 
position, but continued to oppose it years later. His legacy is as a hard-line 
Unionist (see Watson 2013).
It is clear that in this instance Craig was torn between letters from loyalist 
supporters representing a potential threat to his political position, and the 
increasing disruption costs of the civil rights demonstrations. Based on 
Luders’ rational model, Craig should be a ‘vacillator’, yet he consistently 
embodies a ‘resister’, in that his policy initiatives ‘offer durable opposition 
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to [the] movement’. Luders fails to correctly assess this target’s response. 
Craig may be a case of ideological or emotion-based decision-making taking 
priority over cost assessment, particularly when we consider the direction 
of his political career after losing his position in the government. Even 
decades later, Craig felt a stronger allegiance to the British crown rather than 
Northern Ireland.4 This points more to an ideological belief and emotional 
attachment, than a careful cost-benefit analysis.
External Pressure from Westminster
In a Stormont cabinet meeting on 20 November 1968, just two days before 
the reform’s passage, policy reform and possible legislative actions were 
discussed vis-à-vis the current Northern Irish and British policymakers. 
The primary concern of the cabinet meeting is the maintenance of law and 
order in Derry, specif ically as related to enforcing the ban on all demonstra-
tions within Derry’s walls (PRONI 1968a).5 The RUC Chief Inspector argued 
that the ban was unenforceable and that ‘further really f irm police action 
could lead to the most serious and prolonged disorder in Londonderry 
and elsewhere […] The police view was given that unless the heat could be 
taken out of events by political means, the law and order situation could 
get completely out of control’ (PRONI 1968a).
This is of particular importance, touching directly upon potential disrup-
tion costs mentioned in the previous meeting. The relentless stream of civil 
rights demonstrations gave Northern Ireland an appearance of instabil-
ity, presenting a power threat should Westminster deem it necessary to 
intervene (see Warner 2005: 17-23). At Wilson’s request, O’Neill, Craig, and 
Minister of Commerce Brian Faulkner, had already met with him to discuss 
the situation. At that meeting, Wilson repeatedly expressed this threat. 
First, in the opening of the meeting Wilson immediately mentioned that the 
situation embarrassed not only Stormont, but himself and his colleagues, 
and that ‘the United Kingdom government did not need to get involved 
in a constitutional crisis in order to exert its will on Northern Ireland 
but could have recourse to other possibilities, for example, the f inancial 
contributions made to Northern Ireland expenditure’, which he called 
‘generous’ (PRONI 1968b). Judging the ‘Northern Ireland scene’ as ‘irksome, 
4 ‘The government was not loyal to the crown. The government compromised the crown’ 
(BBC 2011).
5 The memo f irst lists all present MPs, then begins with ‘The Maintenance of Law and Order 
in Londonderry’, indicating the issue’s importance for cabinet members.
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including the Londonderry situation and the Local Government franchise’, 
Wilson further stated that the Special Powers Act, which Craig strenuously 
defended, required a special exception in the international Human Rights 
agreement the United Kingdom had recently signed (PRONI 1968b). This 
‘weakened the United Kingdom’s standing abroad and gave other countries 
an excuse to criticize’ (PRONI 1968b). The CRM thus proved to be capable 
to threatening Westminster’s international reputation directly.
British Home Secretary Callaghan had also explicitly asked to prioritize 
the local government franchise over job creation as Stormont’s ‘prime objec-
tive’ during the 4 November meeting.6 Wilson then threatened Stormont 
with ‘complete liquidation of all f inancial agreements with Northern 
Ireland’ should the voting matter remain unresolved (PRONI 1968b). Thus, 
the actions of the CRM cost Stormont directly, and also presented a larger 
f inancial burden should the instability maintain its level. Even greater 
than the f inancial threat, however, was the concrete possibility of a direct 
power loss. Under Section 75 of the Government of Ireland Act, ‘the United 
Kingdom has residual responsibility […] [for] Northern Ireland’s […] internal 
affairs’ and while Wilson ‘recognized that the issues under discussion were 
the constitutional responsibility of the Northern Ireland Government, 
[they were] subject, however, to the residual rights of the United Kingdom 
Government’ (PRONI 1968b).
At that very 20 November Stormont cabinet meeting, Craig pointed out 
that removing the ban might upset the loyalist movement. The minutes 
indicate that Craig ‘expressed great concern that, if the ban were to be 
removed at this stage, elements hostile to the Civil Rights demonstrators 
might take the law into their own hands’ (PRONI 1968a). The cabinet minutes 
continue that it was the ‘general opinion of [other] Ministers, however, that 
the police advice that they simply could not enforce the ban could not be 
ignored’ (PRONI 1968a). Craig is corroborated in a letter from Chief Inspector 
Kennedy dated 25 November 1968, wherein the Chief Inspector comments on 
oppositional forces’ inability to distinguish between CRM and IRA. groups, 
6 The minutes record the Home Secretary’s comments as follows: ‘Many people in Northern 
Ireland seemed to think that new jobs constituted the prime objective of Government policy 
but so far as the United Kingdom administration was concerned, there were other matters 
that also seemed important, e.g. the local government franchise. He did not see how the Prime 
Minister could possibly defend at Westminster such things as the company vote and the failure 
in Northern Ireland to grant the local government vote to all over 21 years of age. If Northern 
Ireland were to concede only the abolition of the multiple vote then it was natural that attention 
should focus on the question of adult suffrage.’
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and thus their perception as a constitutional threat (Kennedy 1968b).7 Rather 
than decrease tension or gain loyalist support, the ban on marches placed 
the cabinet in a precarious political situation. As the civil rights machination 
kept a constant state of political instability in Northern Ireland, the unionist 
government had to respond to the protests, due to concession costs of loyalist 
violence and disruption costs of Westminster intervention.
The cabinet minutes identify potential f inancial and power losses from 
instability, detailing the pressure exerted by Westminster, in particular 
Wilson, over Stormont. A much-discussed letter from Wilson stating that ‘if 
[Stormont] refused to accept universal adult suffrage, it would be imposed 
by Westminster’, best exemplif ies London pressure on the Stormont cabi-
net (PRONI 1968a). O’Neill also reminded the cabinet that ‘if the current 
agitation was not brought under control, a situation could arise in which 
Mr. Wilson could say law and order in Northern Ireland was not being 
maintained’, and Westminster would intervene (PRONI 1968a). This explicit 
loss of power further reinforces how CRM’s creating an image of instability 
represented a sizeable disruption cost for the unionist regime.
Cost Evaluations and the Five-Point Plan
The majority of ministers at the cabinet meeting asserted that introduc-
ing profound and radical legislative change during what was continually 
referred to as a time of ‘duress’, would be unwise and ‘most unacceptable’ 
(PRONI 1968a). The ministers’ perception of voter reform concession costs 
makes them reluctant to pass effective legislative reform. This placed the 
cabinet in the almost impossible position of having high disruption costs 
of ongoing movement actions (political instability and Westminster threat 
to reduce Stormont power) on the one hand, and high concession costs in 
response to universal adult enfranchisement (loyalist counterdemonstra-
tions and voter backlash) on the other hand. Clearly, the cabinet was torn 
between impending universal adult suffrage legislation and an inability to 
ensure its enforcement without violent disturbances. They faced scrutiny 
on the issue from all sides, even their own party, and had to f ind the ‘politi-
cally feasible’ solution: a reform package that avoided dealing directly with 
universal suffrage.
7 Craig repeatedly claimed, both publicly and privately, that the CRM was an IRA front. He 
claimed the Derry march was primarily IRA members when Wilson suggested eliminating the 
Special Powers Act. The meeting minutes recorded Craig thusly: ‘Baulked in its efforts to use 
Republican Clubs as recruiting grounds by the ban on such clubs, [… the IRA] had turned its 
attention to the civil rights movement’. 
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Even though it may have been unenforceable, the ban on marches was 
enacted to appease the loyalist countermovement and maintain party 
support, demonstrating the unionist cabinet concession costs evaluation. 
Revoking the ban would endanger the loyalist voting bloc necessary to 
maintain the majority needed for the cabinet to retain power. The threat 
was actually twofold, as a reform with an impact as wide as ‘one man, one 
vote’ would likely incur a backlash from loyalist supporters, and enfranchise 
a larger section of the Irish Catholic minority hostile to unionist domination. 
Stormont’s Chief Whip explicitly referenced this concession cost, arguing 
that if the cabinet ‘announced a ‘package’ of proposals but did not deal with 
the franchise, the current agitation would continue and the pressures, inter-
nal and external, would not be relieved. […] Roman Catholic votes must be 
secured if the constitutional position was to be maintained’ (PRONI 1968a). 
The concession costs were thus quite high. While housing, employment, 
and minor local governmental restructuring were issues which would lose 
votes from loyalists if the cabinet acted in favour of movement demands, 
none were as volatile as ‘one man, one vote’. The constant references to 
the ‘wrong time’ for this change reflected cabinet members’ high level of 
vulnerability to both internal and external pressures. The cabinet was in a 
weak position as the disruption and concession costs had put its members 
into a corner, forcing them into action.
According to Luders’ cost-benefit matrix, a target facing both high con-
cession and high disruption costs will vacillate between minor or token 
concessions, and movement repression. The ban indicated in the letter 
from the RUC Chief Inspector to Craig was a concrete method of repression 
against the CRM, trying to suppress one of their most successful tactics.8 
Thus, we see the f irst step in vacillation between repression and token 
reform that Luders predicts. The enfranchisement bill which was drafted 
in the end, the Electoral Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1968, Chapter 20, 
addressed a range of movement demands: the permanent Boundary Com-
mission directly dealt with the accusations of unionist gerrymandering, and 
it abolished the University as well as the Business vote in Stormont elections 
(Deutsch and Magowan 1973: 13). The Five-Point Plan, publicly announced 
by O’Neill on 22 November, touched on housing, local government reforms, 
and the Company vote, but never mentioned the ‘one man, one vote’ issue. 
8 The effectiveness of the civil rights marches are further demonstrated by the fact that the 
British Prime Minister was involved enough to send letters and privately meet with O’Neill 
to discuss enfranchisement, specif ically mentioning in the meeting the marches and their 
mishandling by the RUC.
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Failure to include it makes the act a ‘limited reform’, as it ameliorated 
minor aspects, while ignoring the movement’s primary demand. Rather 
than the emotional or ideological reasoning usually assigned to target 
reactions, Luders allows us to see how this reform package was the result 
of a build-up of pressure from Westminster, as well as third parties like the 
loyalist countermovement and international media, and a consistent level 
of pressure from the CRM.
Conclusions
The analysis of decision-making processes is becoming more prominent in 
social movement scholarship (e.g. Jasper and Duyvendak 2015). However, 
studies of the target ’s decision-making process (usually not the analytical 
focal point) largely ignore the nuances of why targets align against issues, 
whether on an ideological basis, or through rational cost evaluation (see Uba 
2016). Because analyses typically adopt a movement-centric perspective, tar-
get decisions are often depicted as a force to react to, rather than rationally 
motivated decisions. If the target’s decision is incorporated, it is as a result 
of the political structure itself, either allowing or disallowing concessions, 
not governing bodies (targets) evaluating actions on a case-by-case basis.
This chapter examined the Five-Point Reform package to examine the 
validity of Luders’ model outside of its original application, and to assess 
whether targets rationally evaluate action costs in their decision-making 
process. The target actions analysed in this case correspond with Luders’ 
theory, generally upholding the proposed cost-evaluation model. Prime 
Minister O’Neill and most of his cabinet turned out to be ‘vacillators’, at-
tempting to navigate high disruption and concession costs by alternating 
limited concessions and repression towards the CRM and its main demands. 
However, the model fails to correctly assess Craig’s political actions as 
Minister of Home Affairs during the second half of 1968. While the model 
would predict him to follow Prime Minister O’Neill’s lead as a vacillator, 
Craig exhibited consistent oppression and resistance to the CRM, even after 
losing his position, unto his deathbed. Craig’s case demonstrates that while 
targets do rationally assess options based on cost calculations and vulner-
abilities, completely eliminating ideological and emotional influences on 
those decisions is imprudent.
Depending on time frame and domain, Craig’s case could be construed 
differently, however. An argument could be made that, despite his resist-
ance costing him power, Craig was still following Luders’ model: once he lost 
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his cabinet position, he sought external power by maintaining his strong 
resistance stance, f inding himself at the forefront of the loyalist political 
movement. Then, when Stormont was dissolved and Westminster imposed 
direct rule on Northern Ireland in 1972, he was in a prime position to f ight 
for status in the resulting power vacuum. Delving into Craig’s political 
ambitions after his dismissal might thus yield a different interpretation 
of his actions and decisions. However, this does not negate the fact that 
Luders’ model would predict Craig acting as a vacillator while a minister 
in Stormont, yet, he is a hard-line resister prior to and after his dismissal.
Luders’ approach opens new avenues of research: by considering the 
target, rather than simply the movement, scholars can begin to understand 
under which circumstances social movement actions may have the best 
result. When the target is analytically unpacked as both a player and an 
arena (Duyvendak and Jasper 2015), with motivations that transcend gov-
ernmental structures, weighing costs and ideological beliefs, we eliminate 
the monolithic ‘target’ and can attune movement analysis to the target. 
Moreover, movements themselves can learn from and incorporate this 
perspective, and Luders breakdown of targets, into their tactical decisions. 
Actors participating in contentious politics, be they movements, counter-
movements, authorities, or third parties, utilize some rational evaluation to 
determine the best course of action from their vantage point. This is even 
true in the context of an ethnically divided society like Northern Ireland, 
where the unionist government’s early responses to the civil rights requests 
of public housing and universal suffrage can be correctly interpreted as that 
of a vacillator. The mix of repression and limited reform was the rational 
response to a very vulnerable political situation with high disruption and 
concession costs and no easy way out. The re-emergence of the loyalist 
threat increased signif icantly the concessions costs for O’Neill, who would 
a few months later resign as Prime Minister, while opening up the political 
space for ethnic entrepreneurs like Ian Paisley and William Craig.
Divided societies then add an additional layer of complexity to conten-
tious politics. In the context of competing ethnonational mobilizations 
and a state not fully legitimized (see Bosi and De Fazio, in this volume), 
conceding to movement demands might represent a particularly costly 
strategy for the state. If concessions to movement requests are perceived 
to impinge directly, or even symbolically, on an opposite ethnonational 
faction, then the threat of political violence could be substantially higher 
than in other democratic regimes, making concession costs prohibitively 
high. Ethnonational claims can in fact elicit ideological and emotional 
reactions that make compromises very hard to reach, inevitably altering 
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the vulnerability of targets, as well as their ‘rational’ evaluation of costs. 
Future research should attempt to replicate this model in similar contexts to 
further advance our understanding of the dynamics of contentious politics 
in divided societies.
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4 White Negroes and the Pink IRA
External Mainstream Media Coverage and Civil Rights 
Contention in Northern Ireland1
Gregory Maney
As emphasized in the introductory chapter to this volume, levels and forms 
of ethnonationalist contention vary over time and are shaped by contingent 
historical contexts. Local, national, and transnational processes may all 
impact contention. Surprisingly little scholarship has focused upon how 
transnational processes have shaped political contention in Northern 
Ireland.
Social movements scholars studying other cases have devoted consider-
able attention to international mainstream media coverage as a transna-
tional process. Regarding forms of contention, McAdam and Rucht (1993) 
highlight the international media as a non-relational mechanism that sends 
protest ideas across borders. Even in the context of new social media, Aday 
et al. (2013) stress the ongoing importance of the international mainstream 
media to bringing about the Arab Spring. With respect to the outcomes of 
contention, some studies find that the mainstream media hinders the ability 
of social movements to achieve their objectives (e.g. Solomon 2001; Rosie and 
Gorringe 2009) while others f ind the opposite relationship (Layton 2000).
Below I develop an analytical framework that uses the concepts of move-
ment and media-generated master frames to help explain these contrasting 
f indings. An analysis of external media coverage of civil rights contention 
in Northern Ireland lends empirical support for the approach. By impacting 
the legitimacy of the British and the Northern Ireland governments, cover-
age that aligned movement and media master frames initially generated 
moral and material pressure for concessions to civil rights demands. As 
the forms, leaders, and goals of civil rights protests shifted, and as the 
Northern Ireland government developed its communications infrastructure 
and strategy, a change in media master frames no longer generated this 
pressure. If anything, external coverage legitimated repressive responses 
to the civil rights movement. Beyond demonstrating the relevance of a 
transnational process to the outcomes of contention, the analysis presented 
1 This research was funded, in part, through a grant from the National Science Foundation 
(SES-0958743). 
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in this chapter yields three additional, signif icant f indings that highlight 
the interplay between agency, culture, and structure. First, local actors 
were often successful in their efforts to encourage or discourage external 
journalists to align movement and media master frames in their coverage 
of contention. Second and consistent with the analysis provided by Turner 
and De Fazio (in this volume), the ability of external media coverage to 
legitimate or de-legitimate movements, opponents, and targets by generat-
ing moral shock suggests that responses to contentious events are often 
deeply emotion-laden and identity-driven. Third, changes in the forms, 
goals, and primary participants over the course of contention (as noted 
by Ó Dochartaigh and White and Demirel-Pegg, both in this volume) can 
influence which master frame is applied by journalists.
This analysis was made possible through collecting a sample of news 
coverage of civil rights contention in Northern Ireland by external media 
outlets along with discussions of external media communications strategies 
by participants in contention using several sources, including clippings 
of and references to coverage found in the archives of organizations 
based in Northern Ireland (Linen Hall Library Political Collection and an 
anonymous collection) and the United States (American Irish Historical 
Society), the archives for the Stormont cabinet (Public Records Off ice of 
Northern Ireland), a regular feature in the Derry Journal on external media 
coverage, a search of two issues per week of The Times (of London), and the 
memoirs of participants in the civil rights movement, opponents, targets 
and bystanders. The f indings of others scholars (e.g. Wilson 1995; Ward 
1984) collecting similar news coverage samples are referenced below and 
cross-validate my analysis of predominate coverage frames at different 
points of contention.
Movement and Media-Generated Master Frames
Snow and Benford (1992: 138) theorize that master frames are responsible 
for the emergence of international cycles of protest. The authors state that 
like collective action frames, master frames are ‘modes of punctuation, 
attribution and articulation’. The key difference between the two lies in that 
master frames ‘may color and constrain those of any number of movement 
organizations’. Drawing from Tarrow (1983: 36-39), the authors describe 
international protest cycles as ‘sequences of escalating collective action 
that are of greater frequency and intensity than normal’ that occur on an 
international level.
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Like activists, journalists frame collective action. Just as movements can 
develop frames that spawn a host of imitators and produce an international 
protest cycle in the process, journalists can develop frames for covering 
these same movements; frames that are used repeatedly in coverage of 
subsequent movements emerge during the cycle. Media master frames 
are likely to emerge during international protest cycles. Time and space 
constraints compel journalists to develop news routines (Tuchman 1973). 
The standardization of coverage of protests is particularly necessary during 
periods when many such events occur. Because of the exigencies of news 
routines, journalists look for hooks for their pieces. Furthermore, the more 
the frame is used, the more its potency increases. In an effort to make 
foreign events interpretable to domestic audiences, reporters often apply the 
same themes and topics used in coverage of domestic news (Gans 1980; Ward 
1984). For all of these reasons, coverage that is faithful to a frame underlying 
previous coverage of similar protests is likely to appeal to mass audiences.
Differences between movement and media master frames can have 
important implications for contention. In a longitudinal study of the Ger-
man peace movement, Cooper (2002) f inds that divergences between the 
collective action frames used by activists and the coverage frames used by 
the media resulted in lower levels of mobilization. Not all movements taking 
place during a protest cycle are framed the same way by the mainstream 
media. Divergences are most likely to occur when organizations within 
a movement make demands for fundamental social change, or engage in 
violent or destructive tactics. Events involving such organizations are likely 
to be covered using extremist, deviant, and dismissive frames (e.g. Hertog 
and McLeod 1995; Boykoff 2006). By impacting claims, demands, and tactics, 
changes in the organizational composition and the power dynamics within 
a movement can result in changes in the media master frame that is applied. 
It is also possible that contention itself can have radicalizing effects upon 
actors previously making moderate claims and demands and engaging in 
non-violent tactics (e.g. Tarrow 1994; Kriesi, Koopmans, Dyvendak, and 
Giugni 1995; Alimi, Demetriou, and Bosi 2015; Ó Dochartaigh and White 
and Demirel-Pegg, both in this volume). Such radicalizing effects can result 
in a divergence between movement and media frames to the detriment of 
the movement.
In addition, non-violent movements can be eclipsed by, as well as con-
flated with, armed rebellions whose actors can attempt to legitimate their 
violence by referencing claims and demands by non-violent movements. 
Newspaper editions, radio broadcasts, and television programmes have lim-
ited space/time within which to present news (Gans 1980; Ryan 1991). Thus 
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the chance of any particular event getting in the news is a function not only 
of its own news value, but also of the sheer number and news value of other 
potential news events that day. An event that would ordinarily be news can 
be crowded out by bigger news (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). The space/
time available for coverage of foreign political events is generally smaller 
than the space/time devoted to domestic affairs. Moreover, political events 
in over 160 countries compete with one another for attention. As a result, 
only events considered to be highly newsworthy and easily interpretable to 
domestic audiences receive coverage. This makes it likely that non-violent 
protests, if mentioned, are covered as a minor subset of news items focusing 
upon armed rebellion. To maintain thematic consistency, journalists are 
likely to apply the same frame to protesters and armed insurgents.
With regard to the possible influence of media coverage on outcomes, 
Rojas (2006) hypothesizes that protests can bring about social change 
through de-legitimating targets, imposing material costs, or encouraging 
targets to mimic or imitate other comparably positioned actors making 
concessions to protesters. I argue that media master frames that converge 
with movement master frames are likely to contribute to each of these 
mechanisms of pressure. Conversely, media master frames that diverge from 
movement frames are likely to impose material costs upon movements, 
de-legitimate them, and encourage targets to mimic other comparably 
positioned actors repressing protesters. During international cycles of 
protest, coverage of events by mainstream media outlets based outside of 
the primary geographic site of contention is particularly likely to influence 
outcomes. Beyond interstate competition for spheres of influence (Layton 
2000), outside media coverage can also influence outcomes by prompting 
external intervention and international isolation, damaging international 
legitimacy, jeopardizing inward investment, and deepening intra-party 
divisions (e.g. Risse-Kappen, Ropp, ‎and Sikkink 1999; Maney 2000; Turner 
and De Fazio, in this volume).
While the concept of an international media master frame may suggest 
an inability of participants in contention to shape coverage, this is not the 
case. Because of the possible consequences of coverage, movements, targets, 
and opponents often develop communication strategies. Media master 
frames are either harnessed or challenged depending upon their perceived 
favourableness (Maney, Woehrle, and Coy 2005). Savvy activists will har-
ness movement master frames that have converged with media master 
frames so as to garner sympathetic coverage of their events. Conversely, 
savvy targets and opponents will challenge these media master frames and 
harness media master frames that diverge from movement master frames. 
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Often this involves efforts to persuade journalists that the movement is 
not what it seems, and is more like a movement to which negative media 
master frames have been applied. The implementation of these conflicting 
communication strategies constitutes a discursive form contention – a 
battle of words for the hearts, minds, and choices of frames of journalists. 
I now present a case study that inspired the development of this framework 
and illustrates its potential.
External Mainstream Coverage of Civil Rights Contention2
External media coverage of Northern Ireland politics during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s provides an example of the interactive relationship between 
contention and transnational processes. Coverage of protest events taking 
place in other societies not only shaped the goals and forms of contention 
prevailing in Northern Ireland, but also influenced the frames applied by 
external media outlets. External media coverage was initially favourable to 
the civil rights movement and helped to generate pressure on behalf of its 
demands. Later coverage, however, was less favourable and de-legitimated 
the movement.
Two master frames were developed with regard to mainstream media 
coverage of protests during the 1950s and 1960s. First, as an early riser in 
the international protest cycle, the civil rights movement in the United 
States influenced other movements’ framing both domestic and abroad. 
The movement’s framing also became dominant among mainstream media 
outlets covering civil rights protests. Second, the emergence of the New Left 
in the United States influenced student movements’ framing in other socie-
ties (McAdam and Rucht 1993). In contrast to civil rights contention, the 
mainstream media, on the whole, diverged from the movement’s framing 
in favour of extremist, deviant, and trivializing frames (Gitlin 1980). Both 
media master frames were applied to civil rights contention in Northern 
Ireland. Both were cultivated by opposing actors. Coverage using the dif-
ferent media master frames had contrasting effects upon the civil rights 
movement’s ability to achieve its goals.
2 This study examines coverage of contention in Northern Ireland by mainstream media 
outlets located outside of Northern Ireland, including outlets in Great Britain and the Republic 
of Ireland. Because many consider Northern Ireland to be a part of the United Kingdom or, 
alternatively, a part of the Republic of Ireland, I have chosen to use the term external rather 
than international.
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Media Framing of Early Mass Civil Rights Contention in Northern 
Ireland
The reformist, non-violent orientation of the US Civil Rights Move-
ment, combined with the Cold War-infused salience of egalitarian and 
democratic discourses, legitimated the movement in the eyes of influential 
mainstream media outlets throughout the world (Layton 2000). Dooley 
(1998: 108) suggests that the initial, positive media coverage of the civil 
rights movement in Northern Ireland was a welcomed, but largely unan-
ticipated product of contention. In contrast, my research indicates that 
while journalists may have independently drawn parallels between the 
struggles of African Americans and Irish nationalist activists, the latter 
left little to chance.
During the f irst mass civil rights march in Northern Ireland from Coalis-
land to Dungannon in August of 1968, Fionbarra Ó Dochartaigh received 
loud applause when he declared, ‘We are the white negroes of Northern 
Ireland’ (Farrell 1988: 57). Key organizers had their sights focused upon 
producing favourable international publicity. An organizer of the march, 
Austin Currie (1998: 16), writes: ‘A prime objective of the proposed civil rights 
marches was to publicise internationally injustices to Northern Ireland 
and to force the British government to intervene to redress them’. External 
media coverage of protests, therefore, was envisioned as the primary tool 
for generating pressure on behalf of civil rights demands.
International condemnation over the actions of the police force in Bir-
mingham, Alabama, and other instances of brutality against civil rights 
protesters in the US offered an important tactical lesson; repression of 
peaceful demonstrators asking for equal rights would prompt extensive 
outside media coverage and widespread condemnation of the government. 
Organizers of the 5 October 1968 civil rights march in Derry/Londonderry 
were fully aware that their publicly stated plans to march through the 
Diamond would probably produce a violent response by the police and 
loyalist civilians (McCann 1993: 92-97). As anticipated, a repressive response 
to the Derry/Londonderry march by the Northern Ireland Minister of 
Home Affairs William Craig and the Royal Ulster Constabulary brought 
a worldwide outpouring of criticism and demands for British government 
intervention. The publicity surrounding the event underscored the eff icacy 
of taking to the streets and remaining non-violent in the face of repression 
(e.g. Ó Dochartaigh 1994: 26-27).
Most observers agree that in the year following 5 October, the civil rights 
movement in Northern Ireland had won ‘the media war’ (e.g. Moloney 
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1998: 139-141; Dooley 1998: 108-110). External television coverage focused 
on images of brutality against non-violent demonstrators (Farrell 1976: 
247; Guelke 1988: 86). After examining coverage in ABC, NBC, and CBS 
evening news broadcasts, Newsweek, and Commonweal, Andrew Wilson 
(1995: 21) concluded that police assaults on civil rights marchers received 
extensive coverage in the United States. Cued by civil rights activists and 
eager to make foreign events intelligible to a domestic audience, these 
outlets highlighted similarities between African Americans and Catholic 
nationalists. By highlighting minority grievances, newspapers outside of 
Northern Ireland also legitimated their civil rights demands.
From October of 1968 through August of 1969, the mainstream interna-
tional media largely dismissed allegations by Unionists that the civil rights 
movement in Northern Ireland consisted of communists, republicans, 
Trotskyites, and anarchists. Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs 
William Craig’s repeated assertion that ‘the Pink IRA’ was behind the 
5 October march was derided as paranoid fantasy. An editorial in the 
Baltimore Evening Sun on 15 October stated: ‘Take some civil rights pro-
testers. Place them in reach of policemen who tend to ‘overreact’. Throw 
in an underground conspiratorial movement on which to blame all the 
blood and broken heads that result from the proximity of the f irst two. 
Where are you? Chicago? No, this time the scene is Londonderry, N. Ireland’ 
(Derry Journal 1968a). The piece was not exceptional in rejecting efforts 
by Stormont off icials and loyalists to apply extremist frames to civil rights 
activists.
Even after Stormont announced a series of reforms on 22 November 1968, 
the media continued to cast a critical eye upon the government. During an 
evening news broadcast, ABC covered a civil rights march from Belfast to 
Derry/Londonderry in early January of 1969. With demonstrators singing 
‘We Shall Overcome’ in the background, the television network’s reporter 
Bill Beutal noted that ‘some observers have compared the plight of the 
ghetto residents in Northern Ireland to ghetto residents in this country’ 
(Ward 1984: 204). Overall, external media coverage of political contention in 
Northern Ireland initially favoured the civil rights cause. The consequences 
of civil rights activists’ winning the early rounds of media contention will 
now be examined.
A consensus exists among both participants and observers of the period 
that international publicity surrounding civil rights events in late 1968 
placed signif icant pressure upon Stormont to enact reforms. Civil rights 
activists like John Hume (1998: 4) believe that it was the critical component 
to success:
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The positive effect of October 5 was very strong. It had a worldwide impact 
through television. It led to the establishment of the Derry Citizens’ 
Action Committee of which I was proud to be a member. Harnessing 
the maximum strength of the city against injustice, the DCAC achieved 
more change than had been achieved in the 50 years previous in 48 days 
in response to the massive national and international pressure created 
by the consequences of October 5.
The effects of coverage upon domestic and international public opinion 
prompted the British government to intervene. Negative publicity beyond 
the United Kingdom jeopardized Stormont’s international standing and, 
in the process, threatened the vitality of an economy heavily dependent 
upon external investment. Within Northern Ireland, negative publicity 
deepened splits among Unionists. Each of these sources of pressure is now 
reviewed in turn.
First, negative publicity prompted British government intervention by 
de-legitimating Stormont. By wrapping its demands in sacrosanct principles 
of British political culture, the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland 
ensured sympathetic media coverage that, in turn, placed moral pressure 
upon the Labour Party-led British government to intervene on its behalf. 
With the emphasis upon equal rights as British citizens, government of-
f icials could not easily turn a blind eye to the forceful denial of civil rights 
within its own backyard. With the public focused upon events in Northern 
Ireland, feelings of hypocrisy helped to override a longstanding aversion to 
intervening in Irish affairs.
Beyond moral pressure, negative publicity created practical political 
incentives for intervention. Inaction threatened not only a possible revolt by 
Labour backbenchers at Westminster, but also a backlash at the polls. Just 
as the call for equal rights under the law by African Americans  generated 
considerable sympathy and support among liberal Americans, similar 
demands by the nationalist minority in Northern Ireland resonated widely 
and deeply with British public opinion. In the words of the Northern Ireland 
Minster of Commerce and future Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner (1978: 48):
It sounded to a world attuned to such protests, a positive humanitarian 
cry from an oppressed people. It also seemed to involve a very basic right 
[…] Many well-meaning but ill-informed people, even in Britain, were 
under the impression that the ‘evil Unionist government’ had made it 
illegal for Catholics to vote in elections.
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By creating moral shock (Jasper and Poulsen 1995), coverage of police brutal-
ity placed British public opinion even more f irmly behind the demonstra-
tors and their demands. The British government could only ignore these 
sentiments at its peril.
Stormont found itself unprepared to f ight a war of words with civil rights 
activists. Ministers and civil servants were soon overwhelmed in trying to 
respond to a barrage of criticism issued from media outlets throughout the 
world. By deliberately avoiding issues of partition, civil rights activists had 
rendered standard Unionist counter-frames obsolete. Without suff icient 
public-relations capacities to counteract civil rights propaganda, Stormont 
capitulated to British government demands for changes, announcing a 
series of reforms on 22 November 1968.
The reforms package, however, did not alleviate the pressure caused 
by negative publicity. The pattern established in late 1968 of negative 
international publicity, ineffective public-relations efforts, and policy 
concessions would repeat itself. British media coverage of violence against 
civil rights demonstrators participating in the march from Belfast to Derry/
Londonderry in early January of 1969 gave the government another black 
eye. Stormont responded by trying to develop its publicity machinery. Less 
than a week after the march, the cabinet decided to provide the RUC with 
a senior press off icer from the Government Information Service until the 
recently created Police Public-relations Off icer position could be f illed 
(PRONI 1969a: 1-2). Agreeing that ‘publicity arrangements must be reviewed 
and improved both at the Government and Party levels’, the cabinet also 
reactivated its publicity committee. Only by March of 1969, however, did the 
government begin to formulate a coherent strategy. The following month, 
O’Neill committed the government and the Unionist Party to universal 
franchise in local elections.
With the ousting of O’Neill as Prime Minister in late April 1969 and the 
strengthening of the government’s public relations capacities, loyalists 
intensif ied their efforts to block reforms. When dramatic political events 
on the streets of Northern Ireland once again focused the international 
media spotlight on Northern Ireland, the usual pressures for concessions to 
the civil rights movement resurfaced. British media coverage of the August 
1969 riots prompted the Labour government to once again intervene. British 
Prime Minister Harold Wilson stated that:
[E]very London news reporter and leader-writer, whatever the political 
complexion of the paper for which he was writing, was appalled by the 
situation he had to describe. It was the culmination of three centuries 
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of atavistic intolerance. It was also the culmination of nearly f ifty years 
of the unimaginative inertia and repression of successive, unchallenged 
and, because of Ulster’s history unchallengeable, Ulster Unionist Govern-
ments. (1971: 692)
With the British Prime Minister and the British Home Secretary knocking at 
the door, Northern Ireland Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark agreed to 
announce further concessions. The cabinet agreed to set up an advisory body 
to review the organization and practices of the police forces. Two months 
later, the Hunt Commission would recommend the disbanding of a part-time, 
auxiliary police force, the B Specials, and the disarming of the RUC. More 
immediately, on 19 August, the British and Northern Ireland governments 
issued a joint declaration stating their mutual agreement that ‘it is vital 
that the momentum of internal reform shall be maintained’ (Deutsch and 
Magowan 1973: 152). By the end of the month, the two governments issued 
another joint statement. The communiqué focused upon both implement-
ing promised reforms and taking additional initiatives envisioned, such 
as introducing legislation to establish ‘machinery for the investigation of 
citizens’ grievances against local authorities or other public authorities’.
As evidenced by its preoccupation, Stormont would not have readily 
signed the statement in the absence of increased British government pres-
sure resulting from negative publicity. The day before the joint communiqué, 
the Minister of Development, Brian Faulkner, called for ‘an urgent examina-
tion of the publicity machinery and the methods needed to improve the 
Government’s public-relations’ (PRONI 1969b: 2). In addition, the Prime 
Minister asked the Publicity Committee of the cabinet to meet later to 
‘consider how outside professional advice could best be harnessed’. Beyond 
the threats posed by British intervention, negative international publicity 
placed other policy priorities in jeopardy.
Second, negative publicity imposed material costs. As a devolved govern-
ment, Stormont off icials worried primarily about how the British govern-
ment would respond to international criticism. The government, however, 
also had a more direct economic stake in keeping its own reputation in 
good standing among foreign nations. Negative publicity stemming from 
civil rights contention threatened to undermine the government’s efforts 
to attract inward investment. Speaking to a Publicity Association luncheon, 
the Minister of Commerce, Brian Faulkner, voiced his concern:
Bad publicity costs nothing. And it travels further, faster and with more 
immediate effect than good publicity. That is a hard fact of life illustrated 
WhITe NeGroeS aNd The PINk Ira 81
only too clearly by the news coverage given to the recent disturbances 
in Londonderry. ‘Image’ is a much overworked word. But it is vitally 
important that a true image of Northern Ireland is projected to the world 
at large. This is not just a question of pride or prestige. The picture which 
others have of Ulster can affect us in a most direct way – f inancially. 
(PRONI 1968)
External organizations supporting the civil rights movement like the 
American Congress for Irish Freedom sought to take advantage of Northern 
Ireland’s external f inancial dependence by threatening to take legal action 
against US corporations with operations in Northern Ireland that discrimi-
nated against nationalists. Stormont’s concerted efforts to counteract the 
campaign provide evidence of the degree of pressure generated by these 
activities.
Third, while the case provides support for the expectations that sympa-
thetic external media coverage would create moral and material pressure 
on behalf of the civil rights movement, there was no support for Rojas’ 
mimicry hypothesis. Nonetheless, the case reveals an additional source 
of pressure, namely how coverage created a political opportunity for the 
civil rights movement by deepening ideological and strategic splits among 
Unionists. Most researchers and participants have stressed the importance 
of loyalist mobilization in limiting the scope of reforms. Few, however, have 
highlighted the role of Unionists in promoting reforms. Some Unionist 
politicians agreed with the depiction of Northern Ireland presented by 
the outside media and sought to use it to their advantage. Bolstered by the 
negative external reaction to the events of 5 October, some government 
off icials spoke about the moral imperative of reforms. During a speech to a 
Unionist gathering at Larne, the Unionist Chief Whip, Roy Bradford, stated:
A turning point has been reached in Northern Ireland’s history and if 
the Unionist Party does not keep abreast of the tide of change they will 
be swamped by events instead of fashioning them to our own purpose. 
We have never had a worse press. Our reputation with our fellow-British 
citizens of the UK has been badly tarnished. Any talk of UDI [Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence] for Ulster was dangerous lunacy. There is a 
high road and a low road in politics. The high road is the road of fair play 
and enlightened government. The low road is the road of repression which 
ends in anarchy. We must act now to clear our name of any allegations 
of injustice. To do nothing is to invite shame as well as violence. (Derry 
Journal 1968b)
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In summary, multiple pressures resulting from external media coverage of 
civil rights contention between 1968 and 1969 forced Stormont to announce 
reforms and reaff irm its commitment to implementing them. The lack of 
similar instances of political accommodation in over 40 years prior to the 
advent of modern mass communications underscores the importance of 
external mainstream media coverage to the policy gains achieved by the 
civil rights movement. Nonetheless, just as this coverage contributed to ini-
tial victories, it also contributed to the civil rights movement’s subsequent 
inability to ‘maintain the momentum of internal reform’ (NICRA 1978: 7).
External Media Framing of Later Civil Rights Contention in Northern 
Ireland
As the main forms, demands, and leaders of civil rights protests shifted, the 
tenor of external media coverage changed. Beginning in 1969, correspond-
ents increasingly focused their attention on violent civil rights protests and 
outspoken activists using New Left and republican frames. Along with the 
emergence of armed rebellion in 1970, these developments resulted in the 
use of extremist, deviant, and trivializing frames in coverage of civil rights 
activists and events. As a result, the pressure for reforms and for the restraint 
of repression that outside media coverage had once placed upon Stormont 
largely dissipated. Just as civil rights activists had cultivated international 
publicity to promote their objectives, their opponents exploited the sea 
change to discredit the movement.
As civil rights demonstrations turned increasingly violent in 1969, 
external media coverage focused upon the actions of protesters rather 
than their messages. For example, following a civil rights protest in Newry 
involving violence by a large number of demonstrators on 11 January 1969, 
Van Wormer (1998: 46) recalls: ‘Predictably the next day’s headlines are 
devastating: “Riot Breaks Out during Civil Rights Protest”’. The press also 
began to convey Stormont’s spin on events, viewing their assertions as being 
empirically credible. An article in the Dublin-based Irish Times quoted 
Northern Ireland’s Minister for Home Affairs, Captain Long. Long asserted 
that the aim of the civil rights protesters ‘now appears to be the creation 
of civic strife in an attempt to disrupt the harmonious relationships which 
have grown up among all sections of the community in recent years’ (Irish 
Times 1969).
Starting in 1969, a New Left student group, People’s Democracy (PD), 
took the lead in organizing a series of civil rights protests. With striking 
similarities in opinions, appearances, and actions, foreign correspondents 
WhITe NeGroeS aNd The PINk Ira 83
drew upon the same frames used to cover student protests at home. The 
pictures painted were hardly flattering. Weary and wary of student protests 
in their societies, the mainstream media applied extremist frames when 
reporting violence by civil rights demonstrators in Northern Ireland. In 
late April 1969, PD held a sit-down in Lurgan. As the RUC wielded their 
batons, protesters fought back. Subsequently, PD remarked about the way 
journalists portrayed the event: ‘The events at Lurgan during the Easter PD 
march have been represented by the press as trouble-making, long-haired 
students being restrained by our peace loving police’ (PD Voice 1969: 3).
When some student civil rights activists vocally asserted their socialist 
agenda, the content of media coverage outside of Northern Ireland became 
increasingly negative. Their youth and controversial views made good 
copy. As a result, outside reporters sought them out disproportionately 
in relation to more conservative civil rights leaders. During her visit to 
the United States in August 1969, Bernadette Devlin openly advocated a 
Socialist Workers’ Republic of Ireland. A growing number of papers in the 
US came to agree with the Unionist characterization of the MP as ‘Fidel 
Castro in a miniskirt’ (Wilson 1995: 33). During a speech in Detroit as part 
of a fundraising tour for the civil rights movement, members of the audience 
heckled Devlin when she called for civil rights in the United States. Devlin 
responded by having the person employed to sing John McCormack songs 
sing instead the African American civil rights anthem ‘We Shall Overcome’ 
(McAliskey 1988: 87). A number of Irish-American dignitaries seated in 
the front row refused to stand for the song. After the event a Detroit News 
staff editorial described Devlin as a ‘mini-skirted Danny the Red’ (Dooley 
1998: 107). Establishment anxieties over social unrest permeated several 
subsequent features.
Other journalists went beyond Devlin to apply extremist frames to the 
civil rights movement as a whole. A month after the August riots, the British 
Daily Mail ran a series of articles entitled ‘How World Revolutionaries Took 
the Lead in Ulster’s Civil Rights Struggle: The Professionals behind the 
Barricades’. Whereas the pre-split republican leadership took great pains 
to stay in the shadows of the civil rights movement so as not to discredit 
it, New Left activists like Devlin, Farrell, and McCann basked in the media 
spotlight, welcoming the opportunity to expound upon their beliefs.
Once international correspondents wielded the red paint, they smeared 
it rather indiscriminately. After verifying Unionist allegations of communist 
involvement, the external media increasingly portrayed the Northern Ire-
land Civil Rights Association (NICRA) as an ‘extreme socialist’ organization 
(Farrell 1988: 62). An organizer’s report discussed the organization’s ‘bad 
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image’: ‘Image-wise, NICRA has been accused of being a Republican, Com-
munist or Provisional Front. We are also called “extremists”. A lot of this 
smearing has stuck. So that now the media distinguishes between the early 
Civil Rights movement and the NICRA of today’ (NICRA 1974: 1). Beyond 
image problems, civil rights organizations faced declining coverage with 
the emergence of armed rebellion which was generally deemed to be more 
worthy of coverage.
The outbreak of armed conflict in the early 1970s accelerated the decline 
in outside media coverage of civil rights events in Northern Ireland. Riots 
and bombings were deemed more newsworthy than civil rights marches. 
An NBC correspondent told one researcher: ‘We cover Northern Ireland, 
but the stuff that gets on the air is the rough stuff. If there’s something 
fairly peaceful, or something that involves their parliament, it’s hard to 
get it on’ (Epstein 1973: 247). NICRA’s campaign to end internment, repeal 
the Special Powers Act, and secure passage of a bill of human rights at 
Westminster rarely made the papers. Even statements by those interned 
often did not make the papers. Two years into the rent and rates strike 
against interment, NICRA continued to experience diff iculties in getting 
coverage of its campaign (e.g. NICRA 1973a). Paramilitary violence crowded 
non-violent civil rights events out of the media spotlight.
After 1969, the frames that outside correspondents used to interpret 
events in Northern Ireland changed. With its soldiers on the streets of 
Belfast and Derry/Londonderry and its sovereignty under direct challenge, 
the British mainstream media generally responded to events in Northern 
Ireland in a nationalistic manner. Reporters mostly portrayed British 
soldiers as a peacekeeping force. Upon the introduction of internment in 
August 1971, the British press frequently omitted reference to allegations of 
the torture of nationalist detainees during interrogations by British off icers 
(see Sunday Times 1972: 289-291; Curtis 1983: 30).
Beyond Britain, armed rebellion also resulted in a changing of frames 
used by the media to interpret political contention in Northern Ireland. 
Parallels with the Vietnam War became the primary frame deployed by 
US correspondents (e.g. Ward 1984: 207). As British soldiers became targets 
of republican paramilitary operations starting in 1970, the US media drew 
parallels between British troops in Northern Ireland and US troops in 
Vietnam. The media also highlighted republican violence against civilians. 
Whereas mainstream journalists internationally viewed peaceful protests 
for civil rights as legitimate, they viewed armed challenges to an ostensibly 
democratic state’s sovereignty as illegitimate. Increased political violence in 
Western societies heightened anxieties and disdain for armed insurgency.
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With the introduction of direct rule in Northern Ireland by the Brit-
ish government in March 1972, Irish republican activities were further 
de-legitimated. While sometimes criticizing its repressive policies, the 
Western media generally refrained from a frontal assault on the credibility 
of the British government and its rule over Northern Ireland. Along with 
its geopolitical power, the British government’s superior public-relations 
capacities, including control over the BBC’s coverage, helped to insure 
this transformation. Like Stormont did prior to its dissolution, the British 
government put a self-serving spin on events in Northern Ireland (see ACUJ 
1972: 1). As the wave of international media coverage deploying terrorist 
frames to characterize rebellion in Northern Ireland grew to tidal propor-
tions, the civil rights movement got caught up in the swell.
Just as the international media increasingly red-baited civil rights organi-
zations, it frequently portrayed them as republican fronts. As a consequence, 
even the most egregious acts of repression against civil rights activists 
received justif ication from some quarters of the outside media. An editorial 
by the Daily Express asserted in regard to NICRA that ‘many members of 
this organization are neither civil nor right. They simply promote the aims of 
the IRA’ (Dooley 1998: 113). The uniform condemnation of the RUC’s actions 
on 5 October 1968, vanished even in coverage of Bloody Sunday – the most 
repressive response to a civil rights demonstration in Northern Ireland’s 
history. The policy consequences of the shift were equally contrasting.
While sympathetic international media coverage contributed to the 
ability of the civil rights movement to force Stormont to agree to reforms, 
subsequent negative coverage alleviated pressures to follow through on 
promised reforms and to restrain repressive activities. After 1969, the British 
public’s clamour for intervention on behalf of civil rights demands died 
down. In September 1972, NICRA’s Executive Committee introduced a reso-
lution at a special conference stating: ‘One of the main tasks facing NICRA is 
to re-win the support of British democracy […] for our basic demands. This 
support was lost through the bombing campaign’ (NICRA 1972). NICRA also 
recognized the success of the British and Northern Ireland governments in 
promoting the use of anti-extremist frames in outside media coverage (e.g. 
NICRA 1973b). In an open letter to the press, the Tyrone Regional Executive 
of NICRA stated:
It must now be obvious that violence in Northern Ireland in opposition to 
the British Government’s policies merely results in the perpetrators being 
manipulated by that Government to create a climate of opinion favour-
able to Britain’s policy of changing the structures of the old outdated 
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system rather than implementing democratic standards of political, 
administrative and social behaviour. (NICRA 1973b)
Beyond the United Kingdom, international media coverage no longer placed 
the international reputation of the British government in jeopardy. Reflect-
ing upon the development, NICRA (1978: 46) lamented:
The British Army is free to harass, arrest and brutalise and the UDR is 
actively encouraged to continue with its policies of sectarian violence. In 
brief Britain is determined to put the boot in. It is a policy easily justif iable 
to the world press in the light of seven years of para-military violence.
In the relative absence of negative domestic and international publicity, 
the British government focused more singularly upon ending rebellion. 
Subsequent reforms reflected counter-insurgency strategies more than a 
direct response to civil rights movement demands for the policy changes.
With the resurgence of armed republicanism, Unionists found them-
selves on more familiar ground. The ‘Orange card’ could once again be 
played effectively. Their efforts to both red-bait and republican-bait civil 
rights organizations contributed to increasingly negative coverage. In the 
process, moderate Unionist pressure largely dissipated. Efforts to sustain 
momentum for reforms through the formation of the Alliance Party failed 
as ref lected by its weak showing at the polls. Both parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary mobilization resulted in the ascendance of hard-line 
Unionists in the Orange Order, in the Unionist Parliamentary Party, and 
in the Stormont cabinet. Unionists’ economic fears remained, but armed 
rebellion, not civil rights mobilization, most threatened inward investment. 
In the relative absence of external pressures for reform, Stormont opted 
(until its demise in March 1972) to pursue political and economic stability 
through intensif ied repression.
Conclusion
Social movements research to date assists us in understanding the role 
of external media coverage in civil rights contention in Northern Ireland 
during the 1960s and the early 1970s. Media coverage of the civil rights 
movement in the United States as well as the New Left student movements 
in Great Britain, France, and elsewhere diffused protest ideas, influenc-
ing minority insurgents in Northern Ireland; specif ically, what demands 
WhITe NeGroeS aNd The PINk Ira 87
were made, how demands were framed, and the ways that demands were 
pursued. At the same time, a closer examination of the Northern Ireland 
case assists in building social movement theory by helping to explain 
contradictory f indings regarding the effects of media coverage, and 
by f illing in gaps in the literature; gaps such as lack of attention to the 
communication strategies of movements and their opponents, and the 
specif ic mechanisms by which media coverage influences the outcomes of 
contention. The role of the external media in the dynamics and outcomes 
of the case studied here mirror those of the f irst Intifada (see Wolfsfeld 
1997), suggesting that ethnonationalist insurgents engaged in political 
violence are likely to be de-legitimated internationally. Further research is 
needed to ascertain the generalizability of the f indings to other ethnically 
divided societies.
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5 ‘We Are the People’
Protestant Identity and Collective Action in Northern 
Ireland, 1968-1985
Sarah Campbell
The period after 1968 could be described as one of retreat and political 
defeat for unionists in Northern Ireland (Gillespie 2007). While the civil 
rights movement has been thoroughly accounted for (see, for example, 
Bosi 2006; Prince 2007; Ó Dochartaigh 1997; Purdie 1990), there has been 
an academic neglect of Protestant protest and collective action in Northern 
Ireland during the ‘Troubles’ (with the exceptions of Novosel 2013; Gillespie 
2004; Nelson 1984). There have been several occasions during the 35 years 
of conflict when sections of the loyalist community have tried to use the 
industrial might of Protestant workers in a national stoppage or strike to 
achieve a political end, some which have been successful, and others with 
only a limited success, or unsuccessful. The most successful of these protests 
was the Ulster Workers’ Council strike in May 1974, which brought down the 
power-sharing executive agreed at Sunningdale. The protests surrounding 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement a little over a decade later, in 1985-1986, while 
failing to achieve any political changes, were successful in mobilizing 
Protestant collective action.
Why were these protests more successful at mobilizing unionists than 
others during this period? And why was the collective action surrounding 
the 1985 campaign not as successful as that in 1974? This chapter seeks to 
answer these questions by examining the role of collective memory and its 
relationship with activism. Using the 1974 and 1985 campaigns as empirical 
cases, this research will demonstrate how mnemonic processes play a central 
role in the articulation of narratives for mobilization. I argue that collective 
memories help to bring the past into the present, and create responsibilities 
to those who came before. The result is a mutually constituting relationship 
between memory and activism (Farthing and Kohl 2013), both where an 
instrumental construction of collective memories reinforces the collective 
identity process, and where memories of previous mobilizations influence 
which activities are considered helpful or successful. Memories can also be 
considered, simultaneously, as outcomes of mobilization and signif icant 
factors in shaping further mobilization (Meyer 2006). Drawing on Fredrick 
Harris’s (2006) theory that collective memory frames collective action, this 
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chapter probes how political entrepreneurs appropriated the memories 
and events intrinsic to a Protestant sense of the past and identity, and used 
them to stimulate collective action and mobilization. It will explore the 
processes and functions of memory and narratives in divided societies and 
how they inform each other to explain their signif icance for mobilization 
efforts and will suggest that individual participants in these movements 
were empowered through identifying themselves with history and the sense 
of making history (Eyerman 2015). The use of historically based collective 
identities is more signif icant in deeply divided societies. A defining feature 
of ethnonationalism is an emphasis on collective memories, shared griev-
ances, and communal claims-making (McGrattan 2013) and a vicious cycle 
involving identity and retributive collective action becomes almost seam-
less (Smithey 2012: 87). Furthermore, this ethnonational divide itself became 
a source of collective identity. The collective identity that was fostered by 
Protestants between 1968 and 1985 was constructed and reconstructed from 
origin myths, historical narratives, commentary on contemporary states of 
affairs and teleological visions, especially as religion served as a resource for 
identity construction (Smithey 2012: 87). By providing a deeper understand-
ing of the relation between memory and mobilization, this chapter will also 
question how the politics of memory shapes cultural meaning-making in 
movements or collective action.
This research draws on a number of qualitative sources: archival materi-
als, secondary sources, newspaper and journal accounts, a semi-structured 
focus group with nine former loyalists and trade union activists, personal 
oral testimonies available online,1 and autobiographies. Archival research 
at the Public Records Off ice of Northern Ireland (PRONI), the Northern 
Ireland Political Collection (NIPC) at the Linen Hall Library and the Conflict 
Archive on the internet2 supplied valuable documentation on various loyal-
ist groups, particularly the Ulster Workers’ Council and Vanguard, and 
loyalist newspapers, including the Protestant Telegraph, the Ulster Loyalist, 
and the Loyalist News. I also conducted a four-hour-long focus group with 
nine former loyalists and trade union activists on the topic of ‘How effective 
has the Protestant working class been at collective action?’ in August 2014.3 
1 Recorded testimonies from activists at a commemoration event on Sunning-
dale in Belfast on 19  May 2014 are available at: https://audioboom.com/playlists/ 
1255041-uwc40-ulster-workers-council-strike-40th-anniversary-conference-at-qub.
2 Located online at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/.
3 The participants of the focus group were identif ied by a ‘gatekeeper’ who introduced me 
to those who were willing to participate. I am grateful to Dr Aaron Edwards, who works with 
members of the loyalist community in his research, for playing this role. 
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This allowed for comments on broader issues as well as those specif ic to 
both 1974 and 1985 and the collection of some impressions on the ideological 
and discursive structures shared by participants. What was important with 
this group was to examine what memories (collective and individual) were 
discussed and what role the memories played in both mobilizing support 
and informing repertoires of action. It also allows for an examination of 
an underestimated aspect of memory and mobilization: constraint within 
movements. Memory can help collective action by drawing on symbolic 
material from the past, but at the same time can constrain people’s ability 
to mobilize, imposing proscriptions and prescriptions (Zamponi 2013). This 
becomes important for understanding why the collective action surround-
ing the 1985 campaign was not as successful as in 1974.
Collective Memory, Collective Identity, and Grievances
Three key areas of social movement study are important for understand-
ing how the past and its public representation inf luence mobilization, 
as well as how social movements or collective action participate in 
the construction of public memory – these include collective memory, 
collective identity and grievance frameworks, and these three areas of 
focus are interrelated. A lot of the research has addressed these issues or 
approaches in paralleled grounds, separate from each other, rather than 
in conversation with each other. This has the potential of missing the 
substantial connections between memory, identity and grievances and the 
way the processes inform each other. In order to understand Protestant 
mobilization in 1974 and 1985, it is crucial to examine how their identities 
were reinforced and institutionalized through collective memory and 
grievance frames.
Collective Memory
Collective memories are partial and constructed experiences of the past, 
inevitably shaped by a standpoint in the present, and also often a vision 
of the future (Lee and Guobin 2007: 2). Collective memory is not given 
but socially constructed (Halbwachs 1992: 48). Halbwachs suggests that 
‘while the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base 
in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who 
remember’ (1992: 22). It is, of course, individuals who remember, not 
groups or institutions, but these individuals, being located in a specif ic 
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context, draw on that context to remember or recreate the past. Hal-
bwachs believed that the present generation becomes conscious of itself 
in counterposing its present to its own constructed past. He argued that 
through participation in commemorative rituals with group members of 
the current generation we can recreate through imaginatively re-enacting 
a past that would otherwise slowly disappear in the haze of time (1992: 
24). Collective memory, then, is the result of an interactive process of 
selecting, processing, and organizing past events or periods within a 
framework that grants them political or social signif icance (Gongaware 
2003: 32; 2010).
Charles Tilly has alluded to two aspects of memory’s politics: both the 
substantive claims and the action repertoire of contentions are shaped by 
how and what people retrieve and conceive of their past: ‘From the past, 
people take not only a history of their relations to potential objects of their 
claims and a more general sense of their own common identity but also 
histories of the particular forms of claim making they have at their disposal 
[…] These pasts frame collective ideas of what actions are generally pos-
sible, permissible and desirable’ (Tilly 1994: 247). Gongaware (2003) agrees 
with this idea and contends that collective memory processes provide the 
framework that organizes the past for present use, provides information 
used for the collective identity process, and aides in the development of 
unity and continuity.
If we understand memory as social remembering (Misztal 2003) and 
as a contested struggle over the meaning of the past, then social move-
ments are an important part of that struggle. Social movements make 
strategic use of the past and are important social forces in carrying the 
past into the future (Eyerman 2015: 83). They are the bearers and shapers 
of individual and collective memory (Eyerman 2015: 83). The theory of 
collective memory and collective action can broaden our understanding of 
the micro-dynamics of collective action. Just as a group’s sense of identity 
or its political culture may provide a lens through which to interpret griev-
ances and political opportunities, so collective memory can serve similar 
purposes for social groups by offering solidarity incentives to engage in 
cooperative action (Harris 2006: 32). Kubal and Becerra (2014) claim that 
tactical repertoires and cultural repertoires provide the resources needed 
to construct collective memories, and repertoires empower memory activ-
ists to engage the political sphere, create change, and nurture solidar-
ity within movement organization. Collective memories, therefore, are 
conduits connecting past experiences with present ones in the formation 
of collective identity. This is important in the collective identity process 
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as it provides, through narratives interactively exchanged, an additional 
source of identity.
Collective Identity
While changing class structures and political opportunities should be 
viewed as crucial to the political context in which collective action oc-
curs, alone they are insuff icient as explanations for popular mobilization. 
Political structures may influence, but they do not determine, the values 
and expectations of social actors. Social movement scholarship has devel-
oped the concept of collective identity to analyse movement emergence, 
mobilization, strategic choices, and cultural effects left unanswered by 
resource mobilization and political process models (Polletta and Jasper 
2001). One important focus of their research explores the sense of unity in 
a social movement. This unity is the result of a process of collective identity 
(Melucci 1997). Collective identity is defined as ‘individuals’ cognitive, moral 
and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice, or 
institution’ (Polletta and Jasper 2001: 285). Pre-existing collective identities 
are often used for mobilization, for the strategic framing of those identities 
is critical in recruiting members (2001: 291). Similarly, scholars examining 
collective memory contend that groups of people gain a sense of cohesion 
through the interactional construction of collective memories (Gongaware 
2003). Despite its wide application, collective identity is still a notoriously 
abstract concept. Flesher Fominaya (2010) suggests that it could be described 
as a process that is generated through the interaction of movement members 
as they attempt to mobilize for a shared goal.
To mobilize their groups, ethnic elites aim at creating a collective sense 
of unity and solidarity amongst their members (Saleh 2013: 164). Collec-
tively signif icant events can become (selectively) incorporated in social 
representations that enable the positioning of ethnic identities and leads 
to the construction of Protestant narratives that shape collective memory 
and produce specif ic political identities that are mutually exclusive.
Grievance Framework
Oberschall (1973) has posited that ‘[i]deas and beliefs that have a revolutionary 
potential are usually present and are available for use by a protest leadership. 
Sentiments of opposition, of being wronged, are also frequently present in 
the lower orders and can be easily linked with more elaborate ideologies 
and world views’ (quoted in Gamson 1992a: 53). Gamson identif ies three 
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components of collective action frames4 as injustice, agency, and identity 
(Gamson 1992b: 7). The injustice frames allow movement actors to construct 
– and ordinary people to make sense of – their grievances through a sense of 
moral indignation. Injustice frames not only provide evaluations about what 
is fair, but they also provide activists with a politicized consciousness to chal-
lenge whatever perceived harm or suffering they have encountered (Gamson 
1992b: 7). Likewise, Jasper (2014) suggests that anger and indignation, the 
morally grounded form of anger, are crucial to many aspects of protest. They 
not only motivate participation (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013), 
but they direct blame for social problems, create sympathy and admiration 
for protestors, and guide strategic choices. The mere existence of relative 
deprivation, however, is not suff icient to mobilize collective action. Trans-
forming such deprivations and grievances into collective action requires a 
politicization of ethnic identity. As Esman (1994: 28) compellingly argues:
Mobilization is the process by which an ethnic community becomes 
politicised on behalf of its collective interests and aspirations. This 
process requires awareness, usually promoted by ethnic entrepreneurs, 
that political action is necessary to promote or defend the community’s 
vital collective interests. This awareness results in the recruitment of 
individuals into the movement or into organizations that purport to 
speak for the movement.
The next sections will examine how important memory processes are in the 
allocation of meaning to events by Protestants in Northern Ireland to trigger 
action in 1974 and 1985. It will suggest that the meaning allocation process 
takes place in mobilization through grievance articulation, but it will also 
focus on the mnemonic elements that are involved previous to and alongside 
the articulation of identity and grievances that trigger mobilization.
Memories, Myths, and ‘Ulster Resistance’
Popular memories of unionist resistance in 1912-1914 emerged as a political 
and cultural force during the post-1969 period in loyalist communities in 
4 Snow and Benford (1992: 133-137) demonstrate that collective action frames – def ined as 
‘action-orientated sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and 
campaigns of a social movement organisation’ – are the mechanisms that assist activists and 
would-be activists in crystallizing their grievances. 
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Northern Ireland. As people struggled for moral and cognitive frameworks 
to understand, assess, and sometimes resist the signif icant changes in their 
lives,5 memories of earlier successful resistance flourished. Events such as 
resistance to Home Rule in 1912 represented structures of meaning that 
that were constructed through a process of streamlining their representa-
tions and imagery. The excess of meaning that these structures carried 
made them potential triggers of mobilization, which provided power to 
the narratives that articulated them (Vélez-Vélez 2013: 56). Jackson (1992: 
164) argues that the unionist rulers of Northern Ireland saw in the issues 
and personalities of 1912-1914 an important moral prop in the same way as 
varieties of nationalism have sought to cultivate the legacies of Wolfe Tone 
or Patrick Pearse.
A traumatic consequence of the past 35 years for the Protestant working 
class, however, has been its crisis of identity. Loyalist ideology is constructed 
so as to draw on class, community, sectarianism, and national identities. 
All these, however, are subordinate to the dominant representation of that 
ideology, the notion of ‘Britishness’ within the collective whole (McAuley 
1994; Hall 1994; Nelson 1984; Novosel 2013). Rolston reinforces this point, 
arguing that the very variety of mural imagery in loyalist areas reflects the 
lack of political consensus, while playing a central role in the construction 
of community identity and ideals (Rolston 1992; Graham 1992). Movement 
leaders also commonly overlay different collective memories to unify di-
vergent groups who often present a fragmentary list of demands (Farthing 
and Kohl 2013: 9-10). The mural discourse demonstrates the importance of 
past events to Protestant identity and the role of historical precedent in 
contemporary attitudes and decision-making.6 The events of 1912-1914 serve 
as a useful foundation or creation myth for unionists in Northern Ireland. 
In 1968, the Protestant Telegraph declared:
In 1912 Ulster was in the peculiar position whereby she would have had to 
oppose British troops in order that she, Ulster, might remain British. That 
day may come again […] Our fathers had to arm themselves in defence 
of previous traitors in Westminster, and it seems as if history is going to 
5 For Protestants in particular, these changes included the disbandment of the ‘B-Specials’ 
in 1969, the proroguing of Stormont in 1972, and the introduction of a power-sharing executive 
in 1974.
6 Critical events in Protestant time include the 1641 Rebellion, the Siege of Derry in 1689, 
the Battle of the Boyne in 1990, the def iance of Home Rule between 1912-1914, and 1 July 1916 
when the 36th (Ulster) Division was destroyed near Thiepval on the f irst day of the Battle of the 
Somme.
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repeat itself. Wilson and Lynch will not be dealing with weaklings like 
O’Neill when they come to deal with the hard core of Ulster Protestants. 
(Protestant Telegraph 1968)
The narrative behind the slogan ‘We Are the People’ is crucial in the shared 
identity of Protestants in Northern Ireland. Shirlow and McGovern (1997: 
1) argue that whether it is written on the walls of Belfast, spoken by the 
Apprentice Boys of Derry, or sung at Windsor Park, the phrase ‘We Are 
the People’ is a clear and unequivocal statement of loyalty and devotion 
to and from the Protestant people of Ulster. As such, this adage is a grand 
signif ier of loyalty, devotion, and identity. Declan McGonagle (2006: 114) 
remembered Protestant protesters in Northern Ireland shouting, ‘We are the 
people’ in the face of the emerging civil rights campaign of the late 1960s. 
The battle cry, in other words, represented a fundamental mind-set, a self-
validating sense that was based on a myth of the way that things naturally 
and elementally are and must be. If anything, it is a constant reminder of a 
self-identif ied community who sense that they are besieged and threatened 
by sociopolitical and cultural oblivion. The slogan, therefore, fabricates no-
tions of cultural solidarity and collective power. This foundation narrative 
became increasingly important among grass-roots unionism during the late 
1960s and 1970s, as the descent into violence created a crisis of confidence 
in this community.
The ways in which Protestant leaders exploited collective memories 
of Edward Carson and his resistance to Home Rule in 1912, and later the 
Ulster Workers’ Council strike’s success in bringing down the power-sharing 
government in 1974, highlight the ways collective memories can have a 
homogenizing effect, constructing a collective identity among activists 
and creating conditions for mobilization. The signif icance in examining 
the narratives is to highlight the dependence of these constructs with 
the mnemonic structures to convey and elicit meaning. For instance, the 
experience of resistance in 1912 and loyalty during the First World War as 
mnemonic structures are seen as giving meaning to the claim of resisting 
power-sharing in 1974. So as loyalists equated the resistance of Home Rule 
in 1912 with the ultimate tool of resisting any further erosion of Protestant 
identity through power-sharing, the recollections of the 1912 movement and 
involvement in the First World War as a collective memory are the ones that 
substantiate the claim as legitimate and signif icant.
The f iftieth anniversary of the opening of Stormont in 1971 was met by 
the signing of a pledge that was modelled on the Ulster Solemn League 
and Covenant (1912). The language of both is almost identical, with the 
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1971 pledge committing the signatories: ‘[T]hroughout this our time of 
threatened calamity to stand by one another in defending our cherished 
position of citizenship in the United Kingdom and in using all lawful means 
to defeat any conspiracy to overthrow our Parliament’.
Siege Mentalities and Protestant Working-Class Grievances
While Protestant opinion perceived the civil rights as a Catholic movement, 
many working-class Protestants could identify with its demands. Resent-
ment existed, however, that it seemed to only be addressing Catholics (as 
noted in interviews carried out by Ferguson and McAuley, in this volume).
Jackie Redpath, a community activist in the Protestant working-class 
Shankill area of Belfast in the 1970s, explained the sense of grievance felt 
by many Protestants at the time:
From a Protestant working class point of view, from a Protestant commu-
nity point of view […] what was happening was the very quick stripping 
away of almost everything of what you had known as certainty […] It felt 
like everything you had known was now up for grabs and everything you 
had known was being stripped away. And it stirred up that old sense, 
which was hundreds of years old, of being a community under siege […] 
[The loss of Stormont and the increasingly deteriorating security situation 
meant] it was a time when your very identity was under question. There 
were no more certainties. (Redpath 2014)
While grievances were related to identity to a larger extent, they also had 
an economic dimension. By the time of the civil rights movement’s agita-
tion, Northern Ireland was an employment black spot within the United 
Kingdom. In 1984, for example, a year before demonstrations against the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, almost 70 per cent of households in the Protestant 
Rathcoole estate in Newtonabbey were in receipt of state benef its, with 
those in work largely on very low incomes.
The Mobilization of Workers: The Ulster Workers’ Council Strike, 
1974
Protestants responded to the suspension of Stormont and the introduc-
tion of direct rule by Westminster in a number of ways. Even before this 
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event, Protestants had begun to mobilize – the lack of confidence in the 
established authorities which was felt by grass-roots unionism, and particu-
larly working-class loyalists, led to the emergence of new groups in several 
key areas. New political movements were formed, including a major new 
loyalist paramilitary organization, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), 
organizations of industrial workers, the Loyalist Association of Workers, 
led by shipyard worker, Billy Hull, and Ulster Vanguard, led by Bill Craig 
(Gillespie 2004). Ian Paisley and his Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) also 
came to prominence in the late 1960s and took centre stage in Protestant 
mobilization efforts in 1970s.
Ulster Vanguard was an attempt to re-create the anti-Home Rule alliance 
of politicians, physical force militants, and industrial workers in a three-
wing movement against various enemies of ‘true loyalism’ (Nelson 1984: 
101). Vanguard focused its policies on a collective memory of Protestant 
privilege in the pre-1968 era. The policy of Vanguard related, in its entirety, 
to sovereignty in Northern Ireland and a return to the pre-1968 status 
quo. It was an expression of the Protestant ‘siege mentality’, couched in 
constitutional terms (Nelson 1984: 101). Between February and March 1972, 
in reaction to British plans to remove internal security from Stormont’s 
remit, Vanguard organized a number of progressively larger rallies. These 
culminated in a f inal demonstration in Belfast’s Ormeau Park on 18 March 
with approximately 60,000 in attendance (although estimated at 92,000 by 
organizers). Drawing on the historical collective memory of Edward Carson 
and the founding of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) in 1913, a noteworthy 
feature of the protests was the inspection of persons drawn up in ranks. A 
Home Affairs report noted that ‘[t]his militaristic pose was more notable at 
the f inal Rally in Belfast where a guard of honour was formed by members 
of the U.S.C. association; the Colours of the old U.V.F were paraded; women 
in uniform type clothing were drawn up in ranks and a contingent from 
the Oldpark Defence Association paraded in dark glasses and desert-hats, 
etc.’ (PRONI 1972). The Loyalist Association of Workers also connected the 
current situation in 1972 and historical collective memories of Carson in 
1912 and the rebellion and massacres of 1641. One of their pamphlets from 
March 1972 reflected:
Portadown certainly lived up to its reputation on Saturday last with 
thousands of its Loyalist citizens displaying their loyalty to VAN-
GUARD, as their Fathers did to Carson. This is the action we expected 
from the loyal provincial town, and by quoting Col. Saunderson when 
Home Rule was suggested 50 years ago – ‘It may pass the House of 
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Commons but it won’t pass Portadown’. So today the sons of the men 
50 years ago say exactly that. NOT AN INCH! (Loyalist Association of 
Workers 1972)
The decision to suspend Stormont was also met by a two-day strike. Many 
thousands of Protestant workers stayed home from work, paralysing 
the region and bringing industry, commerce, and public services to an 
almost complete halt (Irish Times 1972). This show of popular discontent 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the strike and convinced loyalists of 
all shades that such tactics could be used again for political ends. The 
tactic was used again in February 1973 in reaction to the internment of 
two UDA members, the f irst loyalists to be interned, following a grenade 
attack on a Catholic works bus. This strike, however, did not appeal 
to the wider unionist community on account of its narrow grievance 
framing, and because the violence that accompanied it alienated many 
Protestants. Yet, both these instances showed unionists the political 
effectiveness of using the industrial might of Protestant workers in a 
national stoppage.
In May 1974, an assorted collection of Protestant industrial workers and 
paramilitaries succeeded in bringing down the power-sharing Northern 
Ireland Executive. The Ulster Workers’ Council (UWC) strike was called 
in protest to the political and security situation in Northern Ireland and 
more particular at the proposals in the Sunningdale Agreement, which 
would have given the government of the Republic of Ireland a direct say 
in the running of the region. The strike lasted two weeks and succeeded 
in bringing down the power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive. For the 
two weeks of the strike, effective political power was in the hands, not of 
Westminster nor of elected Northern Irish politicians, but of factory workers 
and labourers (Nelson 1984: 155). Martin Dillon (1994) has commented 
that ‘[t]he modern rebellion of 1974 is one of the most signif icant – and 
intriguing – events of the last 25 years of conflict […] It was an episode of 
complex political, social and military events […] The rebellion, by a large 
section of the loyalist and Unionist community, is a landmark in the history 
of the period’.
In early April 1974, the magazine of the UDA, the Ulster Loyalist, 
alerted its readers to the existence of the Ulster Workers’ Council. The 
Northern Ireland that the council would f ight for, it was stressed, would 
be one free of privilege and discrimination and notice was served on 
politicians, ‘whatever banner they operate under, that the workers are 
no longer tools to be used to forward their political ambitions but equal 
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partners and that the future of Northern Ireland will no longer be decided 
behind closed doors between rival groups of politicians, each jockeying 
for the best advantage for himself and to hell with the workers’ (Ulster 
Loyalist 1974). The group emerged from what Glenn Barr (2014) called an 
‘abysmal’ lack of leadership in Protestant working-class communities, 
in an attempt to f ill this void. Acutely aware of the success of miners 
in Britain in forcing industry down to a three-day working week by 
reducing electricity supplies, the UWC adopted this action as a tactic in 
their protest (Barr 2014).
The results and impact of the collective action in May 1974 had far-
reaching consequences for future action. 1974 became central to loyalist 
collective memory. It was remembered because it met two conditions: 
activists considered the event commemorable and it met the mnemonic 
capacity to create a commemorative vehicle (Armstrong and Crage 2006). 
Disruptive, violent, large-scale events are more likely to be viewed as news-
worthy. Direct participation or perception that an event caused a change 
(for better or worse) in the fate of a group also enhances commemorability 
(Armstrong and Crage 2006).
The Ghost of Carson and 1985
While the strike may have ostensibly brought an end to the power-sharing 
executive, and so was seen as a victory for loyalists, Sarah Nelson (1976: 
223) notes that the stoppage could not be seen as a ‘victory for the working 
class’ because the strike itself was not fundamentally about a class issue. 
Further, while some of those who were active in the constituent groups of 
the UWC joined the United Ulster Unionist Council and ran in elections for 
the Constitutional Convention in the aftermath of the fall of Sunningdale, 
thereby politicizing some of the gains made on the streets; the grass-roots 
movement itself dissipated in the months after the strike. Gillespie argues 
that in those months it became clear that the UWC as an organization 
hardly existed. It had, however, provided the glue which held together 
a disparate coalition of loyalist workers, politicians, and paramilitaries 
just long enough to force the collapse of the power-sharing executive 
(Gillespie 2004: 129-130). Meyer (2006: 202) also contends that the stories 
people hear about the past influence how they view future possibilities 
and, most signif icantly, their prospective role in making it. Thus, 1974 
would be seen as a success by mobilizing forces in unionism and would 
be used in future.
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It would take a new confluence of events and grievances to establish the 
same momentum in order to lead to mass collective action again. As Andy 
Tyrie, chairman of the UDA remarked a couple of months after the strike:
Let’s be honest about it. As far as the loyalist paramilitary organisations 
are concerned, they will never be the same again until there’s a crisis 
situation. All we can do is hold on to a good nucleus of men and build and 
organise, and wait for the opportunity to ride the waves again. (Fortnight 
1985)
In the weeks and months after the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed on 
15 November 1985 between Britain and the Republic of Ireland on what 
amounted to joint-sovereignty of Northern Ireland, there were two models 
which could be followed by leaders hoping to mobilize unionist reaction: 
the f irst was Edward Carson’s leadership in 1912 against Home Rule; the 
second was the UWC strike of 1974. Both events had inspired many union-
ists to believe that loyalist mass mobilization, backed up by the threat of 
industrial disruption and physical force, would be enough to frustrate the 
plans of the British government (Focus Group 2014). Loyalist strategy sought 
a dramatic demonstration of community solidarity. At the same time, these 
two moments of popular Protestant activism were remembered as a golden 
age of resistance, and ones that should be emulated.
While the threat of strike on the same scale of 1974 was implied, loyalist 
leaders evoked 1912 and Carson to mobilize their supporters. One very 
clear connection between 1912 and 1985 was the establishment of ‘Ulster 
Clubs’. The Ulster Clubs were set up by radical unionists in the rural areas 
of Northern Ireland after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 
November 1985. This was an attempt to provide both organization and 
muscle to the unionist campaign against the initiative. In their conscious 
mimicry of Carson’s Ulster Clubs in the f ight against Home Rule at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, they represented a classic instance of 
unionism’s tendency to look back to past victories in order to deal with the 
present crises (Cochrane 1997: 86; McBride 2001).
Ulster Club spokesman, Alan Wright, commented: ‘It is a case of his-
tory repeating itself. In 1893 when the f irst Home Rule Bill for Ireland was 
presented to Parliament, the Unionists got together and formed a Unionist 
Club. So we decided that we needed a structure that everyone could come 
together under’ (Fortnight 1986). With a direct reference to Carson, Wright 
stated, ‘[we] need to have what Carson had which was a people’s army to 
make this country totally ungovernable to bring this government to its 
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knees’. But Wright also recognized the need to conjure the memory of 1974, 
and the role that ordinary, working-class Protestant mobilization played 
in the result:
Obviously comparisons are being made to ’74. We have to recall that in 
February 1974 the politicians went back with a massive mandate to smash 
Sunningdale. But the politicians didn’t smash Sunningdale. They started 
the momentum but the workers and the ordinary people reminded the 
government that it was still, very much loyalist f ingers on all the buttons 
in this society […] We see this Agreement as being the f irst half mile in 
the road to Dublin rule. And that is nauseating, repugnant and totally 
unacceptable. I believe you will see something even greater than 1974. 
(Fortnight 1986).
The most obvious expression of loyalist opposition was the massive ‘Ulster 
Says No!’ rally in Belfast on 23 November 1985, where the crowd was reported 
to be 100,000 (although unionists claimed 200,000). In his speech to the 
crowd, Ian Paisley directly quoted Carson: ‘We ask for no privileges, but we 
are determined none shall have privilege over us’. While the links between 
collective memories and collective action seemed much stronger in 1985 
than they were in 1974, mobilization of Protestants against the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement failed to reach the same level as that of Sunningdale. Leaders 
were unable to secure unif ied support on what action to take. The Belfast 
Telegraph, conducted a poll of Catholics and Protestants in January 1986 and 
noted that only 22 per cent of those surveyed were in agreement with tak-
ing industrial action against the agreement (though considerably stronger 
amongst the working-class), and 74 per cent disagreed (Belfast Telegraph 
1986).7 Jackson (1992: 174) has suggested that the Unionist command has 
shown itself capable of occasionally mobilizing its resources; but it has also 
proved to be much less adept at coping with its own transient success and 
lacks the ability to supply coherent direction or a long-term flexible plan of 
campaign. This certainly seems to have been the case in 1985-1986. There 
are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, as outlined in Bosi and De Fazio 
(in this volume), scholars tend to underemphasize specif ic characteristics 
of mobilization, including the intra-movement competition and conflict 
within heterogeneous ethnonationalist groups. This appears to have been 
7 Among the Protestants from the C2DE group who were surveyed, 37.1 per cent were in favour 
of taking industrial action in protest to the Agreement (compared to 25.9 per cent in the ABC1 
group).
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the case in 1985 more so than in 1974. Those within the movement could 
not be considered a monolithic collective and there were divisions over 
what sort of action to take. A memo from J.E. McConnell of the Political 
Affairs Division of the Northern Ireland Office on the aftermath of the ‘Day 
of Action’ in March 1986 noted that: ‘All the people who rang me […] are 
deeply opposed to the Agreement but while they supported the strike, they 
are extremely concerned about the rejection of the Downing Street talks 
by their leaders […] They now feel that Unionists in Northern Ireland are in 
an impossible position’ (PRONI 1986). The collective identities constructed 
from historical myths by movement mobilizers around opposition to the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement are largely based on polarized identities that are 
found in deeply divided societies. When groups define themselves and each 
other in terms of the conflict, they collude in perpetuating the psychological 
bases for destructive conflict (Northrup 1992). Further, this zero-sum stance 
means that compromise becomes impossible and the protest is seen as 
ineffective when it does not achieve the aims it sets out to.
Also, while memories of particular transformative events, such as 1912, 
are produced and reproduced at times of political crises in unionism, which 
enhance the capacity of the community to mobilize, it can also constrain 
it. Benford (2002) argues that narrative and storytelling can act as a means 
of social control in social movements. This could be seen in two ways in 
the 1985 campaign. Firstly, the state used the idea of historically based 
narratives and collective identities to control the action that protesters took. 
It was noted in a memo that civil disobedience (non-payment of rent, rates, 
electricity, and water) could be used by unionists to oppose the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. This was seen as one of the more problematic actions unionists 
could take because the arrangements for dealing with non-payment of 
such items would not cope with mass refusal. Ministers were, therefore, 
encouraged to ‘emphasise traditional values of Protestant ethic to counter 
any pressure for such action’ (PRONI 1985).
Secondly, there were divisions over the use of violence and this did not 
sit easily with constructions of identity based on the past. On reactions 
to the ‘Day of Action’ in March 1986, it was noted: ‘The general feeling is 
one of revulsion against the behaviour of many of the strike supporters on 
Monday […] There is no doubt that many supporters of the strike have been 
frightened at the ferocity of the action taken by the “hardmen”’ (PRONI 1986).
Nonetheless, while the collective action was not sustained, nor did it 
achieve any meaningful political change envisaged by the protesters, it does 
demonstrate that collective memory played a signif icant role in mobilizing 
the masses, even if only for a short period of time.
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Conclusion
Collective memories help bring the past into the present, and create re-
sponsibilities to those who came before. These memories meet a number 
of needs and people are likely to turn to them when they are struggling to 
make sense of events in times of uncertainty. Collective memory links a 
sense of the past to present day injustices. In Northern Ireland, the social 
appropriation of collective memories, particularly historical memories, is 
extensively used by community leaders and politicians (McGrattan 2013). 
These pre-existing narratives and memories can be drawn upon by leaders 
to build lines of solidarity and/or forge strategies for collective action. Events 
are transformed into collective memories through the process of social 
appropriation. This process of social appropriation triggers collective action 
as actors use the event to construct action frames that signal favourable 
environmental conditions. Consequently the event is incorporated into 
a social group’s memory repertoire. The capacity of mnemonic practices 
to provide meaning to current events in light of the past, and potentially 
directing future ones, brings about the quality of memory processes to 
engage audiences into action (Vélez-Vélez 2013: 61). This does not always 
have the desired effect, as is seen by the 1985 example. While the collective 
memory of Carson was once again re-appropriated to mobilize support, the 
support was limited, signalling that other factors are indeed necessary to 
sustain action, as well as suggesting that movement narratives can have a 
constraining effect, in tandem with a mobilizing one.
As Lee and Yang (2007) demonstrate, nostalgic and critical memory 
is not suff icient to bring about suff icient collective action. The emer-
gence of labour unrest also depends on the local structure of economic 
and political opportunities and the organizational capacity of workers’ 
communities. Nonetheless, because collective memories represent more 
than recollections of shared events and happenings, and also entail the 
prescription of symbolic events in relation to present (and future) ones, 
a focus on memory and collective action adds a meso level of analysis 
to social movement research. Ferguson and McAuley’s research (in this 
volume) explores the role of collective identity among loyalists and the 
importance of narratives in its creation. They suggest that these narratives 
either perpetuate violence or can be reformulated to abandon political 
violence in a post-conflict society. This makes the process of collective 
memory and identity constructs in mobilizing communities even more 
worthy of consideration.
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6 Ulster Loyalist Accounts of Armed 
Mobilization, Demobilization, and 
Decommissioning
Neil Ferguson and James W. McAuley
A section of the population here tried to overthrow the state by force 
of arms, and the British government, after the fall of Stormont, failed 
in their fundamental right, or the fundamental thing for them was to 
protect life and to me they failed in that. I could have easily got involved 
with the RUC, because, I mean, I wasn’t involved in any criminal activity 
before I joined the Ulster Volunteer Force, but I felt that we had been let 
down by our government, who had handcuffed the security forces with 
their policy of appeasement and restraint rather than the same sort of 
policy they used in the conflict in the Falklands. If they had had the same 
attitude towards republicans, I don’t think it would have been a war. I 
think it would have been a conflict that could have been put down in a 
couple of years. (Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2007)
This quote is from a former member of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and 
former prisoner who served thirteen years of a life sentence for murdering 
a republican paramilitary and who is now actively involved in conflict 
transformation, reflecting on why he decided to join the UVF during the 
1970s. It is a quote that resonates with many of the accounts given by former 
loyalist paramilitaries about their reasons for shunning the ‘legitimate’ 
state forces in an attempt to combat violent militant Irish republicanism. 
This chapter will explore narratives shared by former loyalist paramilitar-
ies which explored their participation in armed loyalist movements and 
actions, and how the paramilitary ceasef ires and peace process facilitated 
their disengagement from politically motivated violence and their transfer 
into more civic or political roles within their community. These narratives 
were collected in a series of interviews conducted by both authors and their 
respective research teams over a decade from 2000 to 2010.
The fragmented response of loyalism1 gave rise to a multitude of paramili-
tary organizations, based in the Protestant working class. As the response 
1 See Campbell (in this volume) for an extended discussion of working class loyalist mobiliza-
tion and the collective memories which fuelled loyalist responses in the early 1970s.
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began to become more structured, two main paramilitary organizations 
dominated, one was the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster Young Militants 
grouping; the other was the UVF/Red Hand Commando grouping. The 
Ulster Defence Association (UDA) founded in 1971 grew out of the wide 
network of vigilante groups that had appeared in loyalist districts and 
the UVF, which (although it had surfaced in 1966) began to organize and 
recruit heavily in the early 1970s. The dynamic behind growing paramilitary 
membership continued to draw on existing notions, especially narratives of 
siege and community defence. It also gave expression to the conviction felt 
by many Protestants that the constitutional position of Northern Ireland 
was under direct threat, that the government response was weak, and that 
Northern Ireland faced a challenge that was not being effectively met by 
state forces, which were unable or unwilling to effectively engage militant 
republicanism. It must also be remembered that the motivations for young 
Protestants joining one armed grouping over another are complex and will 
vary across location and time depending on the legitimacy, popularity, and 
strength of the organizations in that locality and the current threats the 
community faced. Indeed in the tightly knit communities of Belfast, living 
in one particular street instead of the one around the corner may be the 
only signif icant factor in choosing to join the Red Hand Commando (RHC) 
over the UVF or the UDA. Furthermore, even the coherence of the UDA and 
the UVF as singular organizations is questionable, and at times battalions 
or brigades move in contradictory directions to the overall organization 
(McAuley 1994).
In line with Bosi and De Fazio (in this volume) and Fillieule (2010, 2015), 
the narrative accounts of mobilization and disengagement presented here 
are broadly supportive of the wider literature surrounding engagement in 
political protest, viewing social mobilization as a dynamic process involving 
individual agency and interaction between political actors, groups, and the 
context in fuelling engagement and disengagement in political protest and 
violence. As the narratives will demonstrate, any analysis of the paths in 
and out of armed groups must incorporate the repeated interplay between 
micro, meso, and macro factors as demonstrated in recent research with the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Italian Red Brigades (Bosi and Della 
Porta 2012), rather than relying on static grand macro theories (Fillieule 
2015).
These narratives accounts explain how people sustain political pro-
test (see Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007, 2013) and the role of 
political socialization in that process (McLeod and Shah 2009; Petrovic, 
Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2014). In particular, these narrative 
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accounts share much with the work of Klandermans and his colleagues 
(1997, 2003; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007) and illustrate the 
importance of social identity and shared emotion in the interviewees’ 
personal understanding of their engagement in politically motivated 
violence. In terms of political socialization, the narrative accounts il-
lustrate that while the political socialization is a lifelong process, with 
movement into conflict transformation after the ceasef ires of 1994 and 
the Good Friday Agreement testament to this, late adolescence and early 
adulthood is the key period for the political socialization of the former 
paramilitaries, as it is with many people who engage in protest or join 
social movements in other contexts (Ferguson, Burgess, and Hollywood 
2008; McLeod and Shah 2009; Silke 2003). For all our interviewees it 
was during this period of their lives that they decided to join loyalist 
paramilitary groups.
The individuals providing these accounts of mobilization into loyalist 
groups share similarities; they all came from urban working-class back-
grounds. Indeed many of the interviewees reflected on how their living 
conditions and socio-economic opportunities were similar to the Catholics 
who were agitating for civil rights.
The questions that we have to ask, like when you look at civil rights, the 
people living in Brown Square and the Shankill were living in the same 
type of accommodation, the same type of conditions as the people in 
the Falls. There was no difference. They all had outside toilets. They all 
lived twelve to fourteen to a two-bedroomed house. So, I mean, what was 
the difference? (Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2007)
One of the key differences from their Catholic neighbours was that they 
had been socialized in the working-class loyalist traditions of band parades 
and Eleventh Night bonfires, while many had family members who had 
been in the Orange Order or who had attended political rallies organized 
by Protestant demagogues such as Ian Paisley:
There was a very strong community spirit, very loyalist, very unionist, 
very Orange. My father would have been in the Orange Order, I grew up 
in the junior Orange Order, you know, as you do. Follow in the family and 
community traditions […] I suppose you didn’t think you were sectar-
ian. You weren’t even aware of it. You weren’t aware of being a bigot or 
anything like that. It was just your traditions you grew up with. (Interview 
with RHC Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2007)
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Many of the loyalists we interviewed spoke of how they viewed Ian Paisley 
as a role model or looked up to him, or were naïve enough to believe in 
his ‘black and white’ rhetoric which fuelled their fears and pushed them 
towards loyalist paramilitary groups: ‘I thought Ian Paisley was God. I 
thought whatever he said had to be true because he was a leader and he 
wore a collar and everything like that’ (Interview with Ferguson 2004). 
While Paisley’s role in recruiting young men into paramilitary groups was 
f iercely contested by himself and others (Taylor 1999; Tonge et al. 2014), 
he had a number of associations with members of paramilitary groups 
throughout his career and was involved in the creation of a number of 
quasi-paramilitary groups with links to members of the UVF and UDA, 
such as the Ulster Protestant Volunteers (UPV) in the 1960s, along with 
‘Third Force’ and ‘Ulster Resistance’ in the 1980s.
However, Paisley had no proven involvement with the instigation of 
violence and he always stated that he never advocated the use of violence. 
Regardless of his role in these groups, his powerful speeches resonated with 
the fears of Ulster Protestants that they were being ‘sold out’ by Westminster 
and their lives and livelihoods were under threat from Irish Catholics and 
republicans. His messages and status as a ‘man of God’ had a profound 
influence on many working-class Protestants, an influence which caused 
many to consider using violence to defend Ulster and pushed some of them 
towards paramilitarism.
While these young paramilitary recruits had strong Protestant, union-
ist, loyalist (PUL) identities, were closely bound to their community, and 
had their fears amplif ied by Paisley and others, their political ideas were 
naïve and relatively unformed when they joined loyalist paramilitary 
groups:
I didn’t see us as setting out to achieve anything. I saw us more as a 
reaction, as a deterrent. I always hoped that the IRA would desist from 
what they were doing and then the UVF would be able to reciprocate, 
which I’m hoping is happening now, albeit a long time later. At that time 
[the early 1970s] I don’t think anybody my age would have thought we’d 
be going into thirty years of conflict. (Interview with UVF Volunteer, 
Belfast, Ferguson 2004)
At a time when governments, academia, and the media are focused on 
radicalization and the role of radicalization in leading to engagement in 
political violence, it is important to remember that many purveyors of 
politically motivated violence are not radical or have not been radicalized 
uLSTer LoyaLIST accouNTS 115
(Della Porta and La Free 2012). Many are politically and ideologically naïve, 
and their violence is the result of the more implicit pressures of group 
solidarity and/or explicit threats or feelings of threat than political intention 
(Fillieule 2015).
The interviewees were all young men living in a time of huge flux at the 
beginning of the 1970s and this offered lots of opportunity for adventure and 
risky behaviour, which provided novelty and excitement and led to some of 
them joining the Young Citizen Volunteers (YVC) or Ulster Young Militants 
(UYM) while most engaged in rioting and clashes with the neighbouring 
Catholic community or the security forces.
At the age of eleven I can remember listening to gun battles between the 
B Specials and the IRA. So my earliest memory of some of the Troubles is 
that, coz at the bottom of the street was a wee off-licence or wee bar that 
used to be there called – and bullet holes riddled it the next morning. 
I was a child so it was a bit of excitement […] From that age then until I 
think about sixteen or something I remember being involved in the riots. 
I laugh when I tell people [that] we were the f irst ones to be stoning the 
British troops. I think it was the Fusiliers or the Welsh Fusiliers. I can 
remember as clear them coming round on their wee jeep with none of 
this armour stuff that you have today, and it was a new experience for 
everybody, I think. It was certainly a new experience for a teenager. 
(Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2008)
Prior research within Northern Ireland and in other contexts has shown 
that eventual membership of armed political groups is the result of an 
incremental process of increasing acts of insurgence (Burgess, Ferguson, 
and Hollywood 2005; Ferguson, Burgess and Hollywood 2008; Oberschall 
2004). The following is an example of such views:
There was a number [of reasons for joining a loyalist paramilitary group], 
the main one was one of my best friend’s father was shot dead. He was 
a UDR [Ulster Defence Regiment] man. His young sister was eleven 
years old. She was shot in the legs. My hometown had been completely 
destroyed by IRA bombs twice. There were four or f ive other UDR men 
in the area who were shot. There was a couple of British soldiers that had 
been shot dead in Lurgan outside the hospital. A couple of local policemen 
[were] shot in the town. So, just that whole environment at that time. I 
went to the funeral of my friend’s father. His young sister was screaming 
for her daddy to come back. I can remember crying. I left that, but swore 
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[that] if I ever get the chance for revenge then I would [take it], so it was 
mostly a human response to what was happening around me. (Interview 
with UVF Volunteer, mid-Ulster, McAuley 2007)
Many of our interviewees discussed how they would begin on the fringes 
of the conflict, perhaps running with gangs and getting involved in riots, 
before being approached by, or approaching armed groups and becoming 
involved in assassinations or bombings. Even when they engage in their 
initial political activity, protest, or violence it is usually as the result of 
local-level reactions to the events taking place around them and is without 
any coherent or developed political strategy – it is a simple reaction to the 
perceived unjust action of others. As mentioned earlier, much of this initial 
activity is born from a frustration with the inability of the state to contain 
or counter republican violence, again reiterated here by another former 
UVF volunteer:
We wanted to smash back or hit back, and living in that area was a perfect 
place to do it. So that was how I became involved. It’s yes I wanted to 
defend my area, yes I wanted to smash back at those who were creat-
ing the mayhem and the havoc and [I] genuinely and honestly felt that 
the police weren’t doing enough, you know, they weren’t defending us. 
(Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2008)
It is important to identify the necessary context for constructing loyalist 
identity, the role of community within that identity, and the place of a 
self-contained social system, which provides a coherence of meaning within 
loyalism. Feelings of grievance, frustration, and perceived injustice are com-
mon factors which promote movement participation (Klandermans 1997; 
Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013), especially when these feelings 
are based on group-level comparisons which induce feelings of fraternal-
istic deprivation (Runciman 1966) and which also resonate with personal 
experiences (Foster and Matheson 1999). For many of our interviewees, 
this movement from an apolitical life into active political participation was 
the result of some incident that had a dramatic impact on their world view. 
Most of these critical events related to someone they knew being harmed or 
killed, or that the violence of the Troubles was ‘getting a bit near to home’. 
In the words of a former loyalist paramilitary, membership in paramilitary 
groups ‘was an explosion waiting to happen and it happened when I was 
fourteen, and by the time I was nineteen I had made a conscious decision 
to join the UVF. Not before that.’ This interviewee had heard that a young 
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man killed by one of 22 bomb explosions on ‘Bloody Friday’ in July 1972 
shared the same name and age as himself. The effect this incident had on 
him was dramatic: ‘And I thought, ‘That’s my fence sitting days over’, and 
I joined the UVF. And there’s so many stories like that where you talk to 
republicans and loyalists and you f ind out there was a moment. There was 
a moment when they crossed the Rubicon’ (Interview with UVF Volunteer, 
Belfast, Ferguson 2004).
An unplanned and unpredictable occurrence or a critical incident, 
such as the Bloody Friday bombings, increases a person’s chances of po-
litical mobilization by impacting on them in two distinct ways. Firstly, an 
individual’s sense of collective identity is heightened as ethnocentrism 
increases as a reaction to the increased threat facing his or her community. 
Second, the critical incident precipitates a period of self-reflection that 
helps the individual to determine a boundary demarking acceptable and 
unacceptable expectations, treatment, and/or conditions. As with other 
interviewees, experiencing this critical event caused him to re-evaluate 
his life and the outcome was his decision to ‘return the serve’. He began to 
engage in a campaign of violence against Irish republicans and the wider 
Catholic community, which led to his incarceration in HMP Maze for over 
half a decade.
During this period of self-ref lection, the individual weighs up their 
‘resources’, eff icacy, social capital, and options for action and inaction, 
bringing in personal history, current circumstances, socialization experi-
ences, socio-economic considerations, education experiences and prospects, 
sociopolitical context, etc., together as they try to make sense of the incident 
and create a future path for themselves. A number of scholars, including 
the philosopher Karl Jaspers (1970), have recognized the importance of 
the Grenzsituation (boundary situation) created by having to deal with 
a situation that prior knowledge or rational objective reasoning cannot 
prepare a person to overcome. These boundary situations or critical life 
events then force people to radically reconsider and reformulate their life 
trajectory. These boundary situations also demonstrate the dynamic linkage 
between macro-, meso-, and micro-level events interacting and producing 
the conditions for an individual to facilitate engagement in political violence 
and are common in other accounts of micro-mobilization in activist careers, 
criminal life histories, and engagement with terror groups (Fillieule 2015; 
Goodey 2000; Horgan 2014).
Interestingly, these young, politically naïve men are now engaged in 
politically motivated violence and actively engaged in committing murder 
or attempting to kill. Research has demonstrated that engaging in these 
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activities has significant negative implications for psychological and physical 
wellbeing and personal freedom (Burgess, Ferguson, and Hollywood 2007; 
Ferguson, Burgess, and Hollywood 2010, 2015; Grossman 1996; Jamieson, 
Shirlow, and Grounds 2010), yet while mobilized they are not politically or 
ideologically radicalized. In becoming ‘radicalized’ we mean they enter a 
process of political and ideological awakening and develop deeper political 
understanding, ideals, and aspirations. For our sample, their political educa-
tion or radicalization did not begin until they were imprisoned.
The prison years had a profound impact on their political life, with their 
protests continuing in prison, but now focused on the prison regime; in 
these encounters they also honed their negotiation and communication 
skills, which would assist them in their political careers post-incarceration. 
Prison also offered them the opportunity to develop their political think-
ing and engage in prison education programmes; indeed, for many of the 
loyalists incarcerated, prison provided their f irst real attempt at education. 
The ‘opportunities’ prison provided began to fuel this process of political 
and ideological radicalization (McAuley 2000, 2001). These developments 
are succinctly expressed by a former UVF volunteer:
I’ve been involved for something like 35 years and the next stage obviously 
when you get involved in the conflict, the more operations you carry out, 
the more you get involved, the bigger chance you’ve got of getting caught 
or killed. So I was caught, and put in prison, so I had those prison years 
where, and it should be no surprise to anybody, because some of the best 
leaders in the world developed their political thinking in prisons, Nelson 
Mandela […] so it should come as no surprise that people in prison do 
develop because you’ve been removed from the conflict. (Interview with 
Ferguson UVF Volunteer, Belfast, 2006)
It is also clear that these prison years provided the space to think, which 
prompted these loyalist prisoners to reformulate their ideas and see the 
conflict from a fresh perspective while also developing a longer-term 
political strategy, that was only possible to develop in isolation from the 
action-reaction cycle of sectarian violence taking place on the streets of 
Belfast and elsewhere. Once released they found their thinking had moved 
forward and they were on a different page, in comparison to those continu-
ing the conflict outside the prison walls. As another interviewee observed:
Prison just gives you an opportunity to be detached from the conflict. 
It’s a dubious way to be detached, but you’re detached from it and it 
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gives you time to think. You come out with pretty clear ideas in your 
head. It’s pretty diff icult after that period of time when you’re away 
and you go back and see your friends and colleagues from before and 
some of them are thinking in exactly the same way as they did in the 
early seventies. How’s this happening like? And then they think because 
you’ve been in prison it’s softened you or broken you or whatever, but 
that’s not the case. It’s just common sense, pragmatism. You can’t go 
on killing each other forever. Some time you’re going to have to talk, 
so why not do it now rather than go through another ten, twenty (or 
whatever) years of conflict? (Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, 
Ferguson 2006)
So this reformulation and a renewed focus on education prepared them 
to leave prison ready for the next stage of their political journey, a stage 
which was exemplif ied by a move away from the employment of violence 
to a desire to engage with their local community to create the conditions 
for community development and conflict transformation. For most of the 
former loyalist combatants interviewed, one of the key reasons they began 
to disengage from political violence after the paramilitary ceasef ires in 
1994, was the desire not to witness another generation of children have the 
same experiences of political violence they had endured: ‘Hopefully my kids 
will never see trouble like I seen. No never in my life do I want them to see 
that. I have a wee lad there and another child on the way’ (Interview with 
UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2007). While social movement research 
and research from terrorism studies provide well-developed theoretical 
frameworks to explain mobilization into political movements, research on 
the processes involved in leaving social movements or disengaging from 
terrorist activities is much more limited (Ferguson 2011; Fillieule 2015; 
Horgan 2009; Klandermans 2003).
However, recent research on loyalist paramilitaries (Ferguson, Burgess, 
and Hollywood 2015), republican paramilitaries and members of the Italian 
Red Brigades (Bosi and Della Porta 2012), and with other armed groups from 
across the globe, such as Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups (Horgan 2009; Rashwan 
2009; Vidino 2011), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (Reinares 2011), or neo-Nazi 
groups (Blee 2002; Bjorgo 2009), illustrate that a range of push-and-pull fac-
tors (e.g. losing faith in group ideology, burn out, change of circumstances, 
etc.) are involved in promoting or hindering an individual’s demobilization 
from armed political groups.
Across the globe disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) 
processes have become a common and critical aspect of post-conflict 
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reconstruction initiatives (Knight 2008), with the reintegration of combat-
ants into productive civilian life viewed as key to post-conflict security 
and recovery. Kingma (2000) provides four important reasons for engaging 
in DDR, namely, humanitarianism – many combatants are victims of the 
conflict in addition to being perpetrators of violence; compensatory justice 
– soldiers have done their duty and expect compensation because of their 
potential contribution – ex-combatants can be a major force in rebuilding 
war-torn societies; and f inally, they are potential ‘spoilers’ who can jeop-
ardize the peace process or engage in criminal activities which threaten 
economic and democratic stability and thus need to be dealt with.
However, there is no singular DDR programme and some approaches 
have been much more successful than others. One common measure of suc-
cess is simply to count the numbers of combatants successfully demobilized, 
but there is a need to look beyond the numbers to explore the success of 
the reintegration of combatants into civilian society and this becomes 
much more diff icult. Particularly when researchers try to understand the 
micro- or individual-level determinants of successful demobilization and 
reintegration.2 So while the consensus is that these processes are funda-
mental to building peace, increasing security and assisting in economic 
post-conflict recovery (Doyle and Sambanis 2000), their complex nature 
makes it diff icult to distinguish which strategy or intervention makes what 
specif ic beneficial contribution (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007).
However, as in the case with every political conflict across the globe, 
Northern Ireland is a unique situation in terms of conflict transformation, 
DDR, and the lessons which can be learned and exported (Ferguson 2010; 
Rolston 2007; Shirlow and McEvoy 2008). Thus, all potential lessons need 
to be carefully considered before application elsewhere. Just as with any 
analysis of mobilization, any analysis of demobilization and disengagement 
must be a multilevel analysis which considers the interactions between 
the micro, meso and macro. In this context, any individual demobilization 
narrative from a loyalist paramilitary needs to be understood against the 
backdrop of a wider organizational disarmament process which began in 
1998 and concluded in 2009 for the UVF and RHC and 2010 for the UDA, 
which were also part of the wider Northern Irish peace process.
For our interviewees the key drivers for demobilization came from 
within the organizations, rather than necessarily from within themselves. 
In particular, the leadership and the ability of the leadership to ‘turn the 
tanker’ and guide the rank-and-f ile membership towards a less militarized 
2 See Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) for an illustration of this complexity.
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and more civilianized role was key to them disengaging from politically 
motivated violence:
I’ve seen people at the top and it’s starting to f ilter slowly, slowly, slowly. A 
lot of stuff now going on is the foot soldiers, the ceasefire soldiers […] and 
I know there are these thoughts within organizations, how do we address 
these kids? How do we basically get rid of them, you know what I mean, 
without them falling into ruin the way the LVF [Loyalist Volunteer Force] 
went, you know. (Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2008)
However, guiding the membership towards a new violence- and crime-free 
future is not as easy as many outsider observers, or loyalist leaders would 
like it to be. In particular, the paramilitaries fear that the peace process 
would make them ‘redundant’ and negatively impact on their ability to 
f inance themselves. Or that this inactivity and lack of direction would in 
turn lead to the development of schisms within the organizations, such as 
that witnessed in the 1996 with the birth of the LVF, or the degeneration of 
different companies into organized crime gangs:
At this point in time, the paramilitaries are disintegrating or mutating 
into gangs because it’s, since 1994 when the ceasefire was called, it’s what 
do you do now mate, we’re redundant aren’t we? […] How do paramilitar-
ies justify their existence if there’s no conflict? Yes, we’ve tried to move 
and alter culture, trying to get people involved in the community, trying 
to get people involved in politics and some people just want to be by 
themselves, so we do try. But the greed, the money, I mean you’re talking 
about big money. (Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2007)
While the role of the loyalist leadership in providing direction was often 
praised by the former loyalist paramilitaries, the leadership, or, more pre-
cisely, the lack of leadership and strategic direction within loyalism was 
viewed as a barrier to demobilization by former combatants. Generally, the 
barriers discussed usually related to the lack of capable leadership within 
loyalism and unionism more broadly or the lack of a grand political project 
within loyalism. The lack of a long-term political project was very much 
related to the nature of loyalism being focused on maintaining the status 
quo or simply combating the IRA, without any grand goal, such as achieving 
a united Ireland, to rally the troops around. The interviewees also tended 
to make comparisons with Sinn Féin and the Provisional IRA and bemoan 
how Sinn Féin and the IRA were better placed to provide opportunities to 
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their volunteers post-agreement than loyalism could. This former loyalist 
paramilitary sums up these problems:
The educated, your articulate, you never got them in loyalist paramilitar-
ies. I mean, that was one thing that there was a major, major shortage of. 
You had nobody to speak, to formulate policy, to talk about strategy, to 
talk about the way forward. It didn’t exist. You had one or two thinkers, 
but not in the same degree as you would have had within the republican 
circles, so it was more or less a blind man fumbling in the dark. Where 
do we go from here and how do we go from here? How can we be used? 
(Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2008)
It is also important to note that while these former paramilitarists began 
their journey into these political movements from a start position of politi-
cal naivety and only became politically educated and radicalized through 
their lengthy involvement or during imprisonment, when they disengaged 
from politically motivated violence they did not become de-radicalized or 
disengaged from political activity.
Since the ceasef ires many former Northern Irish paramilitaries became 
involved in community and youth work as a form of community capacity-
building or conflict transformation (Mika 2006), and likewise, the majority 
of our interviewees were now working on a variety of projects, such as, truth 
recovery and storytelling, co-ordinating restorative justice programmes, 
setting up mobile phone contacts to diffuse interface tension, developing 
sports and community activities, promoting racial tolerance, and/or were 
involved in local politics.
Thus, we have a paradox that while the political agency of the participants 
fuelled decades of conflict and political violence; violence that has left peace 
process of Northern Ireland stagnating under the shadow of the Troubles, 
yet it means they are also uniquely placed to initiate the attitudinal and 
behavioural changes necessary to persuade the younger generations not 
to continue the cycle of violence. Former political prisoners have been 
able to work together across community boundaries in a way that is less 
apparent among mainstream political parties (McAuley 2002; Shirlow and 
McEvoy 2008).
Indeed, the leadership shown by former prisoners has been instrumental 
in preventing the resumption of organized political and communal violence 
across Northern Ireland rather than successful policing or elite political 
accommodations (Shirlow et al. 2005; Shirlow et al. 2010). This point is 
clearly articulated by one of the former loyalist prisoners we interviewed:
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If anybody thinks that the PSNI [Police Service of Northern Ireland] are 
maintaining the peace in the interfaces, they are living in cloud cuckoo 
land. The paramilitaries are maintaining the peace at the interfaces. But 
that’s good news. Some people would say, ‘That’s terrible – it shows the 
power they have’, but given the year we had last year, and the year before 
that, and the year before that, and the year before that, it’s not bad that 
we have this degree of calm at this point in time. (Interview with UVF 
Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2007)
For the vast majority of our participants, their political lives were now 
focused on using non-violent means to bring future political changes. So 
while the participants were politically naïve when their journeys begin in 
the early days of the Troubles, after 30 years or more of being politically 
active their journey continues, yet for many the direction of their journey 
has changed to match the wider changes in Northern Irish society, however, 
their political identity and radical beliefs have not waned.
For the interviewees there was also a realization that to have a ‘normal’ 
peaceful society there would be a need for former combatants to become 
reintegrated into mainstream society and shake off the labels and associ-
ated stigma attached to being an ‘ex-prisoner’ or ‘former paramilitary’.
I’ve got to a position, which you know it is a position within the com-
munity, doing a lot of work the schools recognize, the police recognize, 
loads of things. I’ve dropped the tag of ex-prisoner and all that stuff, 
dropped that a long time ago. You know, some people feel that they still 
need to use that and we were saying, people like [David] Ervine3 were 
saying, like there has to come a stage where you leave that behind […] 
you have to move beyond that and move forward. (Interview with UVF 
Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2008)
However, many have found this diff icult especially as they felt rejected by 
mainstream society and the political elite; which tended to blame them 
solely for the Troubles:
As someone who has worked towards trying to create a transition I realize 
all the diff iculties involved in that and that again creates resentment […] 
3 David Ervine was a UVF member and former prisoner who became leader of the Progressive 
Unionist Party (PUP) and was elected to the Northern Irish Assembly. For a detailed biography, 
see Moloney (2010) or Sinnerton (2003).
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when you realize how tirelessly a lot of people worked to try and make 
that happen these people [middle-class unionists] have really simplistic 
views of the way things work. You just don’t wind down thirty years 
of militarism and paramilitarism just like that. You can’t turn it off. 
(Interview with UVF Volunteer, Belfast, Ferguson 2008)
During the interviews it was clear the narratives were still being written 
and many were still active in politics, while for others the war was over 
and it was time to move on and give time back to their families and/or 
communities as a means of reparation for the time spent in prison. This 
enduring politicization should not be surprising as research in other set-
tings has clearly demonstrated that while collective action is contingent on 
holding a strong collective identity (Huddy 2001) once people are spurred 
into action, it is diff icult to simply switch it off (Van Stekelenburg and 
Klandermans 2007).
It is clear that the accounts provided here demonstrate the dynamic role 
of identity in collective action, and how, while the introduction of a peace 
accord and the resultant societal change are powerful, they may not cause 
individuals to de-radicalize and de-politicize and simply reintegrate into the 
masses. Instead, we see continued radicalization and a strong attachment 
to collective identity – just channelled into a new direction more f itting 
with the new sociopolitical context.
Part of this process will also involve cognitive dissonance (Festinger 
1957). In that, once people make a decision to follow a particular course of 
action, they have to create justif ications for pursuing this course. So the 
more behavioural commitment to the group and group goals, the stronger 
the feelings and cognitive justif ications for this behaviour and the more 
likely they will continue their activism in spite of the costs. As McCauley 
and Moskalenko (2008) illustrate, the activist is likely to feel more pride in 
group success and more anger and humiliation with group failure as they 
rationalize and defend their actions and devise reasons to rationalize and 
explain their behaviour.
Conclusion
Mobilization into loyalist paramilitary groups during the Troubles in North-
ern Ireland shares much in common with social movement theories and 
research with other protest groups from Europe and beyond. In particular, 
these narratives bear a remarkable resemblance to the narratives provided 
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by the IRA and Red Brigade volunteers interviewed by Bosi and Della Porta 
(2012), especially with the participants who followed the ‘instrumental’ 
and ‘solidaristic’ paths into these groups. These narrative accounts of 
mobilization, engagement in political action, and the processes involved 
in disengagement from politically motivated violence illustrate the complex 
range of factors which require consideration in order to understand the 
drivers pushing individuals in and out of these social movements. It must 
also be noted the majority of the participants in this study joined the UVF, 
UDA, or RHC in f irst decade of the Troubles, thus their experiences and 
motivations will differ from more recent recruits, and especially from 
those who joined after the 1994 ceasef ire. Future research with a variety 
of ideologically different violent and non-violent groups from across the 
globe, who maybe are still actively engaged or have perhaps disengaging or 
even disbanded, will allow theory to develop and provide researchers and 
policymakers with an improved means of conceptualizing the scale and 
intricacy of mobilization and demobilization processes.
Interviews
Conducted by Ferguson, Belfast, 2004
Conducted by Ferguson, Belfast, 2006
Conducted by Ferguson, Belfast, 2007
Conducted by Ferguson, Belfast, 2008
Conducted by McAuley, mid-Ulster, 2007
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7 Social Movements and Social 
Movement Organizations
Recruitment, Ideology, and Splits1
Robert W. White and Tijen Demirel-Pegg
Social Movements and Social Movement Organizations
A common interpretation of the Irish ‘Troubles’ is that they began in the 
late 1960s when counterdemonstrators supported by the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC) attacked peaceful civil rights protesters. ‘Out of the 
Ashes’ of August 1969 arose the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
and ‘Provisional’ Sinn Féin. It is also widely assumed that the conflict 
ended in 1998 when the Provisionals accepted the Good Friday Agreement 
and settled for a reformed Northern Ireland (see also Bosi and De Fazio, 
in this volume).
The transformation of the Provisionals from revolutionaries to consti-
tutional politicians is only part of the story, however. The Provisional IRA 
and Sinn Féin were not the Irish republican movement. They were two 
of several ‘players’ in the Irish republican ‘arena’ between 1969 and 1998 
(Jasper 2015; Mische 2015; Bosi and Della Porta 2012). Other organizations 
included Cuman na mBan and the Irish National Liberation Army. Placing 
the Provisionals in the context of the Irish republican movement allows an 
examination of their origins and how they changed over time, and shows 
how they were part of a series of waves of Irish republicanism.
Tarrow (1989) argues that mobilization occurs in waves and focuses 
on processes of escalation and de-escalation in recruitment. Placing an 
organization in the context of the social movement as a whole provides 
insight on organizational dynamics during waves of recruitment and during 
the ‘lean’ years between waves.
The timing of recruitment, the geographic location of new members, 
and their political background/upbringing, inf luence the new recruit’s 
understanding of what s/he joined (ideology). When founding members 
1 Revised paper presented at the f irst annual Ruairí Ó Brádaigh Summer School, Roscommon, 
Ireland, June 2014. Thanks to Lorenzo Bosi, Gianluca De Fazio, Dieter Reinisch, Margaret White, 
and Terry F. White for their help and comments.
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recruit new members, the new recruits enter an organization whose 
members have already established an understanding of who they are and 
what they are about. Even if new recruits join because of a commitment 
to the organization’s ideology, a certain level of heterogeneity is inevitably 
introduced (see also White 1993, 2017; Weinstein 2007). The politics of where 
the new members live, their upbringing and family politics, and the tim-
ing of recruitment also influence the level of cohesion and homogeneity 
among members. Membership heterogeneity influences the likelihood of 
splits. For example, heavy state repression may create conditions for mass 
mobilization, but it may also bring in members who are more likely to be 
co-opted. An end to repression may satisfy new recruits but not founding 
members whose signif icant sacrif ices in pursuit of a full victory pre-date 
the arrival of the new recruits. In summary, geographic location, family 
political background/upbringing, and the timing of recruitment contribute 
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to the heterogeneity of movements, leading to factions and splits (Garner 
and Zald 1987; Freeman 1978; Gamson 1990; Demirel-Pegg forthcoming).
Figure 7.1 is a heuristic. We acknowledge, for example, that the timing 
of recruitment may directly influence ideology and that external factors 
influence splits (e.g. Balser 1997). The figure does not convey the full dynam-
ics of activism. Instead, it is an attempt to convey important mechanisms 
associated with activism, as found in the following case study of Provisional 
Irish republicans within the context of the Irish republican movement.
In the Beginning: The Wave of the Early 1970s
In August 1969, the RUC was unable to maintain order in Derry and violence 
spread to other areas of Northern Ireland. In Belfast, nationalist/Catholic 
neighbourhoods were attacked by Protestant/loyalist vigilantes and the 
RUC. A Belfast respondent described what happened in his neighbourhood2:
Clonard republican: I lived in an area that was called the Clonard. The 
Clonard area in ’69, Bombay Street is in the area, right? The Clonard is 
completely – it’s smaller, it has thirteen streets, right? At the bottom of 
the street it – [it is a] fringe off the Shankill Road area. In ’69 the area 
was attacked from the Shankill Road along Lawnbrooke Avenue by B 
Men, which were sort of paramilitary reservish policemen. The loyalists 
attacked the area. At that time there was only a couple of hunting guns 
in the area. Like shotguns. Nobody was able to defend the area, right? 
So, I decided, myself decided, the best way to defend the area is to get 
involved in the republican movement.
The respondent joined Na Fianna Éireann, the youth wing of the Irish 
republican movement.
Unrest from both communities escalated and on 9 August 1971 the British 
gave the Northern Irish government permission to introduce internment 
without trial. Even though nationalists and unionists had engaged in vio-
lence, only nationalist areas were targeted. Hundreds of nationalists were 
2 Data collection began in 1984 and has continued through 2016. Respondents include a 
variety of activists – women and men, senior and junior level, from across Ireland, etc. The 
initial wave of interviews (1984/85) may be the most representative data ever collected from 
activists associated with a social movement engaged in an armed campaign (White 1993). Some 
quotations have been presented elsewhere.
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interned without charge or trial (McGuff in 1973). This respondent joined 
the Provisionals after the introduction of internment:
Belfast republican: I’d seen many people shot dead. I’d seen friends’ 
fathers who had been taken away and interned. I had friends whose rela-
tives and maybe brothers and things like that were taken to Holywood, 
the interrogation centre at the time, and tortured. And all that from 1969 
right up to just after internment, that was a real awakening for me on 
the injustices of the state.
On Sunday, 30 January 1972, at an anti-internment march, British soldiers 
shot dead thirteen unarmed nationalist/Catholics; a fourteenth died later. 
‘Bloody Sunday’ influenced this respondent, from Derry:
Derry republican: It wasn’t an emotional response, that ‘I hate the Brits – 
it’s about time I did something’, you know? It was just that I’d always been 
concerned, I’d always been motivated towards things Irish and it was just 
another – it was just another act of political vandalism on Irish people. […] 
The British were killing our people, they were locking them up and they 
were nothing more than Stormont [the Northern Ireland government].
These respondents were influenced by violence, defending a neighbourhood 
from loyalists and suffering repression at the hands of the RUC and the 
British Army (see also De Fazio 2013; Demirel-Pegg 2014).
Not every Northern Irish recruit immediately joined the Provisionals in 
response to state or loyalist violence. Factors like the belief that political 
violence would be effective and camaraderie with peers influenced their 
decision-making processes (Bosi and Della Porta 2012; Klandermans 1984; 
McAdam 1999; White 1989). The repression also interacted with family 
background. Persons from republican backgrounds were more easily and 
more quickly recruited. The respondent from Clonard was from a republican 
family and joined relatively quickly in response to August 1969. The respond-
ent from Derry, who was not from a republican family, joined the Provisionals 
more than a year after Bloody Sunday (see also Bosi 2012). Also, the violence 
did bring in recruits who were not from Northern Ireland but were mobilized 
because state violence was an affront to their sense of national identity.
What is important is that the state violence created a fertile ground for 
the founders of the Provisionals as they sought recruits from all over Ireland. 
As the state’s response de-legitimated the state’s authority, young Northern 
Irish nationalists came to believe that they were second-class citizens in 
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a state that could not be reformed. Their best political choice, it seemed, 
was to support armed struggle for a united Ireland via the Provisional IRA 
and Sinn Féin. Family upbringing may have facilitated recruitment, but 
state repression turned the Provisionals into a mass movement in Northern 
Ireland (Bell 1979; White 2017).
Understanding this mass mobilization and the heterogeneity it intro-
duced is essential for understanding why the Provisionals were willing to 
settle for the Good Friday Agreement. As the conflict continued, young 
northerners – many of whom were recruited in the early 1970s – came 
to dominate the Provisionals. Belfast ended up with more Provisionals 
than any other area of Ireland. Key younger people moved into leadership 
positions, including Gerry Adams in Belfast and Martin McGuinness in 
Derry. Finally, because those in the war zone suffered disproportionately, 
the Northern voice became especially important.
At some point in the early 1990s, the new Provo leadership realized that 
armed struggle was not going to lead to a united Ireland. A negotiated 
peace that fell short of a united Ireland but led to a reformed Northern 
Ireland where they would have a political voice became an attractive option 
for people who had been deeply influenced by state violence in the early 
1970s. The Good Friday Agreement, which promised that Irish nationalists 
would no longer be treated as second-class citizens in Northern Ireland, 
was a signif icant achievement. The people who settled for reform were not 
necessarily the people who created the Provos, however.
Before the Provisionals
Modern Irish republicanism dates from the failed Easter Rising of 1916. 
Between 1919 and 1921, the IRA and Sinn Féin re-grouped and pursued a 
guerrilla war and a political campaign for an independent Irish republic. 
In response, the British passed the Government of Ireland Act (1920) and 
partitioned Ireland into the six counties of Northern Ireland, where the ma-
jority Protestant population wanted to remain a part of the United Kingdom, 
and the Irish Free State (declared the Republic of Ireland in 1949), where 
the vast majority of the people were Catholic and wanted an independent 
Irish Republic. The IRA and Sinn Féin split over the Anglo-Irish Treaty 
(1921), which confirmed separate parliaments in Dublin and Belfast. Irish 
republicans who rejected the treaty lost the Irish Civil War that followed 
but maintained the IRA and Sinn Féin and continued their pursuit of an 
all-Ireland republic. There were failed IRA campaigns in the 1940s and 1950s 
in pursuit of an independent and united Ireland (Bell 1979).
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When the violence flared in Northern Ireland in August 1969, Irish re-
publicans disagreed on the most appropriate response. The then leadership 
of the IRA and Sinn Féin, veterans from the 1940s and 1950s, argued that 
the IRA and Sinn Féin should recognize the Dublin, Belfast, and London 
parliaments and combine armed struggle with constitutional politics. The 
people who created the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin were also veterans 
from the 1940s and 1950s. This group of people believed that recognizing 
those parliaments violated fundamental principles and would be a strategic 
mistake. Their view was that participation in constitutional politics would 
inevitably lead to co-optation and settling for reforms that were short of a 
united Ireland. The disagreement led to a split of the IRA in December 1969 
into the ‘Off icial’ IRA and the ‘Provisional’ IRA. In January 1970, Sinn Féin 
split into ‘Off icial’ Sinn Féin and ‘Provisional’ Sinn Féin.
Most important, the people who created the Provisionals were different 
from the young recruits of 1969-1972. The people who created the Provisionals 
were involved in the movement prior to August 1969. In Tyrone’s Struggle, 
Gerard Magee quotes a pre-1969 IRA volunteer who said, ‘I didn’t need to be 
struck over the head by an RUC baton to become an active republican’ (Ma-
gee 2011: 124). To paraphrase a critic of Martin McGuinness, ‘He got his start 
throwing rocks at the RUC’. The Irish republican movement spans Ireland. 
In August 1969, and because of where they lived, some Irish republicans 
were not in a position to be hit by off icers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.
Joe Cahill (1920-2004) helped create the Provisionals. He was born in 
Belfast in 1920. In contrast to many of the young northerners of 1969-1972, 
he was born into the Irish republican tradition:
Interviewer: […] why in general did you get involved in the movement?
Joe Cahill: Yeah. I suppose it was the environment that I grew up in the 
’30s – poverty, and unemployment, and that sort of thing, you know? I felt 
that something had to be done about it. I became involved with various 
groups as a young lad. But I soon came to the conclusion that the root of 
all the trouble in Ireland was British occupation. And I suppose education 
through reading about Tone, people like that. The only way forward was 
to break the connection with England […].
Interviewer: You’re from a republican background?
Joe Cahill: I would be, yeah. Both my father and mother had been involved 
one way or another in the Republican Movement.
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Cahill grew up in an environment where state repression was a part of 
life and armed struggle for a united Ireland was an accepted response. He 
joined the IRA in the 1930s and was jailed during the IRA campaigns of the 
1940s and 1950s. He resigned from the IRA in the mid-1960s because they 
were not militant enough. In August 1969, he returned and with others in 
Belfast helped create the Provisionals.
Most of the people who created the Provisionals did not live in Belfast 
or even Northern Ireland, however. Of the seven people on the Provisional 
IRA’s f irst Army Council, f ive of them lived in ‘southern Ireland’ (the excep-
tions were Joe Cahill and Leo Martin, from Belfast).3 Of the 20 people on the 
‘Provisional’ Sinn Féin Caretaker Executive established in 1970, only two were 
from Northern Ireland.
Ruairí Ó Brádaigh (1932-2013), from Longford in the Irish midlands, was 
Chairman of the Caretaker Executive. He was the son of an IRA veteran 
wounded in 1919:
Ruairí Ó Brádaigh: He and another man, another volunteer, Willie Mc-
Nally, attempted to disarm two members of the Royal Irish Constabulary, 
the predecessors of the RUC and the PSNI, and they were overcome by 
the two policemen. And both of them were wounded, my father very 
severely wounded, and he was disabled for life.
Ó Brádaigh’s mother was a veteran of Cumann na mBan, an independent 
women’s organization founded in 1914:
Ruairí Ó Brádaigh: She was O/C or captain of the Cumann na mBan 
branch in Donegal Town in 1917 and ’18 and then when she went to Dublin 
as a student at University College Dublin. She was a member of the college 
branch of Cumann na mBan and took part in all its activities.
Like Joe Cahill, Ó Brádaigh grew up in a household that valued Irish culture:
Ruairí Ó Brádaigh: Tuesday and Friday evening, paying a penny each, we 
were sent to Irish classes in the town, from five o’clock to seven. The first hour 
being Irish language and history and second hour being ceili dancing, Irish 
dancing, and with an annual fancy dress ceili and all that – cultural activities.
3 ‘Southern Ireland’ refers to the Irish Free State/Republic of Ireland, parts of which are north 
of Northern Ireland. We argue that Irish Republicans born and raised in Northern Ireland are 
politically and socially different from persons born and raised elsewhere.
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Ó Brádaigh joined Sinn Féin in 1950 and the IRA in 1951. He was Chief of 
Staff at the end of the 1956-1962 IRA campaign. He was on the Provisional 
IRA’s f irst Army Council and became the f irst President of ‘Provisional’ Sinn 
Féin (henceforth, Sinn Féin). The founders of the Provisionals, Joe Cahill, 
Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, and their contemporaries, were middle-aged men and 
veteran activists.
When the Provisionals were created, there were also other organizations, 
including the ‘Off icial’ IRA and ‘Off icial Sinn Féin’. Cumann na mBan 
opposed the 1921 treaty and after the Irish Civil War held political values 
parallel to those of the IRA and Sinn Féin. Peig King joined in Dublin in the 
1940s. Like Cahill and Ó Brádaigh, she was from a republican family. When 
she joined, her older sister was already a member:
Interviewer: Why did you get involved in Cumann na mBan?
Peig King: In Cumann na mBan? I knew about Cumann na mBan, my 
mother was in it. And all along the line, my father and mother was 
involved…
Interviewer: When did she get involved?
Peig King: She was involved when – she was in Dublin in 1916. […] She 
was involved all along, right. My father was involved as a young man. […]
Interviewer: Was he an IRA Veteran?
Peig King: Yes, he was. Yes. Yeah.
In 1969/70, the Cumann na mBan leadership agreed with the political 
analysis of those who founded the Provisionals (Reinisch 2016). Peig King, 
while still a member of Cumann na mBan, joined Sinn Féin in 1970.
Recruitment, Ideology, and Resistance to Change – And a Second Wave 
of Recruits
Joe Cahill, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, Peig King, and their contemporaries, joined 
small, clandestine organizations, not mass movements. They shared 
political backgrounds and accepted the view that the Dublin and Belfast 
governments established by the Government of Ireland Act (1920) were 
illegitimate. Their allegiance was to an all-Ireland government that was 
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suppressed in the 1920s and abandoned by former comrades of their 
parents.
Depending upon where they were born and raised, however, the people 
who created the Provisionals grew up in very different worlds. Joe Cahill 
grew up in Northern Ireland, which was predominantly Protestant and pro-
Union, and where Catholics/nationalists were second-class citizens. Ruairí 
Ó Brádaigh grew up in the Irish Free State/Republic of Ireland, which was 
predominantly Catholic and Irish nationalist in outlook. Because of their 
politics, both of them suffered repression at the hands of their respective 
governments. Cahill and his fellow northerners were also victims of social 
oppression because of their religion and their sense of national identity. For 
many northerners, the Dublin government was not legitimate, but it was 
also distant and appeared relatively benign.
As the Provisionals carried on their campaign to re-unite Ireland, some 
of their founders, including Joe Cahill and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, were arrested. 
Others aged and left the scene. With time, younger people – especially 
people born and raised in Northern Ireland – moved into leadership posi-
tions. With them came change. For example, at the initiative of young 
northerners, the Provisional IRA adopted a cell structure (small active 
service units) in the late 1970s.
The new leaders also tried to disband Cumann na mBan and fold its 
members into the Provisionals. From their perspective, the Provisionals 
were progressive and there was no need for a separate women’s organization. 
From the Cumann na mBan perspective, there was a concern that the 
new leadership was trying to f ind a way to better control women activists. 
Cumann na mBan refused to go along with the plan (though some women 
did leave for the Provos):
Interviewer: Why is it important that there’s a separate women’s 
organization?
Cumann na Mban activist: I think it’s important from the point of view 
that women tend to become subsumed – well at that particular time 
[1970s] women’s role was more I think subservient than it would be now, 
you know? Women were only just kind of standing up and being counted. 
And I think it was always important for the Republican Movement that 
women had a separate voice and could stand up for themselves. Because 
even now I think that women in the male military organization are very 
much at the mercy of their male counterparts. And I would rather, as a 
woman, have my own voice and be able to make it known.
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The key point here is that the beliefs and ideology of members of a pre-
existing organization were so strong that they refused to be absorbed into 
a larger movement organization with the same goal. This did not stop the 
younger people from changing the Provisionals in other ways.
A second wave of new recruits, generated by the 1980-1981 hunger strikes, 
solidified the control of the younger and northern leadership (White 2017; see 
also O’Hearn, this volume). Led by Gerry Adams, Martin McGuinness, and 
Danny Morrison, the new leaders changed Sinn Féin’s policy so that elected 
representatives could take seats in the Dublin parliament. They also promised 
that they would never take seats in a Northern Ireland parliament. That  promise 
made it easier for senior northerners, like Joe Cahill, to accept the change.
The opposition to taking seats in the Dublin parliament was led by people 
recruited long before there were Provisional Irish republicans, senior ‘south-
erners’ (or, non-northerners) like Ruairí Ó Brádaigh. They, and their families, 
had personally experienced repression at the hands of the Irish Free State/
Republic of Ireland; the illegitimacy of the Dublin government was immedi-
ate for them. They walked out of the 1986 Sinn Féin Ard-Fheis (convention) 
and created two rival social movement organizations, Republican Sinn Féin 
(RSF) and the Continuity IRA. Cumann na mBan also opposed taking seats 
in the Dublin parliament.
The 1986 split has several implications for studying social movements 
and their organizations. What happens in one movement organization, like 
Sinn Féin, influences other movement organizations, like Republican Sinn 
Féin and Cumann na mBan. From 1986 on, RSF and Cumann na mBan (two 
small organizations) adopted a mutually supportive approach and several 
members of Cumann na mBan would become off icers in RSF; today, Peig 
King is the ‘Patron’ of Republican Sinn Féin. Cumann na mBan did not join 
RSF en masse or through bloc recruitment, but their influence on RSF is 
undeniable (Ní Chathmmhaoil and Reinisch 2014).
The split also shows that when and where someone is recruited influences 
that person’s understanding of what s/he has joined and the course of his/her 
activism, which has been noted previously (see also White 1993; White 2010; 
Weinstein 2007; Viterna 2013). As Sarah Campbell (in this volume) nicely 
demonstrates, collective identities promote solidarity among members of 
a social movement. At the same time, differences in collective identities 
across subgroups of activists in the same organization may promote factions 
and splits. This was demonstrated a second time in 1997.
Eleven years after the f irst split, the senior northerners still active in 
the Provisionals, including Joe Cahill, went along with the (still relatively) 
young leadership as they negotiated the Irish peace process. The primary 
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opposition was a group of activists who were willing to accept Sinn Féin tak-
ing seats in the Dublin parliament but who questioned the Provisional IRA’s 
ceasef ire in 1997 and, later, the Good Friday Agreement. They challenged 
the leadership and created the 32 County Sovereignty Committee, which 
they described as a pressure group within Sinn Féin. Of the 16 people on the 
committee’s ‘Executive’, only four were from Northern Ireland. They were 
committed to a united Ireland, not a reformed Northern Ireland where many 
of them did not live. After being expelled from Sinn Féin, they re-organized 
as the 32 County Sovereignty Movement. It is alleged that the 32 CSM is the 
‘political wing’ of the Real IRA (Mooney and O’Toole 2003).
The Irish Republican Movement: 1998 to Today
The Irish republican movement did not end with the Good Friday Agree-
ment in 1998. Post-1998, Sinn Féin politics dominated the Provisionals 
to the extent that the Provisional IRA formally ended its campaign and 
decommissioned weapons in 2005. And the peace process has been good 
to Sinn Féin. In Northern Ireland, they are the second largest party and 
Martin McGuinness served as the Deputy First Minister of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly until 2017 – in spite of having promised to never serve in 
such an assembly. In the Republic of Ireland, Sinn Féin is the third largest 
political party and Gerry Adams is leader of their parliamentary party in 
Dáil Éireann (the Dublin parliament). North and south, Sinn Féin’s repre-
sentatives still advocate for a united Ireland.
Republican Sinn Féin, the Continuity IRA, the 32 County Sovereignty 
Movement, the Real IRA, and Cumann na mBan, all rejected the Good 
Friday Agreement and continued as social movement organizations. After 
2005 more organizations appeared, including Éirigi, the Republican Net-
work for Unity (RNU), and the Óglaigh na hÉireann (ÓNH). A focus on the 
Irish republican movement brings the activities of these groups into view, 
and also provides more insight on the transformation of the Provisionals.
Indeed, this case study offers insight on what happens between waves of 
mobilization and de-mobilization. The process of recruitment to organiza-
tions that reject the Good Friday Agreement appears to be similar to the 
recruitment process of those who joined after the mass mobilization of 
1916-1923 but prior to the mass mobilization of the early 1970s. The following 
is from an activist who joined Republican Sinn Féin in 2000:
Republican Sinn Féin activist 1: I would like to say I just woke up one 
morning and decided I wanted to see the freedom of my country, but I was 
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brought up in a very republican household, in the republican tradition […] 
I’ve been reared in the republican tradition and I’ve always known that, 
you know, we’re under occupation and that the freedom of your country 
is a noble aspiration, it’s not something you should be ashamed of.
Like Joe Cahill, Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, and Peig King, this activist was strongly 
influenced by family background. When armed struggle by Irish republican 
activists is limited – in the 1930s (Cahill), the 1940s (King), the early 1950s (Ó 
Brádaigh), and the 2000s – family connections are that much more valuable 
a source of recruits (see Veugelers 2011; Della Porta 1988).
Family connections and repression have never been the only source of 
recruits to the Irish republican movement. Another person who joined 
Republican Sinn Féin in the early 2000s commented:
Republican Sinn Féin activist 2: I suppose just all my life I’ve felt that 
continued British rule in Ireland was unjust and immoral as well as illegal 
and so I suppose in a sense it was merely inevitable [that I would become 
involved].
The Good Friday Agreement did not resolve the fundamental issue that 
has sustained Irish republicanism since the 1790s. Ideology, the belief that 
Ireland should be free, continues to motivate recruits to organizations that 
engage in armed struggle.
However, family connections and the belief that Ireland should be free do 
not provide recruits to the degree that events like August 1969, internment, 
and Bloody Sunday sent recruits into the Provisionals in droves. Compare 
‘I was brought up in a very republican household’ and ‘British rule in Ireland 
was unjust and immoral as well as illegal’ with ‘The best way to defend the 
area is to get involved in the republican movement’. If, in the early 2000s, there 
had been a re-occurrence of widespread state repression, there might also 
have been a groundswell of support for organizations like the Continuity 
IRA and the Real IRA. That did not happen.
In the wave of mobilization that generated the Provisionals, the British 
learned that widespread repression was counterproductive in Northern 
Ireland. Therefore, they turned to selective repression, a more sophisticated 
approach. In response to continued political violence from so-called ‘dis-
sident’ organizations, the British, Irish, and Northern Irish (which includes 
Sinn Féin) governments have replaced the counterproductive repression 
of the early 1970s with a more sophisticated approach – ‘internment by 
remand’. Dissent is selectively repressed. Martin Corey was arrested in 
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April 2010. A ‘Release Martin Corey’ campaign was organized, but because 
he was one person its appeal was less successful than the anti-internment 
campaign of 1971-1972; the anti-internment march on Bloody Sunday at-
tracted thousands. Corey’s attorneys were not allowed to view the evidence 
against him, he was never allowed a parole hearing, and when he was f inally 
released in January 2014 – without ever being charged – it was with restric-
tions. Activists in the Irish republican movement still face repression, even 
if the Provisionals do not.
There is also a curious situation with respect to Cumann na mBan. Sinn 
Féin claims that it is progressive on women’s issues. Policies were adopted 
to enhance the role of women in Sinn Féin and the party proudly promotes 
women candidates and its elected women representatives. Michelle O’Neill, 
for example, is the party’s new leader in Northern Ireland. The party also 
embraces Cumann na mBan’s historic contribution to Irish republican-
ism, including having women dressed in 1916-1922 era Cumann na mBan 
uniforms appear at their events. And yet, while promoting women’s activ-
ism, and because Cumann na mBan did not follow the Provisionals into 
constitutional politics, Sinn Féin claims that the organization ceased to exist 
in the late 1980s.
Cumann na mBan still exists, still sees the Dublin and Belfast parlia-
ments as reformist institutions established by the British to maintain their 
rule in Ireland, and still considers itself a revolutionary organization:
Interviewer: I’ve heard it said that the more progressive women got 
involved in the movement more generally, and weren’t interested neces-
sarily in a women’s organization because they felt they were equal, etc.
Cumann na Mban activist: Is that like in the Provisionals?
Interviewer: Yes.
Cumann na Mban activist: Yes, indeed, they were the ones that followed 
their men very, very, quietly into constitutional politics. And that’s the 
answer to that. I mean, they weren’t revolutionary. I know most of those 
women. And I was with them in Sinn Féin. Some of them would have 
been in Cumann na mBan at times. But if you look at Sinn Féin […] you 
had this idea of having eight places reserved on the Ard Chomhairle for 
women. I never agreed with that. I think people should be recognized on 
their merits. And in Republican Sinn Féin […] We don’t have tokenism, 
you know? […] Revolutionary women would stand by the Republic and 
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stand by what they believe in and they won’t worry about their husbands 
or their boyfriends, or their brothers or sisters – brothers, you know, and 
they stick up to their beliefs.
Interviewer: Are you a revolutionary?
Cumann na Mban activist: I would think so. I’ve always been a 
revolutionary.
For some observers, the women who stayed with Cumann na mBan, were 
less progressive and less feminist than their counterparts who went into 
the Provisionals (O’Keefe 2013: 135; see also O’Keefe, in this volume). This 
Cumann na mBan activist argues that the women who went with the 
Provisionals lost their revolutionary way.
Summary
Placing the Provisional IRA and Sinn Féin within the ‘arena’ of the broader 
Irish republican movement and following these two organizations over 
time offers insight on their transformation and the rise of anti-Good 
Friday Agreement ‘dissidents’ who pursue armed struggle today. Pre-
existing organizations, the timing of recruitment, and different belief 
systems among groups of activists inf luenced the Provisionals. So did 
events post-1969.
More generally with respect to activism, the Irish republican move-
ment has experienced waves or cycles of mass mobilization, as occurred 
in 1919-1921 following the Easter Rising, in the early 1970s in response to 
state violence, and in 1980-1981 in response to the hunger strikes. Yet, the 
dynamics of activism during the lean years cannot be ignored. Even if the 
number of recruits is smaller between waves of recruitment, differences 
in the nature of recruitment during these years versus recruits brought in 
during a mass mobilization are important, as they may lay a foundation 
for splits.
Many social movements have lengthy histories with multiple social move-
ment organizations. Without question, in-depth case studies of recruitment 
into specif ic organizations, including studies that focus on a particular 
period of time, have value. However, this case study of Provisional Irish 
republicans, over time and in the context of the broader Irish republican 
movement, shows that we cannot assume that activists within the same 
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movement (or even the same social movement organization) experience 
the same recruitment process. These differences contribute to movement 
heterogeneity and organizational change. Finally, the persistence of some 
organizations in the face of external opposition from states and internal 









Republican Sinn Féin activist 1, 2011
Republican Sinn Féin activist 2, 2011
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The vast majority of work on social movements concerns how people ‘on 
the streets’ mobilize material and symbolic resources in order to persuade 
people to expend time and take abnormal risks in hopes of achieving 
movement goals.2 Prisons are often regarded as places of confinement and 
immobility, especially cellular prisons and even more especially regimes of 
cellular isolation. Beginning with the H-Blocks in Northern Ireland during 
1976-1981, there are many experiences of long-term cellular isolation around 
the world. The most notable examples are supermax prisons and security 
housing units (SHUs) in the United States after 1984 (now holding over 
100,000 prisoners) and ‘F-type’ prisons of Turkey (housing 5000 mostly 
political prisoners). I argue here that prisons with cellular isolation are 
places of movement and communication, regardless of architecture and 
regime.
In past work on the H-Block prison movement I explored the impact 
of bare life on solidarity, arguing that the stripping of written media and 
consumer commodities freed prisoners to build a solidary community 
based on oral communication (O’Hearn 2009). I also explored how prison 
policy and strategies of resistance migrate across space and time (O’Hearn 
2013, 2014). This chapter explores movement, in particular how prison-
ers may move into spaces and appropriate them for their own purposes. 
Moreover, they may ‘move’ across prison walls to connect to movements 
outside. Important factors in this story include attempts by prisoners to 
bring practices of resistance into the prison; ways in which communica-
tion and culture are achieved, although forbidden; the role of leadership/
1 Data sources, unless otherwise indicated, are provided in O’Hearn (2009: 504). A new 
analysis of the Irish blanketmen and other prisoners in solitary, as ‘exilic communities’ living 
on the edges of capitalism, is in Grubačić and O’Hearn (2016).
2 An excellent summary of this literature, both generally and with regard to Ireland, is 
provided in Bosi and De Fazio (in this volume). From a resource mobilization and political 
process perspective, as well as for its ethnographic and historical insights, the work of Robert 
White (see White and Demirel-Pegg, in this volume) is especially noteworthy.
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expertise in such achievements; and the interactions between movement 
activists inside and outside of prison. In the H-Blocks, we shall see how 
movement parts that appear ‘disadvantaged’ and isolated from the main 
community of insurgents can nonetheless control movement campaigns 
and repertoires. The discussion ends with a review of the learning process 
the H-Block conflict enabled in Turkish and US prisons. This comparative 
history indicates that the Irish experience of imprisonment and prison 
struggle not only presents crucial lessons that are repeated in other places 
but even that isolated prisoners learn from other experiences and that of 
the blanketmen is among the most important.
The proposition that prisoners may mobilize signif icant movements 
may seem to contradict most of the resource mobilization and political 
process literature within the f ield of social movement studies (Morris and 
Herring 1987). In particular, it is assumed that social movements need both 
material (money, organizations) and symbolic (legitimacy, leadership, elite 
endorsement) resources to successfully mobilize people. In addition, they 
must have political opportunities that they can seize in order to challenge 
and exploit the vulnerabilities of a regime. Prisoners, it might appear, have 
few such resources: they have little money and are often indigent; they may 
or may not be associated with political organizations or so-called gangs but 
are often cut off from them by their prison isolation; leadership and formal 
organization may be elided by isolation; and they are usually regarded as 
social pariahs by most of the population.
On the other hand, and as we shall see in this chapter, prisoners are very 
creative at obtaining resources and they are extremely eff icient at their use 
of what they have; they have an abundance of one particular resource, time, 
which enables them to organize and build new forms of communication 
despite physical and institutional obstacles and frequent failure; they may 
turn their arm’s length relations with their parent organizations into a 
resource because they have the independence to create their own strategies 
and coalitions without seeking continuous approval by their ‘superiors’; 
and the lack of access to written materials or face-to-face contact may be 
turned into a positive thing because the dependence on oral communication 
may enable much deeper relations of solidarity than is otherwise possible.
Background: Movement from Open to Cellular Prisons
In the early 1970s, Northern Irish prisoners found guilty of politically moti-
vated offences were given ‘Special Category’ (political prisoner) status. The 
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state also interned thousands without trial, mostly young Catholic men. 
Convicted and interned prisoners were kept in ‘cages’ with Quonset huts and 
rudimentary wooden buildings in the hastily built Long Kesh prison. They 
self-managed their lives on a communal basis and organized revolutionary 
education, including history, Irish language, guerrilla warfare, and arms 
training. In time, they re-organized and radicalized the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) and Sinn Féin from within prison walls.3
The British government soon realized that self-organization in a prison 
camp was not in their interests. In November 1975, it announced that anyone 
found guilty of an offence related to the conflict after 1 March 1976 would 
serve their time in a new cellular prison, HM Prison The Maze, in ‘H-Blocks’ 
built in the same complex as the ‘cages’. By changing the prison’s name 
the British hoped the controversy of internment would go away. Instead, 
prisoners refused to go silently into the new cellular regime and a new 
controversy emerged about long-term cellular isolation.
The new regime was simple. Prisoners were brought into the administra-
tion area of an H-Block (see f igure 8.1) and told that they were criminals 
and would have to wear prison uniforms and perform prison work. Prison 
guards were ‘Sir!’ and prisoners were known by a number. Each prisoner 
was stripped and offered a prison uniform.
According to popular narrative, when the f irst IRA prisoner (Kieran 
Nugent) was offered a uniform, he said ‘if you want me to wear that you’ll 
have to nail it to my back’. The guards put him in a cell alone, without 
clothing or reading or writing materials, some rudimentary furniture, a 
towel, and blankets. From then, hundreds of men who refused to wear 
prison uniforms or do work were left naked in H-block cells. They draped 
3 A short explanation is useful. The ‘Republican Movement’ that led the 1916 Easter Rising 
split after the partition of Ireland and creation of Northern Ireland in 1920/21. One side went 
into (Southern Irish) government and the other remained primarily committed to Irish unity, 
retaining the clandestine Irish Republican Army (IRA) and its associated political party Sinn 
Féin. This movement split again in 1969, into ‘Off icial’ and ‘Provisional’ wings. By the time 
covered in this article, the Off icial IRA had declared a ceasef ire and the ‘Provisional’ republican 
movement could be accurately called the IRA, associated with the Sinn Féin. In this article, I refer 
to these two groups together as the republican movement or, simply, the movement. Although 
certain people identif ied with either the IRA or Sinn Féin, dual membership was common. In 
prison matters, people often acted as Sinn Féin representatives even though they came under 
the discipline and orders of the IRA. To complicate matters, an armed organization split from 
the Off icial republican movement in 1974 after the ceasef ire: the Irish National Liberation Army 
(INLA), associated with the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP). INLA blanketmen protested 
alongside IRA blanketmen, although in fewer numbers.
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blankets around their waists and shoulders and thus became known as 
‘blanketmen’.
The blanketmen communicated by talking out of cell windows and 
shouting out the doors. Those on the inside of the ‘H’ could shout to 
prisoners on the opposite leg. At night, they shouted from block to block. 
They developed creative ways of communicating like tying items onto a 
string unravelled from their blankets, tying the other end to a button, and 
‘shooting the button’ across the corridor under cell doors. Their only outside 
communication was with priests, through whom they passed messages and 
received supplies including cigarette papers, ballpoint ref ills, and tobacco.
Turning Immobility to Movement
At first, a macho regime of total non-cooperation prevailed. The blanketmen 
stayed in their cells for two years, assuming that the British would eventu-
ally reinstate political status. This was a miscalculation. The authorities 
had no moral quandaries about keeping prisoners in bare conditions and, if 
asked, trotted out a standard explanation: the Maze was the most modern 
prison in Europe, if the men wanted to take advantage of its facilities all they 
Figure 8.1 Layout of an H-Block in Long Kesh prison
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had to do was to put on a uniform like any other criminal. It was diff icult 
for prisoners to get word about their conditions to the public. A few family 
members organized small protests with little impact.
The blanketmen only came out of their cells to shower and, on Sundays, 
for mass. To attend mass they had to wear uniform trousers so ‘harder’ 
prisoners did not even come out then. Hardly anyone took their allotted 
monthly visit because they would have to wear a uniform to do so. That 
was considered capitulation to British oppression.
Two things changed passive protest to movement. First, key prisoners 
arrived and advocated coming out of cells. Then, the prisoners coordinated 
a protest campaign with outside supporters. As a result, by the time of the 
1980-1981 hunger strikes in which ten blanketmen died, there was massive 
support for their campaign not only in Ireland but around the world.
In early 1978, Brendan Hughes, legendary IRA commander and close con-
fidant of Gerry Adams, was transferred from the cages to the H-Blocks when 
found guilty of a minor infraction. Hughes became Officer Commanding (OC) 
of the IRA blanketmen. Bobby Sands was already ‘on the blanket’, convicted 
of charges related to a bombing mission. Hughes and Sands led a remarkable 
prison campaign from adjacent cells over the next four years. Instead of 
staying in their cells, they told blanketmen to take visits. Not only would it 
ease their lives and get information to the outside world, they could smuggle 
ballpoint refills, cigarette papers, tobacco, and communications (comms).4
Moving out of cells had consequences on relations between prisoners 
and guards. When blanketmen moved through ‘their’ spaces – corridors, 
dining halls, visiting areas – the authorities punished them, provoking 
further actions by the blanketmen, further punishments, and so on in 
an escalating pattern. Sunday masses became organizing meetings and 
smuggling zones; even the priests moved messages and material supplies for 
prisoners. But visits became the main source of supply and communication 
with the movement and public.
The second challenge was to build a support campaign outside of prison. 
Unfortunately, the republican movement did not support the prisoners 
much, apart from sending money to their families. Early support came 
from relatives of prisoners who formed a group called Relatives for Justice. 
Support by the IRA and the broader republican movement had to be built, 
by pressure from inside the prison.
4 Comms were messages written in tiny handwriting on cigarette papers or toilet paper. 
They were folded tightly into a small package and wrapped in cling f ilm so that they could be 
smuggled internally in the body. 
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Appropriating Prison Spaces
For years, the public knew little about conditions in the H-Blocks. Without 
visits, even the prisoners’ families were unaware of their full degradation. 
Soon after he arrived in the H-Blocks in late 1977, Bobby Sands began smug-
gling articles through visits. His f irst article in the Sinn Féin newspaper 
Republican News gave readers their f irst description of life ‘on the blanket’. 
‘Everyone with the exception of the latest arrivals has a beard of sorts. 
When I f irst arrived here I noticed that a lot of the men’s eyes seemed to 
be sunk into the pits of their eyes, and everyone’s face was a pale yellowish 
complexion’ (O’Hearn 2006: 173). Another article starkly revealed the harsh 
winter conditions in the H-Blocks:
It is so cold that we are unable to walk upon the concrete cell f loor in 
our bare feet; the water in the drinking container has frozen and my 
f ilthy foam mattress upon the ground is wet with the snow that came in 
through the window during the night.
I had no sleep again last night, my three flimsy blankets being no match 
for the biting bitter cold. I spent last night huddled up in a corner listening 
to many of my comrades coughing and groaning, whilst scores of men 
lay shivering from flu, f ighting against high temperatures and severe 
pain. (O’Hearn 2006: 176)
Sands continued taking his monthly visits. His mother, Rosaleen, was such 
a magnif icent smuggler that the prisoners called her ‘old faithful’. If Sands 
had a visit, they knew they would have a smoke that night. This taught 
them that visits were not just a source of communications but also luxuries.
By himself, Sands could do little but when Hughes arrived in the H-Blocks 
and more blanketmen began taking visits things changed. They opened new 
lines of communications and got pens and other materials. ‘It was quite 
tough at the time to go out of your cell and put on that prison uniform’, said 
Hughes, yet taking visits lightened the protest. Prisoners saw loved ones 
and moved the protest forward.
Visits turned to confrontation when guards discovered the smuggling. 
They started strip-searching prisoners, probing their hair, mouths, and 
rectums. Forced squatting, bending, and probing became common; beatings 
increased (the issue of strip-searching would become even more controver-
sial for women prisoners in Armagh jail).
Hughes and Sands were intensifying the protest. They wanted to in-
crease publicity about their conditions and were aware that this would 
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provoke further repression. Yet, they hardly predicted the escalation that 
followed.
Action and reaction combined in a creative process of confrontation. 
Both sides strategized and improvised. Familiar tactics from open prisons 
were adapted to new conditions in the H-Blocks; there was no predictability 
about the outcome. Despite brutal searches, smuggling raised prisoner 
morale by providing resources. And by taking risks for each other, the 
blanketmen became a tight, solidary community.
The authorities tested their solidarity at the weakest link: young prison-
ers (YPs). On the pretext that the H-Blocks were becoming overcrowded, 
the guards refused to let YPs out of their cells to wash. They boasted openly 
about how many YPs they could drive off the protest. The blanketmen 
decided if the YPs couldn’t wash, no one would. On 20 March 1978, they 
refused to wash, shower, or clean their cells, beginning a long ‘no-wash’ 
protest (the authorities and media would it call a ‘dirty’ protest). Says 
Brendan Hughes, ‘We basically slid into it. It wasn’t a conscious decision 
[…] It was because of the situation, people getting brutalized going to the 
shower and so forth.’
Every Monday the prisoners introduced a new protest; in return, the 
guards introduced new punishments. After the prisoners refused to wash, 
the guards took away all soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, and combs. When 
the authorities stopped supplying clean sheets, the prisoners threw their 
dirty sheets onto the landing. When the guards came to take away the few 
bits of furniture, the prisoners smashed it f irst.
Eventually, the authorities took away everything except food and human 
waste. When the prisoners tried to get rid of these, the guards gave them 
back. They refused to take leftover food so the prisoners had to throw it into 
the corner of the cell, where it piled up and bred mould and maggots. When 
they began slopping their urine under the doors, the guards squeegeed it 
back, leaving their foam mattresses sopping wet. When the prisoners threw 
their excrement out the window the guards threw it back. Eventually, they 
had to spread it on the cell walls.
Hughes and Sands recognized potential in all this. In Hughes’s words, a 
series of unplanned events ‘soon became a tactic’. If the mess escalated far 
enough, the authorities would have to grant them political status to bring 
order back into their ‘modern’ prison.
The prisoners interpreted each new punishment as a sign that they were 
winning. Says one ex-blanketman, ‘Morale was sky high. We felt that we 
were winning and for a change that we, not the screws, had control over our 
lives because we dictated the pace of events’ (O’Hearn 2009: 509).
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As morale improved, the community bonded tightly together. They 
invented new entertainments like the ‘book at bedtime’, where storytellers 
recited books from memory after the screws left the wing at night. Days 
were f illed with lessons and debates. The number of prisoners f luent in 
Irish rose from a few to hundreds. A full-f ledged solidary community 
developed.5
Building Support
To build a campaign, however, the movements inside and outside of prison had 
to be brought onto the same wavelength. When Hughes arrived in the H-Blocks 
he had been directing the IRA’s armed campaign in Belfast. He knew how weak 
the IRA was after years of arrests and was among a handful of leaders who 
began restructuring the IRA from its old brigade system towards a secretive 
cell structure. ‘We had an issue here that could give some help to the leadership 
on the outside. I knew that was the situation, and that’s what we were doing’ 
(Hughes, quoted in O’Hearn 2006, p. 182). Hughes also knew that movement 
leaders wanted to create a dynamic political party to agitate around social 
and economic issues. It would take years for the new structures to mature, if 
they even survived the onslaught by British security. In the meantime, Hughes 
thought the prison protest could provide a popular platform, allowing the 
movement to mobilize support while the IRA regrouped.
Yet, prisoners’ rights were low on the movement’s agenda. Gerry Adams 
thought that ‘prisoners should always take second place’. Apart from divert-
ing resources, this was a time of extreme repression:
People were being shot in the streets. People were being arrested on sight 
[…] These areas were under very heavy occupation and people were living 
underground. So there was enough to be getting on with and those of us 
who wanted to try and build some sort of a popular movement, it was 
very diff icult to do. (Adams, quoted in O’Hearn 2006, p. 235)
Once the ‘no-wash protest’ began, a public campaign was more important 
than ever. Hughes and Sands knew that it was important to feed informa-
tion to outside supporters. The f irst move was to create a communications 
infrastructure by smuggling messages through visits, to give supporters 
information on which to build a campaign.
5 For an extended analysis, see O’Hearn (2009).
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They were helped by fortuitous incidents. After visiting the H-Blocks, 
Irish Archbishop (later Cardinal) Tomas Ó Fiaich made a highly publicized 
speech in which he compared the conditions of the blanketmen to the 
‘sewers of Calcutta’. In October 1978, the blanketmen hit international 
headlines when US syndicated columnist Jack Anderson compared the 
H-Blocks to ‘the most barbarous regimes of Communist commissars or 
tinhorn Latin American dictators’ (Clark 1987: 96). Then, Frank Maguire, 
an independent member of British parliament from Fermanagh-Tyrone, 
visited the H-Blocks and spoke out against conditions there. Activists in 
the United States and Europe heard about the blanketmen and organized 
support among trade unionists, politicians, and intellectuals.
Mostly, the blanketmen required mass publicity in Ireland and Britain. 
For this, the movement had to get on board. Bobby Sands wrote a letter 
to the IRA leadership. ‘As you know’, he wrote, ‘we have failed to reach 
a broader base of support, therefore we have failed to engage any active 
support outside of our immediate hardcore, friends, relatives, etc.’. He called 
on the movement for more support, saying that they could not survive 
unless the prisoners won their struggle. Using the analogy of the ‘breaker’s 
yard’ where prisoners were once consigned to break stones day after day, 
he said, ‘We cannot allow the Brits to turn the H-Blocks into the breaker’s 
yard for the Republican struggle.’
Movement attitudes began to change after Gerry Adams was charged 
with IRA membership and held in the H-Blocks until he was released due 
to lack of evidence. He observed the horrid conditions in the H-Blocks and, 
on his release, he lobbied Sinn Féin to give a higher profile to the prison 
campaign. According to Adams, the movement then,
started to handle [the prison protest] better, motivated I think by two 
concerns; one was a genuine concern for the plight of the people in there and 
the other one was to illustrate to the world and to our own people that here 
was a manifestation of British rule. (Adams, quoted in O’Hearn 2006, p. 235)
Sands and Hughes were not long in testing the movement. Sands led a 
discussion in his H-Block about mobilizing publicity. He sent a series of 
comms to the republican leadership in which he outlined an ambitious 
plan6: ‘The idea to reach people is to pass a simple message to them […] 
“Smash H-Block” […] We want to get this message to everyone, we want to 
6 The comm from which the following quotes are taken was from ‘Marcella’ to the ‘Republican 
Leadership’, see O’Hearn (2006: 237-241). 
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make it impossible for people to forget it, no matter who they are or where 
they are, they shall see it, hear it. Sands said that, ‘we must create our own 
mass media’ through direct action.
In one weekend we move and distribute one million posters […] [W]e stick 
them everywhere on roads, bridges, walls, trees, windows […] [W]e must 
work on people to get them to put them up, we must put them on everything 
that moves to carry them for us, at traffic lights we stick them on vehicles, 
they’ll be carried into towns […] By doing this we create our own mass media.
Sands was certain they could win mass support if they kept hammering 
away at people. Supporters should
give our material and put our case, emotionally breaking people down 
into giving a commitment, put them on the spot there and then, offer 
them ways in which they can help […] By continuing pushing ‘Smash 
H-Block’ we believe we are pushing a small message and making people 
aware through their wee jobs and those who they reach will learn some-
thing if it’s only that H-Block exists. They will help and support. We’ll 
pick up as we progress!!
Sands summarized his campaign in four simple steps:
1 Organize the people that we have already got.
2 Attack through mass media propaganda, through an army of propa-
gandists, you out there and we in here […]
3 Make our message simple – ‘Smash H-Block’, some details, a call for 
action, plenty of emotion.
4 Broaden our battlef ield, locally, nationally, and internationally, the 
f ield is limitless.
But the blanketmen needed resources.
We need a list of names, a who’s who, what’s what in Ireland, all those 
who have influence, here’s a few to start with, trade unions […] social 
conscious groups, left wing groups, churchmen Catholic and Prod, 
with influence, newspaper and tv and media list of people who write or 
produce political or social programmes and articles, etc. Anybody who’s 
anybody […] The idea is this, one of us in here can write to one of those 
above or whoever, in a very emotional and distressing letter.
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To create ‘an atmosphere of mass emotion’ Sands suggested a
Poster with a child on it, emotional The Year of the Child ‘Don’t Let my 
Daddy Die in H-Block’ […] Get those ‘Smash H-Block’ posters up every-
where […] Paint ‘Smash H-Block’ all over the major motorways in Britain 
[…] We want H-Block more common than Shamrock and we can do it.
Finally, Sands suggested chain letters, pirate radio stations, school boycotts, 
industrial strikes, demos at sporting events, an H-Block flag, and an Inter-
national Committee headed up by a team of sympathetic priests.
Over the following months many of these suggestions were enacted. A 
National H-Block/Armagh Committee was launched with its campaign 
centred on the simple message, ‘Smash H-Block’. Within months that slogan 
appeared on walls, bridges, and hoardings across Ireland. Posters did appear 
with the slogan ‘Don’t Let My Daddy Die in H-Block’. And Sands organized 
a ‘factory’ where the blanketmen wrote hundreds of letters each week to 
practically anyone with any kind of influence.
This factory required raw materials: writing supplies, addresses, and 
other information. Sands organized the prison side while women from Sinn 
Féin coordinated a team of young women who visited the prison twice a 
day, smuggling messages and supplies. Sands could send out messages in 
the morning and receive replies from the movement that afternoon.
Smuggling involved kissing prisoners who were f ilthy, had not brushed 
their teeth for years, to get communications that had been in all parts of 
their bodies. The women did things that went against much they had been 
taught about the purity of their bodies. They had to secrete comms, supplies, 
and even miniature radios and cameras in their own bodies. Despite the 
ordeal, day after day, month after month, they kept up their visits.
Comms going out of the prison described conditions in the H-blocks. 
A designated prisoner on each wing of each H-Block gave his blanketmen 
lists of names and addresses. They each wrote four or f ive letters a day, 
based on sample letters that explained the conditions in the H-Blocks and 
why they had been forced into the no-wash protest. Each letter contained 
a personalized message. As time went on, templates were customized 
for different readers. One prisoner wrote a US journalist about how his 
founding fathers had fought the British for independence and the Irish 
had as much right to f ight. Then he wrote to a ‘comrade’ in Pravda about 
the working-class struggle against imperialism. Personalized letters from 
blanketmen went to celebrities such as Muhammad Ali and Jean-Paul 
Sartre.
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While communication was important, prisoners also used 
‘mis’communication to invert movement power structures to their advan-
tage. One incident happened after guards told the prisoners that they would 
begin washing them forcibly. They would start the forced washings among 
YPs, knowing that if they could break YPs, others would follow. Hughes and 
Sands thought the forced washings could involve violent scrubbing and 
prisoners could be injured. They decided to order the YPs to ‘resist’. Sands 
shouted the order to the block that contained most YPs. The OC of that block, 
however, feared that resisting would be bloody and disastrous. Moreover, the 
young men were afraid and might refuse to resist. That would hurt morale 
and might even endanger the whole blanket protest. So the OC ‘did not hear’ 
Sands’ order and the YPs went peacefully to the washings without losing face.
Another incident occurred between the f irst (1980) and second (1981) 
hunger strikes. During this period the IRA leadership ordered blanketmen 
in two H-Blocks to abandon their protest, to see if the prison authorities 
would deliver their own clothes to them. On a Friday, families arrived at 
Long Kesh with packages of clothes. On Sunday, Sands informed the move-
ment that if they did not have their clothes by Tuesday night they would 
smash their furniture. The IRA frantically sent comms to Sands through a 
priest, instructing him to call off the action. Sands got the comms but he 
did not call off the protest.
‘The sagart [priest] didn’t appear’, he wrote the movement as an excuse 
after the prisoners smashed their furniture.
Sands wanted to send a clear signal to his own superiors that he ‘meant 
business’. He also wanted to put them into a clear frame of action for a 
new hunger strike. The movement thought smashing furniture would start 
a transition back into the no-wash protest, but the prisoners meant it as 
a prelude to a new hunger strike. The IRA was so opposed to the second 
hunger strike that they did not realize how far into that strategy the prison-
ers had already moved. On Tuesday the blanketmen trashed their cells. A 
month later they were on a hunger strike in which ten men including Bobby 
Sands would die. Control of communications allowed subservient prisoner 
leaders to ‘not hear’ their IRA superiors, just as the OC in the YP’s block ‘did 
not hear’ Sands’ order to resist forced washings.
Discussion
Prison, even cellular isolation, is about movement: through spaces and 
movement in the sense of organized action aimed at achieving change. 
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Effective movement requires solidary purpose, clear goals, and strategies to 
strengthen collective identity (Gamson 1992). The bare life conditions in the 
H-Blocks, where the community shared resistance and a daily experience 
of intersubjective communication and collective joy, strengthened them 
against oppressive actions of authorities (O’Hearn 2009).
But the collective also required connections to outside networks for 
material needs and public support. This was diff icult since their ‘natural’ 
allies (their movement) were initially unwilling to help build a sustained 
campaign. The degree to which prisoners swayed the minds of key leaders in 
the movement was remarkable, as was their ability to provide information 
(propaganda) for the campaign and even direct its tactics (down to slogans 
and poster content).
De Vito’s model connecting inside-outside movement relations to pris-
oner radicalization7 is of limited use here. He relates the ‘peak’ of European 
prison radicalization in the early 1970s to heightened awareness of the 
connections between the social function of prisons and inequality in 
society – what Wacquant (2009) would later call ‘punishing the poor’. This 
enabled Marxist prisoners to see others as oppressed proletarians rather 
than lumpenproletarians and thus make common cause with them (De 
Vito 2012: 78). This model does not really apply well to national liberation 
movements, a fact De Vito later admits when discussing political prisoners 
in the later 1970s.
IRA prisoners brought their movement practices into prison by resist-
ing ‘British/Protestant rule’ there and by pref iguratively building a sort of 
utopian society in the cages and H-Blocks. The need to restructure relations 
with the movement arose in the H-Blocks because of the special needs of the 
blanketmen. Prisoners won their case to get more resources on the grounds 
that an active public campaign around prison issues could revitalize the 
movement. If there was radicalization of prisoners, it was primarily about 
deepening their consciousness about why they were in struggle, a process 
that was enabled less by inside-outside relations than by the prisoners’ 
intense close proximity to each other, without the usual distractions of 
consumerist life. In the case of the IRA, the movement was largely rebuilt 
from within the prison in 1974-1976, again in 1978-1981, and yet again in the 
late 1980s-1990s (McKeown 2001). Political prisoners brought into prison 
7 De Vito def ines radicalization as ‘a shift in the contents and/or forms of contention that, in 
relation to previous contents and/or forms of contention, is perceived as an escalation by (some) 
historical agents and/or by external observers’ (2012: 72). It is mainly informed by prisoners/
movements in a European context.
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an experience of active resistance and brought back out a spirit of intense 
community-building, horizontal/participative practice, and communal 
risk-taking. Such community-building was necessary if ‘radicalization’, in 
De Vito’s sense of escalated activity, was to be attained.
The actual logistics of escalation raises issues of leadership and space. 
Some distinguish between ‘task-oriented’ and ‘people-oriented’ leader-
ship, between bureaucrats and charismatics. The former ‘get things done’ 
while the latter ‘reshape their followers’ interpretations of the world and 
emotional responses to it’ (Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry 2001: 130; also 
Nepstad and Bob 2006). The H-Block protest indicates that such distinctions 
may be limited. As O’Hearn (2009: 502) proposes, ‘[i]n intense episodes of 
contention, it may be precisely the charismatic ability to motivate people 
into action that “gets things done”’. Certain leaders are particularly sensitive 
to the needs and potentialities of collective change in a changing environ-
ment. They are good at what Goldstone (1991) calls ‘process tracing’, the 
ability to guide rapidly changing processes towards desired outcomes.
Process tracing happens in and through space; not simple Cartesian spaces 
(like football f ields upon which the game of contention is played) but socially 
constructed spaces that have contested and constantly changing uses and 
meanings (Harvey 1969, 1973; Massey 1994). Spaces are appropriated and 
mobilized by insurgents as material and symbolic resources, and defended 
by the powers-that-be as spaces of authority to be kept out of the hands of 
insurgents. Sewell (2001: 55) refers to spatial agency as the ability of groups 
to transform and restructure meanings, uses, and the strategic value of 
space through struggle. Even if, as Sewell contends, insurgents are resource 
poor in traditional senses, the H-Block struggle shows that prisoners may 
have an abundance of generally unrecognized resources like solidarity and 
transformative vision that enable them to use spaces in new and creative 
ways. In the H-Blocks, while authorities imposed massive mechanisms of 
physical control, blanketmen changed meanings and uses of prison spaces 
to gain material needs and change symbolic perceptions of what prison was, 
including a massive publicity campaign that moulded the public perception 
of practices like strip-searches as oppression rather than control.
A key advantage of authorities is their capacity to manage the problem of 
‘time-distance’: getting messages from one place to another. They manage 
what Scott (2009) calls the ‘friction of space’. Although the prison authorities 
had tremendous advantages in time-distance technologies, the blanketmen 
built rival communications networks that overcame them.
One f inal form of movement should be explored: movement of experi-
ences across time and space. On the policy side, a clear thread runs from 
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the H-Blocks (1976-1981), to US Security Housing Units (SHUs) and supermax 
prisons (1983-today), to Turkish F-type prisons (2000-today) and Guanta-
namo. In Turkey we even have a ‘smoking gun’: Gordon Lakes, Britain’s 
top prison securocrat, advised the Turkish government about avoiding the 
mistakes of the H-Blocks and publicly intervened in support of introducing 
F-type isolation (O’Hearn 2013).
Prisoners also learn from each other. While the Irish hunger strikes of 
1980/81 were going on, prisoners in Robben Island, Diyarbakir (Kurdistan), 
and Chiapas (Mexico) followed the Irish hunger strike example. Political 
prisoners in Turkey and the Basque Country followed. More profound was 
the movement of the blanketmen’s strategies of community-building and 
resistance, even to accused ‘gang leaders’ in US prisons. In Ohio, California, 
and Illinois movements of solidarity leading to hunger strikes were heavily 
influenced by studying the blanket protest. In Pelican Bay SHU, Latinos, 
African-Americans, and white prisoners joined together to form a ‘Short 
Corridor Collective’. They shared experiences and discussed texts on left 
politics, Mayan culture and Irish blanketmen (Ashker 2013). The collective 
built shared, orally based practices that crossed racial barriers; constructed 
networks to other prisons and outside supporters, trying to overcome time-
distance disadvantages; began using the media to publicize the nature 
of solitary confinement in California and the United States; organized a 
hunger strike with more than 30,000 prisoner participants; and eventually 
forced the California legislature and the prison authorities to change their 
isolation policies.
As IRA prisoners changed the republican movement from inside the 
prison, the Short Corridor Collective launched a successful initiative to stop 
racially motivated prisoner-on-prisoner violence by gangs in California jails 
and to stop gangbanging by youth gangs in California’s urban ghettos. The 
bare life experience of the SHU, combined with knowledge gained from the 
H-Blocks and perceptive leadership by a small group of prisoners placed 
in close proximity, produced a movement for change that was unthinkable 
a few years before, in one of the most tightly controlled prisons in world 
history.8
Yet a little learning can also be a harmful thing. Leftist prisoners used the 
blanketmen’s experience as guidance for their own hunger strike against 
the Turkish state’s forcible move from open ward-style prisons to cellular 
isolation in new F-type prisons. On the surface, it looked the same as the 
British move from the cages to the H-Blocks. From 2000 to 2007, more 
8 On the Pelican Bay prisoner movement, see Grubačić and O’Hearn (2016).
162 deNIS o’hearN 
than 120 prisoners and their supporters died on hunger strike. Unlike 
prisoners in California, however, the Turkish prisoners missed a series of 
key lessons of the blanket campaign. First, the blanketmen built a strong 
solidary culture and a powerful support movement, along with a widespread 
publicity campaign before undertaking the ultimate step of hunger strike. 
They were assured of mass public support. Turkish prisoners began with 
hunger strike as a f irst tactic and never mobilized such support. Second, 
the blanketmen practiced high participation; no one would be forced to go 
or stay on hunger strike. The Turkish movement, however, used force and 
intimidation against its own hunger strikers. Perhaps most crucially, the 
blanketmen were masters of ‘process tracing’; in the no-wash protest as well 
as the hunger strike they changed tactics as conditions changed. After a 
few months and ten deaths, the blanketmen stopped their strike and went 
into new tactics, where they achieved their objectives of regaining control 
of prison spaces. Turkish prisoners stayed on for seven years, without public 
support, and even today have no creative strategies for f ighting the isolation 
of the F-type prisons.
Conclusions
The example of the blanketmen in Long Kesh prison continues to influence 
policymakers and prisoners across space and time. It also has important 
implications for the study of social movements. It demonstrated that state 
policies that are meant to isolate prisoners from each other, short of extreme 
measures of dungeons and wells, are likely to fail. The more prisoners are 
stripped the more they build a solidary culture. An equally important f ind-
ing is how diff icult it is for authorities to turn prisons into regimes of total 
confinement. Prisoners always f ind ways to move. The more they achieve 
solidarity and begin taking risks for each other, the more ways they f ind 
to appropriate spaces for new purposes and to overcome frictions of space 
that are imposed by authorities. Eventually, they cross prison walls and 
build networks with movements and supporters. Signif icantly, not only the 
H-Blocks but also US supermaxes like Pelican Bay show how prisoners can 
use moral authority as well as creative strategies to control their interactions 
with seemingly more ‘powerful’ outside movements and activists. Prisoners, 
whether ‘political’ or not, are not captives of an all-encompassing ‘gaze’ that 
turns them into their own jailers. They are potential actors with astonishing 
flexibility and power of movement.
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9 ‘Mother Ireland, Get Off Our Backs’
Republican Feminist Resistance in the North of Ireland
Theresa O’Keefe
Introduction
Feminist organizing in Northern Ireland garnered international atten-
tion in the wake of the peace process that ended the military campaign of 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This process gave birth to the Northern 
Ireland Women’s Coalition, an all-female political party that claimed to 
span the ethnonational divide between Catholics and Protestants. The 
Coalition was drenched in the global limelight and heralded as a success 
for a feminist politics of peace. This particular history of the Troubles has, 
however, skewed the mapping of feminist organizing in the North as the 
over-emphasis on the Coalition comes at the expense of a vast array of 
feminist groups and campaigns. More broadly, the tendency to emphasize 
the ‘bridge-building’ politics has led to a dominant narrative of women’s 
organizing in the North that is far from holistic.
Women organizing under the rubric of republicanism offers one such ex-
ample of an understudied contribution to the feminist landscape. While the 
roles undertaken by women during the Troubles remain under-examined 
relative to their male counterparts (McDowell 2008), a limited body of 
scholarship does try to account for women’s involvement in republicanism 
and the republican armed struggle (Alison 2009; Aretxaga 1997; Bloom 2011; 
Dowler 1998; Gilmartin 2013; O’Keefe 2013; Sharoni 2001). Despite these 
contributions, research that analyzes republican women’s organizing as 
feminists is almost non-existent bar a few notable exceptions (Cockburn 
1998; Rooney 1995; Roulston 1997). Republican feminist politics are, for the 
most part, hidden from view. To be sure, icons like Bernadette Devlin McA-
liskey are easily recognisable as feminist actors within the wider republican 
movement but how these feminists organized as republican feminists is 
signif icantly less celebrated. As a consequence, the contributions of this 
form of feminist resistance are in danger of being written out of history 
despite the saturation of scholarship on the Troubles.
This chapter, in the f irst instance, contributes to the widening of a 
Northern Irish feminist genealogy as it charts the development, success, 
and failures of republican feminism – the feminist organizing undertaken 
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by those who identify as both feminist and republican. Republican feminism 
is also situated within a social movement context to reveal the tensions 
and tribulations that plagued wider feminist organizing during the war. 
Thus, the chapter also speaks to the ways in which social movements 
are themselves boundary makers, and how agendas are shaped not just 
internally but across social movements. In divided societies, where borders 
are more starkly drawn (Todd et al. 2006), material, symbolic, and physical 
boundaries serve to encase and shape social movements. Boundary work 
is more acute in this context and, as such, republican feminism has much 
to show us about this process, including the constraints and opportunities 
of agenda setting and movement-building. Relatedly, this research also 
builds on the question of why actors join high-risk movements as posed by 
White and Demirel-Pegg (in this volume). Why did women who were not 
initially republican feel feminism was bettered through republicanism than 
the women’s movement? As Nancy Whittier (2014) documents, feminism 
comprises many struggles and feminists active in such struggles do so 
in an array of social movements and not necessarily in the autonomous 
women’s movement, as is the case with republican feminism. Many women, 
as explored through this chapter, chose to organize as feminists through 
republicanism not just because they identif ied with republicanism but 
also for reasons connected to class, state repression, and the perceived 
exclusionary nature of the Northern Irish women’s movement. This story 
is meaningful not only for the articulation of diff iculties that arise when 
organizing in a conflict zone; the analysis also offers compelling insight 
into how collective identif ication is shaped by both negative and positive 
relational experiences (Gamson 1995).
The research for this work is part of a larger project on Irish republican 
feminism and is based on a feminist ethnography that began in 2000 and 
concluded in 2007. The data in this article consists primarily of 20 qualita-
tive, in-depth, face-to-face interviews with women active within the repub-
lican movement during the Troubles. Interviews were obtained through 
snowballing with the help of two key gatekeepers who are former republican 
prisoners. Themes covered by the interviews spanned a range of topics from 
prior political activism, motivations for joining the republican movement 
(including the IRA), gender roles within the movement, feminism, and 
relationships with other groups and campaigns. Documentary research 
and artefact analysis of political party manifestos, pamphlets, murals, and 
political ephemera are also an integral part of this feminist ethnography. 
The research suggests that republican feminism was ignited and shaped by 
a number of key factors. It formed into a coherent, critical feminist project 
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that positively impacted the lives of women in working-class republican 
communities across the North, as well as the wider republican and women’s 
movements.
Republican Feminist Praxis
Republican feminism is not derived from any written manifesto as such 
but its presence is strongly felt in the community as well is in more formal 
political structures. It is a collective identity, f luid and relational (Polletta 
and Jasper 2001: 298), ‘located in action and interaction’, formed through 
relationships as opposed to any identif ication formed through individual 
self-conceptions (Whittier 1995: 16; Melucci 1995). Republican feminism has 
been shaped over time by four key factors: a historical connection between 
feminism and Irish nationalism, politicization and ‘gender awareness’ from 
experiences with gender-based state violence, feminist politicization around 
prison struggles, and a marginalization of republican women by both the 
republican movement and the broader women’s movement.
Those who identify as republican feminist claim it to be a radical politics 
flavoured with Marxist/socialist tendencies rooted in the material realities 
of working-class women. Some depict it as an all-encompassing view that 
speaks to broader issues of autonomy, equality, and social justice. Republi-
can and lesbian feminist activist Claire Hackett explains the approach best 
when she def ined it as a commitment to ‘self-determination’:
The concept of self-determination is what best def ines republican 
feminism for me. This concept is perhaps better known for its nationalist 
than its feminist connotations. Yet, it must be clear that it has meaning 
for feminist discourse – self-determination as the right and ability to 
make real choices about our lives: our fertility, our sexuality, childcare, 
the means to be independent in all the areas in which we are currently 
denied autonomy and dignity in our various identities as women. (1995: 11)
The British occupation of the North is considered to be the main source of 
women’s oppression as it shapes all political, economic, and social structures. 
The late Mairéad Farrell, perhaps the most illustrious female IRA volunteer, 
claimed women in the North are doubly oppressed: ‘I am oppressed as a 
woman, and I’m also oppressed as an Irish person. Everyone in this country 
is oppressed and yet we can only end our oppression as women if we end 
the oppression of our nation as a whole’ (Derry Film and Video Collective 
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1988). Farrell also suggested women were not taken seriously as political 
actors by republicans or wider society due to traditional gender norms, 
including those rooted in nationalistic tropes. She claimed the republican 
prisoners in Armagh women’s prison felt hampered by societal expectations 
regarding motherhood and femininity emblematic in the trope of Mother 
Ireland. Republican feminism can thus be understood as an attempt to 
disrupt such norms, to say ‘Mother Ireland, get off our back [sic]’ (Derry 
Film and Video Collective 1988).
Republican feminism, situated in the context of the broader struggle for 
an end to British imperialism in Ireland, has taken on many forms of the 
years. Its origins lie in grass-roots organizing though it quickly bled into 
the formal political realm as republicanism increasingly engaged in elec-
tioneering. Though there have been many groups connected to republican 
feminism since the start of the Troubles and, as a result, differences abound, 
at the core of this organizing is a belief that partition has put a particular 
shape on gender relations on the island of Ireland.
Historical Contexts
The f irst factor to give rise to republican feminism was the pre-existing 
relationship between Irish nationalism and feminism. Feminist nationalist 
icons active in the 1916 Easter Rising like Constance Markievicz and Helena 
Moloney continue to serve as role models to most republican women (Ward 
1983). While, as Connolly (2003) suggests, the suffragettes had victories 
independent of the nationalist movement, for many the two struggles were 
inextricable. Markievicz made clear the relationship between women’s 
position in Irish society and the national question when in 1909 she 
wrote that the ‘f irst step on the road to freedom is to realise ourselves as 
Irishwomen – not as Irish or merely as women, but as Irishwomen doubly 
enslaved and with a double battle to f ight’ (as cited in Owens 2005: 112). 
Cumann na mBan’s formation in 1914 pronounced the tensions between 
those who wished to place primacy on the suffragette movement and those 
who favoured prioritizing the national struggle. Noted suffragette Hanna 
Sheehy Skeff ington felt the women’s question was not taken seriously 
enough within nationalist quarters and registered her disdain for those 
women who chose to join Cumann na mBan in a letter to the Irish Times 
denouncing the organization as nothing more than an ‘animated collecting 
box’ for men (Owens 2005: 115). Nevertheless, as Diarmaid Ferriter (2004: 218) 
argues, many women took on multi-dimensional roles that spanned these 
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two key movements (Ferriter 2004: 217-218). The visibility and celebration 
of historic feminist nationalist f igures normalized the presence of women 
and feminist ideas within the republican movement (Sales 1997).
Gendered State Violence and Politicization
The development of contemporary feminist nationalism though inspired 
by the actions its foremothers was predominantly instigated through a 
response to the violence of the British state. When the Troubles erupted 
in 1968, women were primarily located within the home. With political, 
economic, and social marginalization of working-class Catholics, the 
introduction of British soldiers to the streets of the North, and atrocities 
such as Bloody Sunday, many women became involved in the resistance 
movement that developed in response to these repressions. The experience 
of state violence can be considered a ‘moral shock’ (Jasper 1997) for some 
respondents insofar as it forced many women to engage in a politics of 
resistance for the f irst time in their lives. One republican feminist activist 
and former IRA member explains:
Growing up in the early seventies […] there were riots every night, CS gas, 
Catholics being burnt out of their houses. All this madness was around 
you daily. I was swept up in what was happening. I joined gCaílní na 
hÉireann, the junior wing of the IRA, when I was thirteen. Unconsciously 
I became more politically aware. At sixteen I joined the army. (Interview 
No. 13)
Similarly, another former IRA volunteer and republican feminist states, ‘I 
grew up in the conflict and war was all around. I gained a political aware-
ness when I was twelve or thirteen and I started asking questions about who 
is responsible for all of this’ (Interview No. 12). These women are ‘reluctant 
guerrillas’, a term Jocelyn Viterna uses to describe women who joined 
revolutionary movements out of necessity (2006: 24), as they felt they were 
left with no other options but to f ight back. This process of politicization 
is commonly recognized by social movement scholars as symptomatic of 
the lived experience of hardship and oppression around which grievances 
and mobilizations are based (Piven and Cloward 1977; Nilsen and Cox 2013).
Republican feminism thus arose, in part, from a process of politicization 
acquired through engagement in community resistance. Women remarked 
that their ‘increased involvement in political activity gave them a new sense 
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of identity’. A former female political prisoner compared the politicization 
of women in republican communities to the shift in gender roles that took 
place during the Second World War, particularly in relation to internment 
when women were left almost entirely to run the communities and the 
movement as men were in prison or on the run: ‘Women took over from the 
men, everything that they did. But, unlike that [WWII], after internment 
when the men returned, women stayed there and excelled at things. They 
didn’t go back into the home because men expected them to […] Nothing’s 
ever been the same since’ (Interview No. 5).
Experiences of state violence motivated republican women to engage in 
a politics of resistance which in turn fostered a ‘gender awareness’ brought 
sharply into focus through a realization that the violence of the state was 
gendered. Because of the gender roles in Irish society, women – women’s 
bodies, in particular – became the interface at which the struggle for power in 
the North was fought. At that time women were less likely to work outside the 
home, they brought the children to school, did the shopping during the day 
and, when internment was first introduced, made up the majority in housing 
estates as men were either on the run or locked up. Women had to contend 
with continual house raids and street interrogations by security forces as they 
carried out their daily routine. In addition, women led the street resistance 
against the state, forming ‘hen patrols’ to warn of approaching army patrols, 
breaking state-imposed curfews, and disrupting everyday army blockades.
While sectarian harassment by security forces was commonplace 
(McVeigh 1994), women experienced sexual harassment on countless oc-
casions (Pickering 2002: 37). Sexual slurs and jeers at their bodies were often 
part of the verbal assaults in attempts to sexualize women and make them 
uncomfortable. In addition to being called a ‘slut’, ‘Irish whore’ or ‘Provie 
blanket’, references to rape were also made. Such comments were made by 
soldiers in passing foot patrols, driving Land Rovers, or even standing in 
watchtowers where women were easily scrutinized (Harris and Healy 2001: 
69, 85, 89). This harassment was so commonplace that women typically 
considered them normal or ‘just the usual’ (Interview No. 18).
Sexualized violence and harassment was also found inside detention 
centres and jails. Sexual overtones, slurs, and actions were frequently used as 
a means of intimidation during interrogation while some go so far as to sug-
gest multiple cases of ‘rape, threats of rape, and technical rape’ committed by 
the army and the RUC in the North (Harris and Healy 2001; McCafferty 1981: 
34). More than one interviewee reported experiences with sexual violence 
at the hands of state forces and their stories ranged from threats of rape to 
harassment and assault (Interview No. 18; Interview No. 21A; O’Keefe 2013).
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The execution of gender-based state violence is also evident in the strip-
searching of female political prisoners, instituted as a regular practice in 
1982 (Gillespie 1994: 2). Strip searches were used to target republican women 
in particular, including those on detention awaiting a court hearing. Women 
endured strip searches more often than their male counterparts and the 
searches were often accompanied by the threat of sexual violence or the 
use of sexually violent language (Pickering 2002). Many who experienced 
these invasive procedures compared them to rape (POWs in Maghaberry 
Prison 1986; Aretxaga 1997: 24; Aretxaga 2001: 9). Searches were justif ied as a 
security measure despite the fact that little contraband was ever unearthed. 
Both the National Council of Civil Liberties and Amnesty International 
conducted inquiries into the practice and condemned it as an exercise ‘with 
the deliberate intention of degrading and humiliating women’ (as cited in 
O’Rourke 2013: 76).
Republican women were attuned to the gendered nature of this violence 
as is shown in former republican prisoner and current Sinn Féin MEP Mar-
tina Anderson’s statement on her experience: ‘The British government is 
using women’s nakedness to tyrannise them. We feel that our bodies are 
used like a weapon to penalise us with the intention of making us collapse 
under the pressure’ (McAuley 1989: 75). The ability to use a gender lens 
to examine their experiences of state violence helped to foster a deeper, 
feminist political awareness. Republican activist Lily Fitzsimmons suggests 
that ‘The British presence unif ied women in a determination where we 
organized ourselves against the military repression of the British army. It 
also made us realize our strength as a group’ (Gillespie 1994: 12).
Prison Struggles and Acts of Solidarity
Another factor that contributed to the growth of feminism amongst re-
publican women is the experience of prison struggles either as a prisoner 
or campaigner on the issue of women’s prison conditions. Though related 
to strip searches and gender-based state violence during detention, time 
spent in prison is distinctly significant in that it was a fortuitous educational 
experience. Political incarceration created a space for discussion, learn-
ing, and reading about other struggles for social justice. Though Armagh 
prison did not have formal classes like those offered to men in Long Kesh 
(McKeown 1999: 9; Interview No. 13) women engaged in self and collective 
education by means of shared reading and discussions through prison 
walls. Many of these readings included histories of struggles for equality. 
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One former Armagh prisoner states, ‘Throughout my life I have always 
identif ied with women’s rights and equality but throughout jail my whole 
outlook was broadened […] The whole range of how I would think and speak 
is a feminist outlook’ (Interview No. 12). Similarly, Mairéad Farrell said of 
her time in prison: ‘Well, we were educating ourselves in there and through 
events we became more aware of ourselves as women. So the movement 
developed and has developed over the years as regards to women prisoners 
and we developed ourselves in there. It was educational for both I think’ 
(Derry Film and Video Collective 1988).
Familiarity with social movement struggles across the globe was com-
monplace amongst republican activists. Long-standing connections had been 
made with other movements, including Palestinian solidarity organizing, 
the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and the US Civil Rights Move-
ment. Feminist icons, such as Andrea Dworkin, spoke on the Falls Road, the 
heart of republican West Belfast while Bernadette Devlin popularized the 
politics of former Black Panther Angela Davis when she visited her in prison 
(Interview No. 17). Some feminists outside the North sought to lend their 
solidarity to the women in prison and many feminists from Britain, Europe, 
and as far away as the United States and New Zealand joined the pickets 
organized by republican feminists outside the gates of Armagh prison (D’Arcy 
1981; Interview No. 6). These acts of solidarity had a profound effect on the 
republican women as they resulted in knowledge exchanges and the sharing 
of feminist ideas. One woman who helped organize the pickets explains:
It was a whole learning process […] A lot of the women who came over to 
help were lesbians and it was free and open […] They were talking about 
different things and we realised that we were so ignorant and we decided 
we should read about women’s bodies, so I read Our Bodies, Our Selves. I 
was reading it and thought, ‘I didn’t have a clue’. Once you broke out of 
your shell you wanted to know everything. (Interview No. 5)
Thus, for those women who spent time in prison or organized on the condi-
tion of women prisoners, their experiences helped foster an appreciation 
and commitment to feminism issues.
Marginalization
Finally, republican feminism was fostered through the experiences of 
marginalization and disempowerment many women felt inside both the 
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republican movement and the broader Northern Irish women’s move-
ment. Studies concerning other cases of feminist organizing highlight 
the importance of boundary work or oppositional identif ication to the 
framing of particular feminist collective identities (Taylor and Whittier 
1992; Roth 2008; Rupp and Taylor 1999). Kimberly Springer (2005) details 
the signif icance of oppositional conflict in collective identity formation to 
Black feminist struggle. Relating to both Black men active in the struggle 
for Black liberation and white women in the women’s liberation movement 
was an integral part of the process of politicization and group definition for 
Black feminism. This relational process resonates with the development of 
republican feminism in that oppositional conflict within and across both 
the nationalist and women’s movement was also part of the process of 
republican feminist collectivization.
Gender divisions were clearly evident within the IRA, for instance, as 
women initially had to f ight to be admitted in to the organization. Prior to 
the early 1970s, women were relegated to auxiliary roles as part of Cumann 
na mBan. This changed when women demanded military training from a 
new IRA leadership (Interview No. 11; Interview No. 13).
According to a number of the women I interviewed, men did have dif-
ficulty when women joined the army initially, while others insisted they had 
to engage in a more sustained struggle for equality. ‘They had to f ight for it’, 
one former volunteer explains. ‘A lot of the women that were involved had 
to f ight for their position and certainly Marian Coyle and Rita O’Hare even 
had to f ight to be a volunteer, you know, because we were just supposed to 
be making the tea or whatever’ (Interview No. 21A).
Once within the IRA women took on key roles like bomb-making and 
training but their work in combat was not reflected in the organizational 
structure of the Army. One former female IRA volunteer states:
They still only have second-class status. They would not be in top-ranking 
positions and that is all across the board, North and South […] Over the 
past 30 years you might f ind f ive [women at a high level within the leader-
ship of the IRA] […] Men make all the important decisions. Generally 
speaking, the Army Council is men and maybe a token woman […] Men 
are there because they are men; women have to earn their place because 
they’re women. (Interview No. 7)
This gendered divide is made clearer when looking at the peace process 
and the limited role afforded to women over the course of the negotiations. 
Republican women were angry at their exclusion and publicly called on the 
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leadership to rectify their marginalization (Falls Women’s Centre 1995; Clár 
na mBan 1994: 15).
The exclusion of women from these formal structures is not the only 
indication of the unequal status of women relative to men within the 
movement. Women’s participation in the republican armed struggle is not 
given the same prominence as that of their male comrades. Hero worship in 
the form of ballads, poems, murals, and memorabilia are overwhelmingly 
dedicated to male volunteers (O’Keefe, 2013; McDowell, 2008; Dowler 1998). 
So explicit is this ‘exorcism’, as Martina Anderson termed it (Anderson 
2001), that women organized their own collective memory work to ensure 
their place within the movement’s history is documented (see, for example, 
Brady et al. 2011; Falls Women’s Centre 1995).
Republican feminism as a collective identity was also shaped and consoli-
dated by the marginalization of republican women from the broader women’s 
movement in the North. Republican women were blamed for the tensions 
and subsequent under-development of the movement. Monica McWilliams 
of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, the Northern Ireland Women’s 
Rights Movement, and the Downtown Women’s Centre writes: ‘Regardless of 
the differences between some of the groups, the dominant voice within the 
women’s movement in Northern Ireland has been that of the various shades of 
nationalism. Giving top priority to the nationalist question served to silence 
the voices of Protestant women’ (McWilliams 1995: 27; McWilliams 1991: 94).
Many within the movement emphasized the importance of bridge-
building and felt it necessary to focus on universality rather than difference. 
A ‘check your label at the door’ policy was adopted for a number of meetings, 
and, most notably, as general policy for the largest group – the Northern 
Ireland Women’s Rights Movement. This ‘lowest common denominator 
politics’ (O’Keefe 2013) meant that women attending meetings were not 
allowed to raise issues that were not shared by all women. It silenced those 
who wished to talk about experiences of oppression as, for example, gay 
women, working-class women, or republican woman.
This lowest common denominator politics meant that republican women 
were not allowed, for instance, to discuss the most pressing issues in their 
lives, namely, the violence of the state. Claire Hackett, a self-described 
republican feminist and queer activist, says:
There were no concerted efforts on behalf of the women’s movement to 
address [state violence against women]. It came from women organising 
within the republican communities […] The daily state harassment wasn’t 
articulated as a gender issue but a republican issue […] They didn’t deal 
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with it because they would have had to take up a position themselves on 
the state and that was too scary. (Interview No. 14)
This policy, therefore, ignored the daily material realities of most women 
living in the North (Roulston 1997). It obscured the conflict and its affects 
on women, particularly women in working-class areas.
The campaign for the rights and dignity of female republican prisoners 
was particularly contentious for the women’s movement. As strip searches 
were implemented, republican women pleaded with the broader women’s 
movement for support (Loughran 1985; McCafferty 1980). Rather than 
condemning gendered state violence, many groups gave these women the 
cold shoulder, leaving them to organize on their own or with the support 
of women outside of the North.
More contemporary women’s organizations (such as the Northern Ireland 
Women’s Coalition) continued to anchor their politics on the assumption that 
overcoming ‘tribalism’ and encouraging communities to get along would 
resolve the political and structural issues in the North. Like their predeces-
sors, the Coalition refused to take a position on state violence and argued 
‘politics is about getting on with people […] [and] moving beyond the often 
destructive divisions of the past’ (Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition 2001: 1).
This marginalization shaped republican feminism insofar as it encour-
aged a reflexive approach to dialogues around difference (Cockburn 1998). 
It also created a space for republican women to organize with other women 
isolated by lowest common denominator politics (Interview No. 2). For 
example, lesbian feminists were also silenced by this approach as issues per-
taining to sexual orientation were deemed divisive and ‘putting off ordinary 
women’ (Interview No. 17; Interview No. 14). A strong relationship between 
republican and lesbian feminist communities developed as a result of their 
shared marginalization. Some within the lesbian community even chose 
to put their faith in republicanism to struggle for LGBTQ equality (Hackett 
2001; Interview No. 17; Interview No. 9; Interview No. 14). The collaboration 
and solidarity that developed helped shape republican feminism insofar as 
it made it more inclusive and meant LGBTQ issues were incorporated into 
republican feminist politics.
Republican Feminism in Practice
Republican feminism sought to link patriarchal violence of the state to 
that which occurred in the bedroom. Republican feminists were active in 
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naming and resisting state violence and also in challenging violence against 
women in the community. They positioned their work at the intersection 
of capitalism, imperialism, and patriarchy. Examples of what constitutes 
republican feminism in practice are best found in Women Against Imperial-
ism, the Falls Women’s Centre, Sinn Féin Women’s Department, and Clár 
na mBan, all of which made tangible challenges to gender inequality in 
the North.
Women Against Imperialism (WAI) formed in 1978 the wake of a series 
of splits in the broader women’s movement in the six counties. It was made 
up of working-class women from republican communities in Belfast and 
Derry who wished to organize against the violence of the British state and 
to simultaneously challenge inequality on a number of fronts. According to 
founding member Una Ní Mhearain, WAI ‘took the view that imperialism 
had distorted all the landscapes within Ireland, all the personal landscapes 
and political landscapes’ (Interview No. 9). WAI is best known for leading 
the pickets outside the gates of Armagh prison during the no-wash strike. 
This small group of women gave talks in pubs and clubs on the topic of 
domestic violence in republican households for which they received a 
lot of criticism and outrage (Interview No. 9). Una Ní Mhearain suggests 
these talks had an effect on women in the community: ‘An awful lot of 
women actually made the links as well when we were doing those talks. 
And it allowed, I think, it allowed women to come together and start to 
mention those things and start to mention violence, “yeah it does exist 
in this community”’ (Northern Visions Television 2009). WAI members 
were also critical to bringing an end to the IRA practice of tarring and 
feathering. Women were tied to a lamp post in plain view and literally 
tarred and feathered as punishment for ‘fraternizing’ with British soldiers 
(Interview No. 9). These women also mobilized around debt, poverty, and 
living conditions (Interview No. 9). The group lasted until 1981, but many 
of its members continued to be active across a range of campaigns and 
organizations.
After WAI disbanded some members, including Una Ní Mhearain, 
founded the Falls Women’s Centre. The centre became a vital support and 
resource for women in republican West Belfast. It opened its doors in 1981 
and sought to provide a safe space for women in the community to be able 
to discuss and organize around all issues, including abortion, domestic 
violence, and poverty. The leaflets advertising the centre asked, ‘Do you 
need help, support, advice with marital problems, D.H.S.S., assault, rape, 
incest or housing queries?’ (Northern Visions Television 2009). The centre’s 
volunteers (and, later on, paid staff) accompanied women to the courts, 
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to see solicitors when their marriage was breaking down, or to banks and 
debt collectors, if in f inancial crisis. They also escorted many frightened 
women to Women’s Aid and removed them and their children from danger 
if they were being abused. In addition to being a women-only drop-in centre 
that served as a space for women to meet and chat, it provided classes on 
subjects ranging from computer training to confidence-building. With an 
on-site crèche, this made education a reality for many women (Interview 
No. 9).
The Falls Road was a community not served by the police, so for many 
women the centre was the only line of defence between them and the 
husbands who were battering them. Like other women’s centres that 
subsequently popped up in West Belfast, the Falls Women’s Centre of-
fered much-needed services and support to working-class women who 
did not have access to traditional supports. Advice was offered on taboo 
subjects like pregnancy and childbirth as well as abortion and contracep-
tion, signif icant as abortion was illegal and access to contraception 
was limited (Interview No. 9). The establishment of the centre was a 
major achievement for republican feminism as it improved the material 
realities of many women and helped forge feminist connections between 
them.
Sinn Féin Women’s Department is another example of republican femi-
nism in practice. Operational in 1980, its purpose was to ensure women 
had a political voice within the party and in its ‘ballot box’ politics. It 
sought to affect party policy and introduce women-friendly structures 
in addition to raising key concerns for women. This was done using more 
formal party mechanisms as well as through regular publications such as 
Women in Struggle, a series of manifestos and policy documents. Its f irst 
comprehensive policy document was introduced and adopted by Sinn Féin 
at its 1980 Ard Fheis. The department highlighted issues of importance 
not just in relation to the republican struggle, like strip searches or the 
conditions of women prisoners. It also broke the silence on issues like abor-
tion, contraception access, childcare, divorce, and domestic violence. The 
department is also responsible for Sinn Féin’s quota system, which ensures 
25 per cent of positions on its Ard Comhairle (Executive Committee) are 
reserved for women. The department also had the party commit to placing 
female candidates in winnable seats during elections (Interview No. 2; Ward 
2000: 7; Rooney 1995: 52).
Due to pressure from the Women’s Department, Sinn Féin introduced 
an educational process for its members on domestic violence (A Woman’s 
Voice 1988; De Rossa 1998). Childcare subsidies were also introduced for 
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Sinn Féin’s female employees (Lyons 1992: 267). Una Ní Mhearain of the 
Falls Women’s Centre explains: ‘Women have fought very long and hard 
to have those policies brought in and to shape policy’ (Interview No. 9). 
Despite these achievements, the Women’s Department failed to secure a 
pro-choice position from the party, much to the disappointment and anger 
of many republican women. Though the Women’s Department no longer 
exists, the issue of reproductive choice continues to be a thorn in the side 
of the party as republican feminists place pressure on the party from the 
inside to adopt a feminist, pro-choice stance (Lane 1998).
Clár na mBan is another important example of republican feminist 
mobilization. Based on a series of informal conversations about the future 
of women in Irish nationalism, Clár na mBan off icially formed in 1994 in 
the wake of the ongoing Hume-Adams talks. The group consisted of many 
established republican feminists like Claire Hackett and Una Ní Mhearain 
and sought to bring republican women together to discuss what a new 
Northern Irish society might look like. Clár na mBan was committed to 
ensuring that the voices of working-class women were heard when it came 
to shaping the future and in that vein organized a Belfast conference in 
March 1994 entitled ‘Clár na mBan’ (Irish for ‘Women’s Agenda for Peace’). 
The conference heard from many prominent republican feminists, such 
as Bernadette Devlin McAliskey, who denounced the ongoing peace talks: 
‘I reject the Hume-Adams agreement for the very simple reason, I haven’t 
seen it’ (Clár na mBan 1994: 15). There was a shared concern that the new 
society promised through the peace process would mean business as usual 
for women: ‘[W]hen the [British] government are talking about guaranteeing 
an end to violence, they are talking about the IRA handing over the weapons 
[…] they are not talking about making it a criminal offence for a man to 
beat his wife’ (Clár na mBan 1994: 15). The agenda put forward as a result of 
the conference called for a ‘demilitarised society, economic equality, rights 
for children, and an end to discrimination against disabled people and 
lesbians’ (Clár na mBan 1994: 15). These proposals were submitted to the 
Forum for Peace and Reconciliation and also helped to shape the equality 
measures introduced in the Good Friday Agreement (Rooney 2000: 172; 
Interview No. 14).
These four examples expose the reach of republican feminism across 
both grass-roots and institutional levels. They also provide a snapshot of 
the shape republican feminism has taken as the Troubles progressed over 
time and as different issues came into focus. While the richness of this 
approach is evident throughout the conflict, the same cannot be said as 
the movement transitioned away from armed struggle.
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Republican Feminism after the Good Friday Agreement
In the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement republican feminism bears 
little resemblance to its early manifestations. This, in part, can be blamed on 
the institutionalization of republicanism as Sinn Féin strives for all-Ireland 
electoral success. The Women’s Department was replaced by an Equality 
Department and manifestos dedicated solely to gender concerns are no 
longer issued. Feminists are still active within the party though are much 
less visible as a collective entity now.
Republican feminists are still active at the community level though in 
a manner that is more dispersed and less obvious. With funding for many 
community groups coming from EU Peace and Reconciliation Funds, many 
are forced to emphasize peace-building initiatives rather than decidedly 
feminist projects (Women’s Support Network 2004: 7; O’Dowd et al. 2006). 
The Falls Women’s Centre still exists, however, even though its founding 
members have moved on to other things. It offers much the same services as 
when it f irst opened the doors and these are greatly expanded and profes-
sionalized. It remains a feminist stalwart in republican West Belfast, draw-
ing in younger generations to avail of its educational and social offerings.
While the heyday of republican feminism may have passed its signif i-
cance it should not be discounted, as the lives of many women improved 
as a result of the collective organizing done in its name. It is, therefore, 
important that it is included in any documentation of the history of strug-
gles for equality and social justice in the North. More broadly, there are 
lessons to be learned from republican feminism. Its development tells a 
story of how feminism can grow in extraordinary circumstances, how it can 
be made meaningful, how it is contradictory, and how it can affect change 
even in the face of treacherous conditions. Social movement scholars can 
draw on this case as an example of the signif icance of relational processes 
leading to collectivization and collective identity formation. Feminist 
activists and academics too, can use it to understand the complexities 
of organizing in divided societies. It serves as a reminder for feminists to 
be cognizant of the pitfalls of failing to adopt an intersectional approach 
to building inclusive feminist politics. The republican feminist case also 
serves as a useful critique of universal sisterhood insofar as it shows why the 
construction of difference is as important as notions of universality when 
organising as feminists. Finally, the story of republican feminism reminds 
us of the importance of reflexive feminism grounded in the everyday lives 
of women, of ensuring feminism is relevant and reflective of ‘where we live, 
in our present’ (hooks 2000: 117).
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10 ‘One Community, Many Faces’
Non-sectarian Social Movements and Peace-building in 
Northern Ireland and Lebanon
John Nagle
Introduction
Deeply divided societies are those places where ethnicity contains ‘per-
meative propensities’ (Horowitz 2000: 7-8) in which virtually all political 
and social issues align on the dominant ethnonational rather than the 
socio-economic cleavage. Social movements here play a key role in advanc-
ing sectarian interests, fomenting inter-communal antagonism, and even 
spawning collective violence. Some movements may take to the streets to 
defend their cultural capital, while others emerge to petition for various 
group-based rights, or to press for an enlarged share of public goods to be 
distributed among co-ethnics. In such societies, it is often assumed that 
there is little space for alternative modes of politics that cross-cut ethnic 
cleavages. In such discussions, non-sectarian movements are either invisible 
or rendered as actors that are marginalized, co-opted, stripped of agency, 
and disempowered. Yet – as this chapter will highlight – non-sectarian 
social movements in divided societies, like Northern Ireland and Lebanon, 
represent important forms of mobilization that can even foment policy and 
social transformation. Such movements include lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) groups, environmentalists, trade unionists, housing 
tenants, the global justice movement, feminists, anti-racists, and peace 
mobilizations.
In this chapter, I explore the complex forms of mobilization engendered 
by non-sectarian social movements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. I 
ask how these movements contribute to peace-building in the aftermath 
of inter-communal violence, especially in the context of power-sharing 
institutions that seek to recognize and accommodate divergent ethnic 
and ethnonational identities. Such institutional frameworks are critiqued 
as they supposedly ‘close down the space for other ways of being, other 
ways of being political, other forms of political conflict’ (Finlay 2011: 10). 
Instead of this narrow view, non-sectarian social movements, I argue, 
force us to question the supposedly isomorphic relationship between 
ethnicity and conflict in divided societies. Yet, through examining social 
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movements, we apprehend the multiple ways in which ethnicity and ethnic 
groupness is constructed to allow for violent conflict to materialize and 
how it may be transcended to facilitate peace. Towards this, I note two 
different types of non-sectarian social movements in Northern Ireland and 
Lebanon that aim to create change in different ways – transformationist 
and pluralist movements. While transformationist movements seek to 
strive to completely transform identities by undermining what they view 
as a sectarian form of politics that exacerbates ethnic cleavages in divided 
societies, pluralists seek to force the divided society to recognize and ac-
commodate a greater range of interests and identities that are permitted by 
a binary, ‘either/or’ system that reinforces particularistic and antagonistic 
ethnic politics.
Non-sectarian movements in Northern Ireland and Lebanon can 
contribute towards political and social change consonant with the goals 
of sustainable peace-building. Certainly, there are quite obvious ways in 
which some movements position themselves as fundamental to peace-
building. Some movements appoint themselves as guardians of peace 
in the divided society. They take to the streets, for example, to call for 
the militants to end violence, or hold vigils during peace negotiations, 
and then mobilize to gather popular support for a peace agreement (see 
Smithey, in this volume). However, in this chapter, I argue that many 
non-sectarian movements can support peace-building in extremely 
complex ways that are, in themselves, not always classif ied as traditional 
forms of conflict management. They engage in activities, for instance, to 
promote equality for LGBT members, to demand better rights for workers, 
for greater choice for women over reproductive rights, and for better 
public services. Yet, in calling for these changes, these social movements 
challenge and unsettle the basic grammar and structure that supports 
violent separation and the articulation of narrow ethnic interests in the 
divided society.
Given the strength of ethnic divisions in divided societies, how might 
non-sectarian social movements provide an alternative? Determining a 
movement’s impact on policymakers requires demonstrating that ‘state-
related collective goods would not have appeared in the absence of the 
movement or specif ic actions taken by it’ (Amenta et al. 2010: 300). Given 
the number of third parties existing between the movement and the state, 
the ‘principal diff iculty is how to establish a causal relationship between a 
series of events that we can reasonably classify as social movement actions 
and an observed change in society, be it minor or fundamental, durable or 
temporary’ (Giugni 1998: 373).
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This issue of causality is notably challenging in relation to movements 
involved in peace-making activities. Hermann (2009) identif ies a number 
of diff iculties with assessing peace movements’ achievements and failures 
in Israel. Such movements were interpreted by politicians and ordinary 
citizens alike as a threat to the national consensus, and sometimes even to 
national security. The problem of determining social movement outcomes 
is, I argue, compounded in violently divided societies. Research has demon-
strated that the prospects of social movements to influence public policy is 
bleak when it is closely tied to the national cleavage structure and on which 
public opinion is very strong (Giugni 2004). The very intensity of ethnic and 
ethnonational cleavages in divided societies means that practically all issues 
become points of extreme communal polarization and antagonism. Thus, 
the mobilization on distributive policies, such as public goods, or over the 
environment, nuclear weapons, or economic investment, tend to reinforce 
rather than weaken divisions. Further mitigating the effect of non-sectarian 
movements is the fact that the state is often weak or highly fractured in 
divided societies, thus limiting the available political opportunity structure 
for movements.
If we were to use Gamson’s (1990) criteria of ‘acceptance’ – the ca-
pacity of the state to cede to movement requests – then non-sectarian 
movements in divided societies could claim little evidence of impact. 
As such, we need to consider different ways to measure the inf luence of 
non-sectarian movements. One way to consider this is via Diani’s (2000: 
391) concept of social movements that create ‘intersecting’ networks. 
For Diani, intersecting movements are those that forge relationships 
which are voluntary, multiple, and overlapping, thereby contributing 
to the creation of new models of communitarian and organizational 
action. Such intersecting movements contain relationships that cut across 
established social and political cleavages. These movements are able to 
‘draw upon, or generate, new solidarities and group memberships which 
cut across the boundaries of any specif ic traditional political cleavage, 
and thus undermine current forms of encapsulation’ (Diani 2000: 399). 
Diani points to the ‘patterns of social relations they generate through the 
overlapping memberships and personal linkages of their activists, and 
through the alliances between the different groups which identify with a 
given cause’ (2000: 387). Although Diani is not necessarily writing about 
divided societies, non-sectarian movements, by providing intersecting 
networks and advancing issues that transcend established sectarian 
cleavages, provide powerful alternative forms to narrow ethnic politics 
in divided societies.
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Identity, Consociationalism, and Divided Societies
Northern Ireland and Lebanon are usually categorized as prototypical 
examples of deeply divided societies (Kerr 2005). These are places in which 
the main ethnic groups have mobilized into separate political parties and 
high levels of residential segregation are prevalent as the main groups ‘live 
alongside each other in parallel subsocieties’ (Horowitz 2000: 6). In divided 
societies, it is assumed that ‘ethnic divisions are resilient rather than rapidly 
biodegradable, and that they must be recognized rather than wished away’ 
(McGarry and O’Leary 1995: 338). This conceptualization of ethnicity is 
broadly coterminous with the prevailing explanation of conflict in Lebanon 
and Northern Ireland (Kerr 2005). In viewing conflict as the product of 
competing ethnonational or ethnoreligious identities, specif ic institutions 
and forms of governance which aim to manage destructive intergroup 
conflict have been created. In consequence of this understanding of ethnic-
ity, the objective of conflict management is to accommodate the salient, 
conflicting groups in structures of governance.
This process of accommodation finds fullest expression in consociational 
forms of ethnic power-sharing. In assuring ethnic minorities some mini-
mum representation in government and influence over policy, including 
veto power, consociationalism conforms to ‘accomodationist strategies’ of 
conflict regulation. By seeking to equally accommodate dual or multiple 
identities in the polity, consociationalism stands in contrast to centripetal 
approaches which seek to forge an all-embracing public identity through 
integration (McGarry and O’Leary 2009).
Consociational power-sharing provides the fundamental point around 
which conflict management in Northern Ireland and Lebanon rests. Al-
though Lebanon has a long history of power-sharing, consociationalism 
was recalibrated and reintroduced in 1989 as part of efforts to end the civil 
war which began in 1975 and led to circa 150,000 deaths. The Lebanese civil 
war is often portrayed as essentially one between Christians (wishing to 
preserve their control over the state) and Muslims (seeking to challenge 
Christian hegemony). In reality, the conflict involved a much greater degree 
of complexity, encompassing a wide range of external actors, political goals, 
and high levels of intracommunal fracture. Nevertheless, the signing of 
the Taif Agreement (1989), which returned consociationalism to Lebanon, 
primarily sought to revise power-sharing in a way that accommodated 
the shifting balance of power between Christian and Muslim sects. The 
agreement’s ethos – ‘no victor, no vanquished’ – signif ied that no group 
could exercise dominance over the others within a finely tuned institutional 
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apparatus which managed competing group identities (Haddad 2009). To-
wards this objective, Lebanese power-sharing created an equitable formula 
in which positions are distributed equally to Muslims and Christians in 
governance and throughout the public sphere. As part of maintaining this 
equilibrium, Lebanon’s power-sharing is a classic example of ‘corporate 
consociationalism’, a form that assumes ‘group identities are f ixed, and that 
groups are both internally homogeneous and externally bounded’ (McGarry 
and O’Leary 2007: 675). Group representation is enforced in Lebanon via a 
quota system which rigidly reserves and allocates executive and legislative 
positions for the main groups, an arrangement mirrored across the public 
sector. Until 2009, all citizens had to carry identity cards demarcating ethnic 
identity in order to apply for public sector jobs.
Consociational power-sharing was introduced to Northern Ireland as 
part of the Good Friday Agreement (1998). Like the Taif Agreement, the 
purpose of the consociational agreement was to end violent conflict in the 
region, which began in 1969, and it also outlined a framework for creating 
inclusivity in representation between the main groups – nationalists and 
unionists – as well as institutional roles for the salient external actors, the 
United Kingdom, and the Republic of Ireland. In contrast to the corporate 
structure of the Taif Agreement, Northern Ireland’s consociational model is 
celebrated by its proponents for its ‘liberal’ characteristics; that is, it ‘rewards 
whatever salient political identities emerge in democratic elections’ (Mc-
Garry and O’Leary 2007: 675). Thus, neither seats nor public positions are 
reserved for the ethnonational groups in advance of elections. In so doing, 
proponents argue that liberal consociationalism ‘is more likely to transform 
identities in the long run’ (McGarry 2001: 124) compared to corporate forms.
While power-sharing is largely recognized as instrumental in ending 
destructive violence in the two regions, a number of commentators have 
critiqued both forms of consociationalism for prohibiting a stronger, more 
enduring peace including intergroup reconciliation. Certainly, one major 
consequence of the elite level focus of consociationalism in relation to 
sustainable peace-building is that it typically occludes a range of non-ethnic 
identity groups that are not institutionally recognized and accommodated. 
In fact, the de facto process of excluding these identity groups may even 
have negative consequences for the human rights of individual members. It 
also fails to include all sectors of society, most especially civil society. Yet, 
while it is undeniably clear that we need to be careful when crafting institu-
tions to end violent conflict, consociational arrangements may expedite 
uncertain outcomes some of which are unintended by the architects of these 
measures. Towards this, this chapter examines the intertwining limitations 
190 JohN NaGLe 
and opportunities afforded by power-sharing and the complex forms of 
engagement created by non-ethnic movements in response. Power-sharing 
generates various dynamics that can result in either hegemonic compliance, 
constructive engagement, or active resistance by social movement actors 
that cross-cut established ethnic cleavages and who even foment policy 
and social transformation.
Transformationist Movements
Transformationist social movements are those that strive to completely 
transform sectarian identities and politics in the divided society. Trans-
formationist social movements in Northern Ireland are those that strive to 
completely change a polity dominated by zero-sum ethnonational politics 
and encourage ‘individual actors to transform their social identities into 
something other than merely Protestant Unionist or Catholic Nationalist’ 
(Edwards 2007: 139-140). An example of this can be seen in class-based 
movements, which asks citizens to see their common interests as workers 
rather than as divided ethnicities. In this way, antagonistic ethnic identities 
will be superseded by unified class encapsulations. One socialist movement 
campaigns to ‘make the class we belong to more important than the com-
munity we come from’ (Socialist Environmental Alliance 2005).
The main focus of this type of social movement is annual socialist and 
trade union May Day march through Belfast city centre. The Belfast May 
Day parade is relevant to the present discussion due to how the event has 
been reimagined during the peace process as a form of mobilization that 
embraces ethnic diversity within the broad unity of a class-based move-
ment. Prior to the peace process, in the late 1960s and 1970s, when sectarian 
violence was its most intense in the city, the May Day organizers fought 
to provide an image of working-class unity in distinction to the acrimony 
promulgated by the divisive narratives of ethnonationalism.
The development of the Northern Irish peace process in the 1990s provided 
impetus for the trade union movement to reframe its objectives in terms 
of diversity enshrined in the aims of the international workers movement 
and peace-building. Trade unionists use the May Day parade to challenge 
the competitive nationalisms which contribute to the sedimentation of 
violence and segregation in Northern Ireland. A May Day organizer told me:
What we have strived to do is to create a safe space for people of all 
religions and none to come together to mark their relationship as working 
‘oNe coMMuNIT y, MaNy FaceS’ 191
people rather than as Catholics, as Protestants, as atheists, whatever […] 
It’s a non-sectarian, non-denominational march. (Interview No. 1, 2007)
Another organizer described the annual May Day demonstration thus:
It’s a very good thing coming out and saying: ‘My identity does not neces-
sarily come from the religion I was born into or my perceived political 
baggage or my past or my age or my race or my gender or for that matter 
my sexuality’. What you do when you take part in that May Day parade 
is that you are expressing […] solidarity […] based upon our class and 
also our common humanity. I think it is quite important that it happens 
every year in Belfast. (Interview No. 2, 2007)
The diversity of May Day is further expressed through the range of groups 
who participate: not only trade unions, but also nationalist and unionist 
groupings traditionally linked to paramilitary organizations (such as Sinn 
Féin and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)), the Anti-Racist Network, 
the Campaign Against Water Privatization, environmentalists, the Anti-War 
Coalition, the Northern Irish Gay Rights Association (NIGRA), amongst 
many others. One of the most successful mobilizations in recent years was 
in 2005 when 6000 people marched to protest against rising levels of racism 
and to proclaim solidarity with the city’s migrant groupings. The 2003 May 
Day celebration was described as ‘rejecting sectarianism and celebrating di-
versity in Northern Ireland. Today’s parade is seen as one of the few marches 
in Northern Ireland which has been designed to embrace participation 
from people of different backgrounds’ (Belfast Telegraph 2003). Lebanese 
transformationists are more direct in seeking to end state-sanctioned 
sectarianism, such as the use of the ethnic quotas to determine political 
representation and public positions, and the role of religion in governing 
public life. These movements may deal with specif ic aspects of political 
sectarianism or generate broad-based platforms that encompass a range of 
interconnected campaigns. Issues advanced by movements focus on civil 
marriage (Laïque Pride), electoral reform (Take Back Parliament), domestic 
violence, women’s reproductive rights (Nasawiya), LGBT rights (Helem, 
Meem), and even the introduction of a shared history text for Lebanon’s 
school children (AUB Secular Society). Given the intersectionality of issues 
these movements engage in, it is often the case that the membership of 
these movements strongly overlaps.
A good example of a Lebanese Transformationist movement is the ‘You 
Stink’ mobilization that emerged in 2015. In July 2015, the power-sharing 
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government, stuck in a f ierce political deadlock, was unable to renew the 
contract for the main refuse company to dispose waste in a landfill. As a 
result, more than 20,000 tonnes of rubbish amassed uncollected in Beirut’s 
streets. In response, a newly formed protest movement – ‘You Stink’ – gath-
ered tens of thousands of protestors in Beirut city centre to demand the 
government’s resignation for allowing sectarian differences to supersede 
the public’s environmental and health needs. Many protestors – reported 
as ‘people from across the sectarian and political spectrum’ (Al Jazeera 
2015) – carried placards and symbolic refuse bags and wore paper masks 
to cover the stench of the trash and what they viewed as the decaying 
political class.
For You Stink’s activists, the incapacity of the state to deliver key public 
goods is an outcome of the power-sharing system that incentivizes corrup-
tion and sectarian conflict. A leading activist explained that the sectarian 
elites ‘are using the confessional system for their corruption, so it is a vicious 
circle and you have to f ind a way to stop it’ (Interview No. 5, 2016). The You 
Stink protests, which attracted up to 100,000 participants in Beirut city 
centre, exposed the level of opposition to how power-sharing has been 
deployed to legitimate corruption and to diminish the public sector. A You 
Stink leader argued that the movement represented ‘the silent majority 
that is disenfranchised, but they are not powerless’ (Interview No. 6, 2016). 
In mobilizing these people, You Stink articulated a powerful alternative 
politics to the sectarianism reproduced by political leaders. You Stink, 
therefore, connect to ‘cognitive liberation’: the process through which activ-
ists encourage individuals to formalize shared understandings of their 
situation as one of oppression and marginalization so that they achieve 
groupness (McAdam 1982). While sectarian politics has typically operated 
by reproducing ethnic antagonism, You Stink’s encourages cross-cleavage 
alliances and a political sensibility that fosters civic interests. A leader 
explained:
People are angry in Lebanon and what the politicians do is that they turn 
this anger towards the sectarian ‘other’. What we try to do is redirect the 
anger at the actual culprits. For once we realise that our economic and 
our day-to-day anger shouldn’t be directed at one another. It should be 
directed at the people in power and for us to make them accountable. As 
long as we keep redirecting the anger, this might get the people to forget 
about their confessional background and go towards the higher goal: a 
better country for us all […] There is no such thing as sectarian segregation 
unless it’s in the mind of our politicians. (Interview No. 6, 2016)
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Rejecting the status of marginalized and disempowered actors that are 
unable to affect social and policy change in the context of a monolithic 
sectarian structure, You Stink activists see the protests as fomenting 
signif icant opposition to a form of political sectarianism that incentivizes 
ethnic antagonism, corruption, and dysfunctional political institutions. For 
a You Stink leader, an important achievement of the movement is to break 
the ‘godlike’ stature of the ethnic elites:
They have been treated as gods for the past thirty years […] They are 
supposed to be held accountable when they fail and they have failed 
us miserably. We are killing off their godlike aspect and bringing them 
down to the ground and when you have them on the ground, you will 
beat them up. (Interview No. 6, 2016)
Pluralist Movements
Pluralists are typically cross-cleavage groups who feel that their identities 
have traditionally been rendered mute or even anomalous in a divided 
society characterized by ethnonational/ethnoreligious conflict and either/
or approaches to social identity. Their job is to make wider society more 
appreciative of ‘difference’, especially in regards to issues concerning gender 
and ethnicity. If divided societies are characterized by intolerance, the 
purpose of pluralists is to be heterogeneous so that society, in time, will 
become more open to the presence of multiple identities. Examples of 
pluralist social movements in Northern Ireland include LGBT, feminist, 
and anti-racist mobilizations.
The LGBT rights movement in Northern Ireland emerged in response to 
Victorian legislation that criminalized homosexuality. Northern Ireland’s 
f irst LGBT organization – the Gay Liberation Society (GLS) – began in 1971 
to demand homosexual law reform. In 1974, members of GLS formed the 
Campaign for Homosexual Law Reform (CHLR), which was then followed by 
the Northern Ireland Gay Rights Association (NIGRA), a broad-based social 
movement designed to promote equality for the region’s LGBT population 
(Nagle and Clancy 2010). The rise of the Northern Irish LGBT movement 
coincided with the intensif ication of violent conflict over national self-
determination in the early 1970s. Political resistance to homosexual law 
reform came from the Rev. Ian Paisley, a unionist MP, who collected nearly 
70,000 signatures as he led a petition to ‘Save Ulster from Sodomy’. The 
campaign for law reform, led by LGBT activists, f inally succeeded in 1981 
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when the European Court of Human Rights declared that criminalization 
represented a violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
Despite law reform, sexual minorities represented a marginalized com-
munity with little recognition within wider policy debates in Northern 
Ireland. Decriminalization did not represent a mandate for equality but a 
mere act of toleration. Whereas equality belies approval and acceptance, 
tolerance is a tacit form of disapproval and tolerance has limits. In response, 
LGBT activism started to mobilize in public spaces, especially an annual 
‘Belfast Pride’ event, which began in 1991 with a short parade containing 50 
participants singing ‘gay rights anthems’ (Nagle and Clancy 2010: 122). In the 
1990s, Belfast Pride become a broader-based movement characterized by 
interleaved alliances seeking to pluralize a society defined by ethnonational 
division (Nagle 2013). Pride increasingly focused on a number of interrelated 
issues: achieving equality in all spheres of social life; increased visibility in 
public policy; and promoting diversity to foster mutual tolerance between 
all groups in society. Pride positioned the LGBT movement as a model of 
peaceful coexistence between groups.
The development of the Northern Irish peace process in the early 1990s 
created the broader context for the LGBT movement to articulate an 
agenda for minority rights. At this point, increasing – albeit incomplete 
– consensus was that the conflict in Northern Ireland was essentially one 
anchored in identity: two ethnonational groups with clashing national 
self-determination aspirations. The peace process, consequently, centred 
on the discourse of ‘parity of esteem’ for ethnic identities. Within this 
framework, the LGBT movement situated itself as a peace process actor. 
Evidence of this can be seen in the off icial theme of the 1995 Pride celebra-
tion: ‘Time for Peace, Time for Pride’. At the same time, NIGRA (1995: 1) 
declared its mission statement as ‘Let Us Unite in Diversity’: ‘It is our object 
to found an organization not merely to protect the interests of minorities in 
Northern Ireland but to argue the fact that in diversity is genuine strength’. 
In subsequent years, organizers of Pride, both in the lead up and after the 
signing of the peace agreement, framed the event as a celebration of all 
forms of diversity to counter ethnonational polarization. Such emphasis 
on alliances and relationships is apparent in the theme given annually to 
Belfast Pride: ‘Unity Through Diversity’ (1998); ‘One Community, Many 
Faces’ (2001); ‘Let’s Respect Diversity’ (2003).
The experience of Lebanon’s sexual minority population is formed 
by Article 534, which criminalizes non-heterosexuality by carrying a 
maximum one-year prison sentence. Article 534’s impact ranged from 
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‘discrimination in employment and arbitrary dismissal, to limited access 
to housing, health, and social services, to political and f inancial extortion’ 
(Makarem 2011a: 100). A 2015 report noted that sexual minorities ‘are still 
periodically arrested, detained, and tortured by Lebanese security forces, 
while incidents of societal and family-based discrimination have not abated’ 
(Nasr and Zeidan 2015: 7).
Since Article 534 discouraged individuals from publically identifying 
as gay, it has been argued that that sexual minorities rarely ‘express any 
particular group solidarity […] based on a perceived common sexuality 
or one informed by a mutually embraced political cause’ (Merabet 2014: 
112-113). An LGBT activist explained to me: ‘It is very diff icult for me to 
conceive of a LGBT community in Lebanon much less a LGBT movement’ 
(Interview No. 4, 2015). In other words, while there are many individual gay 
men and women in Lebanon, they have yet to identify themselves as part 
of a collectivity with unif ied political goals. The task of Helem, therefore, 
was to generate ‘cognitive liberation’ (McAdam 1982): the process through 
which activists encourage individuals to formalize shared understandings 
of their situation as one of oppression and marginalization so that they 
achieve groupness.
Despite unpropitious conditions for activism, LGBT social movements 
emerged. In Lebanon, most notably Helem, identif ied as the f irst gay rights 
movement in the Middle East and North Africa. Helem developed in 2002 
out of a network of lesbians and gay men that socialized together and 
in 2004 became a public movement by forming an NGO to advocate on 
behalf of Lebanon’s sexual minorities. Helem’s strategic options were 
initially constrained by the law on criminalization, which deprived the 
organization from gaining off icial recognition as an NGO. In 2005, leading 
members were subsequently detained and interrogated by the security 
forces.
The emerging LGBT social movement in Lebanon interlinks its campaign 
against homophobia with the wider f ight to oppose the political sectarian-
ism of power-sharing. In interviews with Lebanese LGBT members, Naber 
and Zaatari (2014: 100) note how these informants view ‘Lebanon’s sectarian 
structure […] as a key site of struggle not only because it is divisive […] but 
also because it is patriarchal and requires compulsory heterosexuality’. An 
LGBT activist explained to me that the power-sharing ‘system has always 
been opposed to us [sexual minorities]’. In turn, LGBT activists argue 
that their task is ‘f ighting to end confessionalism of the political system’ 
(Makarem 2011a). A lesbian social movement called Meem (M. 2010: 15) is 
‘resisting sectarianism’ since ‘the biggest challenge to any form of social 
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justice in Lebanon is the sectarian makeup of its society’. Thus, rather 
than mobilize for rights within the system, Lebanese consociationalism 
disavows the opportunities for sexual minorities to claim incremental 
reform. Meem argues:
[H]ow does one advocate for gay rights in Lebanon? Suppose the govern-
ment did want to expand gay rights, how would they even do that? Any 
effort to reform laws and practices towards expansion of gay rights would 
have to negotiate independently with each religious community because 
[…] any major political development in Lebanon requires the support of 
all the various sects. (M. 2010: 17)
Radical opposition to power-sharing embodies the protest politics of a body 
of LGBT activists. Some activists view ‘Lebanon’s sectarian structure […] as 
a key site of struggle not only because it is divisive […] but also because it is 
patriarchal and requires compulsory heterosexuality’ (Naber and Zaatari 
2014: 100). This opposition to power-sharing is evident in the statements of 
movement activists. For one former Helem leader, a fundamental objective 
of the LGBT movement is ‘f ighting to end confessionalism of the political 
system’ (Makarem 2011b). A lesbian movement identif ied one of its major 
goals as ‘resisting sectarianism’, since ‘the biggest challenge to any form of 
social justice in Lebanon is the sectarian makeup of its society’ (M. 2010: 
15). LGBT activists also align themselves with non-sectarian movements 
that call for political ‘deconfessionalism’, the abolition of power-sharing. 
Thus, Helem’s development as an ‘anti-imperialist movement led to the 
adoption of an anti-sectarian, anti-racist, and anti-xenophobic position’ 
(Makarem 2011a: 105).
In identifying power-sharing as censoring non-heterosexuality, radical 
Lebanese activists oppose it. LGBT resistance, therefore, is articulated 
through rejecting a sectarian identity (Naber and Zaatari 2014: 103). Such 
politics, as Seidman notes (2012: 22), is a ‘resistance to identity-based models 
of self and politics […] in a nation in which kin and sect impose enveloping 
and inflexible identities on all individuals’. One lesbian movement’s (M. 
2010: 9) ‘very existence as a diverse […] community – one of the rare few in 
Lebanon – is in itself a challenge to the sectarianism endemic in Lebanese 
society and politics’. The movement’s non-identitarian resistance to the 
political sectarianism of power-sharing is further achieved by the relation-
ships of members. To freeze the balance of power between the main groups, 
Lebanon’s power-sharing system forbids marriage between members of 
different religious sects unless one of the partners converts to the other’s 
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religion. The existence of same-sex relationships that cross sectarian 
boundaries profoundly disturbs the ethnic mosaic in which individuals 
are assigned to monolithic and discrete communities. Naber and Zaatari 
(2014: 101) illuminate, in relation to Lebanon, that ‘nonconformist sexuality 
challenges sectarianism, and there are more same-sex couples that come 
together across sectarian divides than heterosexual couples’. Yet, while 
LGBT activists view the movement as a challenge to political sectarianism, 
they also recognize that, in some ways, it can reproduce sectarian divisions. 
A Helem activist noted:
The way that confessional politics works here is amazing, because 
sometimes it seeps into the LGBT community itself, much less so than 
the rest of the country […] You see a lot more bi-sectarian relationships 
among the community. However, you also notice that there are a lot 
of LGBT people with a heightened sense of confessional and religious 
belonging. They go to two churches, the gay bar and the actual church. 
(Interview No. 3, 2012)
Conclusion
The literature on social movements in ethnic conflict largely focuses on 
the mobilization of insurgents seeking to challenge state power (Olzak 
2006; Gurr 2000; Della Porta 2013). These are groups historically excluded 
from the polity and which demand forms of national self-determination. 
Such social movements f igure predominantly in the literature associated 
with the ‘politics of collective violence’ (Tilly 2003) and/or ‘clandestine 
political violence’ (Della Porta 2013). This focus is also evident in social 
movement research in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, though Northern 
Ireland merits a caveat in so far as there has been a rich corpus of literature 
on the inter-communal civil rights movement of the 1960s. Yet, in order 
to understand how conflict and peace is achieved in such societies, it is 
necessary to develop a broader analysis to include movements that do not 
readily f it into the dominant narrative. This mode of analysis is particularly 
important in relation to the aftermath of peace agreements, such as the 
Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the Taif Agreement (1989), since the 
objective of both agreements is to recognize and even strengthen the power 
of the main ethnic groups. Such models of conflict regulation are predicated 
on the assumption of the relative homogeneity of the respective groups. 
While ethnicity is undoubtedly a salient and widespread form of belonging 
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and organization in divided societies, the ability of social movements to 
challenge, overcome, and even provide radical alternatives is extremely 
important.
Social movements can foster a public sphere of debate in which issues 
salient to all groups can be deliberated so that shared polices can be forged, 
and which make ethnonational politicians accommodate identities uncon-
f ined to their own narrow constituencies. This public sphere of debate is 
also essential to conflict resolution by allowing many issues of communal 
contestation to be aired so they can be potentially resolved through rational 
debate. Many movements also bring about many important policies that 
contribute to social change. The LGBT movement in Northern Ireland, for 
example, has successfully brought about many legislative changes condu-
cive to engendering equality for gay and lesbian people in the region. As 
such, polices aimed at enhancing equality and the tolerance of diversity 
can make a signif icant alteration to the social structure.
At the same time, this chapter illuminates the complex ways in which 
non-sectarian movements operate in their respective societies relative 
to different types of power-sharing. In Northern Ireland’s relatively 
liberal power-sharing form few movements purposely mobilize to di-
rectly reform or end consociationalism; instead movements – such as 
those associated with the May Day event – aim to provide alternatives 
to sectarianism. They are transformative movements in the sense that 
they desire to transform antagonistic concepts of ethnicity into ones 
more redolent of shared class encapsulations. In Lebanon, the corporate 
power-sharing system institutionalizes ethnicity to such an extent that 
non-sectarian movements – such as secularists – organize to directly 
transform this system by calling for the end of political sectarianism. 
A slightly different type of movement explored in the chapter concerns 
pluralists, groups that attempt to encourage cross-cutting and hybrid 
identities and interests.
Interviews
No. 1, with a May Day organizer, 2007
No. 2, with another May Day organizer, 2007
No. 3, with a Helem activist, September 2012
No. 4, with an LGBT activist, June 2015
No. 5, with a leading You Stink activist, January 2016
No. 6, with a You Stink leader, January 2016
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11 The Peace People
Principled and Revolutionary Non-violence in Northern 
Ireland1
Lee A. Smithey
The Peace People movement emerged in 1976 in response to a wave of 
intense violence that had grown in Northern Ireland since 1969. The 
movement quickly drew large crowds at mass rallies to protest violence, 
attracting international attention. Many of the people of Northern Ireland 
seemed ready to challenge the status quo of violence and sectarianism 
that had come to dominate everyday life. The Peace People movement, or 
the ‘Community of the Peace People’, adopted non-violent tactics and a 
non-violent ideology, challenged all forms of violence, worked to develop a 
democratic social movement organization, supported community relations 
and community development work, and called for a new unifying Northern 
Irish identity.
In the early stages of the movement, mass rallies were well-attended 
by both Catholics and Protestants. Enthusiasm ran high, and the move-
ment enjoyed substantial support both at home and abroad. Indeed, Betty 
Williams and Mairead Corrigan, two of the movement’s leaders, received 
the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize. During the second phase of the movement, 
the leaders proposed an expansive plan for grass-roots transformation of 
the region, both politically and culturally. However, two years later, the 
organization suffered from f inancial challenges, and internal dissension 
came to a head.
The energy of the movement’s launch and the scope of the Peace People 
programme were remarkable. During the f irst phase of rallies, it was as 
if the normal ethnonational fault lines became less salient in a liminal 
moment as tens of thousands of people joined together in public demonstra-
tions. Ciaran McKeown, Mairead Corrigan, and Betty Williams sought to 
provide direction and leadership in this unusual moment of collective 
emotional outpouring. Through the organization, they also worked to build 
1 Sections of this chapter also appear in Smithey (2009). The author thanks Anne Kane, 
Lester Kurtz, Rob Fairmichael, and Matt Meyer for feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
Any mistakes belong to the author. The Swarthmore College Peace Collection provided access 
to the newsletters of the Peace People organization.
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further participation, a democratically elected central social movement 
organization, a network of community-based chapters, and a constructive 
programme to address contemporary social issues. All the while, they 
hitched their work to the transnational peace movement, establishing re-
lationships with prominent peace activists and organizations in the United 
States, Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. The Peace People move-
ment constituted a signif icant challenge to political violence in a region 
wracked with bombings, assassinations, and covert and overt military 
operations. The leadership envisioned an end to violence; transformation 
of longstanding sectarian divisions; social, political, and economic reform; 
a new Northern Irish identity; and a new local political system, all achieved 
through non-violent organizing within a framework of love and respect 
for humanity. Participants were initially optimistic about the movement’s 
potential, though some observers remained guardedly pessimistic, expect-
ing the movement to quickly disappear as other grass-roots interventions 
had done. Politicians initially dismissed the movement’s potential, but 
later became frustrated with their inability to co-opt it. The Peace People 
were not following the usual sectarian and political scripts employed by 
other political actors, and this afforded a novelty that appealed to many 
otherwise disillusioned citizens.
As the editors explained in their introduction, this long-awaited volume 
brings together social movement research and scholarship on divided 
societies, encouraging us to think more deeply about how social move-
ments play important roles in what are often called ‘intractable’ identity 
conflicts and how the dynamics of such conflicts shape collective action. 
They furthermore highlight the importance of ‘actor-based approaches’ and 
the ‘contextualizing of contentious politics’. In this chapter, we examine 
a social movement with leaders who sought to overcome ethnonational 
identity barriers, rejuvenate local democracy, and further a global peace and 
justice movement. To understand its emergence and decline, it is important 
to take into account historical, political, and socio-economic conditions 
as well as movement strategy and cognitive and cultural forces. The Peace 
People constituted a direct non-violent response to violent conflict that had 
deepened ethnonational division. However, the strategic and ideological 
choices that movement leaders made to embrace non-violent methods and 
praxes proved crucial in shaping the trajectory of the movement.
The movement has been documented by McKeown (1984), Fairmichael 
(1987), and Deutsch (1977), though it has rarely been taken up in academic 
literature and usually only evokes passing reference by historians. The 
case could lend itself to a range of analyses of leadership, organizational 
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structures, transnational movement, gender studies, conflict transforma-
tion, and more. Here, I focus on the cognitive and cultural dimensions of 
the relationship between the expansive programme laid out by Williams, 
Corrigan, and McKeown (the latter two in particular) and movement 
participants.
Cultural considerations have become well-grounded in the study of social 
movements, and as I have argued elsewhere (Smithey 2009), sociologists are 
now beginning to turn their attention towards the cultural implications 
of the methods that social movement organizations employ, including the 
use of non-violent action. This is an exciting new vista of research that 
views conflict as a culturally rich form of interaction within and between 
contending parties. It is important to remember, however, that the effects 
of the framing work and strategic action decisions that movement leaders 
make are contingent on the socio-historical contexts in which movements 
emerge, the cultural terrain that both enables and constrains movements. In 
the case of the Peace People, their far-reaching non-violent agenda allowed 
them to distance themselves from the usual spiral of ethnonational conflict 
that wracked the region, but it also proved diff icult to sustain.
The Peace People represented what Nagle (in this volume) calls a 
‘transformationist’ social movement. Much as the trade union movement 
in post-accord Northern Ireland has worked to challenge sectarianism 
through appeals to class identity and a common humanity, the non-
violent programme and ideology advocated by the Peace People movement 
leadership aimed to transform the familiar sectarian terrain of Northern 
Ireland. They called for a new post-sectarian identity and new political 
systems decoupled from ethnonational divisions. Whether and how such 
a revolutionary programme of non-violent transformation could be made 
to resonate broadly in the midst of an ‘intractable’ ethnonational conflict 
constitutes the particular focus of this chapter.
Ethnonational identities often become monolithic and polarized in 
the heat and trauma of violent conflicts, and trying to soften or diversify 
collective identities is a common goal of conflict transformation efforts. 
Fortunately, collective identities are malleable, but only within limits 
(Todd 2005; Jenkins 2008; Wimmer 2008). Through framing processes, 
movement leaders can work to shift the cultural terrain of collective identi-
ties, prioritizing some over others. However, such transformative work 
is never unconstrained. It takes place within a f ield of historical experi-
ence, countervailing identities, and predispositions. Leaders with a deep 
understanding of their own in-groups often have the cultural capital to 
introduce new interpretations of where group boundaries lie. Such change 
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is incremental, and leaders can stretch their constituents too far when 
they call them to radical new interpretations of collective identities that 
outpace constituents’ abilities to reconcile the new models with those they 
have already internalized (Smithey 2011). Certainly, many factors were 
responsible for the Peace People’s downturn, including internal contention, 
funding problems, and leadership challenges (Fairmichael 1987), but this 
chapter will focus on the crucial interaction between the principled and 
revolutionary non-violence that the movement’s leaders envisioned and 
cultural and ideological preferences in Northern Ireland.2
After relaying the series of events that led to the rapid rise of the Peace 
People and the two main phases of the movement’s development, I present 
the framing of movement values and goals as an important process through 
which to observe the challenges movements face when trying to overcome 
centrifugal forces of division in the midst of a violent ethnonational conflict. 
Moreover, I argue that the leaders of the Peace People called participants 
not just to non-violent action but to extensive ideological commitments to 
principled and revolutionary non-violence. They aimed to escape the relent-
less pull of everyday violence and trauma, a broken political system, and 
polarized collective identities, but their goals proved too great a departure 
from the lived experience and habitus of many in Northern Ireland.
The Peace People
On Wednesday, 11 August 1976, one day after a car chase resulted in the 
fatal shooting of an Irish republican Army (IRA) volunteer by the British 
military and the deaths of three children, 50 women in the republican 
neighbourhoods of Andersontown and Stewartstown in Belfast protested 
republican violence by marching with baby carriages. Later that even-
ing, Mairead Corrigan,3 an aunt of the children, appeared on television, 
pleading for an end to violence. Betty Williams took action door to door 
in her neighbourhood with a petition protesting paramilitary violence. By 
the following evening (Thursday), Williams had collected 6000 signatures 
(Deutsch 1977: 6). She also scheduled a rally to take place the next day 
2 The analysis I offer draws on secondary literature about the Peace People movement, 
published f irst-hand accounts by activists and observers, and articles from The Times of London, 
and the movement newsletter, Peace by Peace (1976-1978).
3 Mairead Corrigan later married her sister’s husband after her sister’s death, and she is 
therefore referred to in more recent literature as Mairead Corrigan Maguire.
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in Andersontown. Ten to f ifteen thousand women, both Protestant and 
Catholic, attended (McKeown 1984: 142-143).
Corrigan and Williams were generally recognized as the leaders during 
the early months of the movement, and Ciaran McKeown, a journalist and 
non-violent activist, soon joined them in leading the movement for the 
next three and a half years. The f irst movement participants were almost 
exclusively women, and the press often referred to the movement as the 
‘womens’ movement’ (Walker 1976b). The leaders promptly sought to include 
all citizens, and they adopted the name, ‘Peace People’.
Phase One – Rallies
The initial phase of movement activity extended from the f irst rally in 
West Belfast on 14 August 1976 through a rally in Drogheda in the Republic 
of Ireland on 5 December 1976. At least 26 marches or rallies took place in 
Northern Ireland, Britain, and the Republic of Ireland, attracting intense 
international media attention and international f inancial and political 
support. Meanwhile, ‘Peace Committees’ or local groups (110 by one count) 
sprang up in communities as participants in the rallies organized them-
selves, and a group development programme was arranged to support local 
organizations (Deutsch 1977: 159; Fairmichael 1987: 13). The leaders secured 
a meagre central off ice in Belfast to facilitate communication between the 
various peace committees that formed and established an Assembly and 
Executive committee.
The f irst rally boasted between 10,000 and 15,000 participants (Geddes 
1976a; McKeown 1984). The rally on 21 August in Protestant East Belfast 
involved more than 20,000 people, and the rallies on Belfast’s Shankill 
Road and in Derry/Londonderry each attracted around 25,000 participants 
(Geddes 1976b; Walker 1976b). These were the largest, but other marches 
and rallies across Britain, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland 
involved thousands more participants. Fairmichael (1987: 6) estimates 
roughly that 100,000 people in Northern Ireland (approximately 6.5 per 
cent of the population) attended at least one rally. The death of the Maguire 
children had revealed collective concerns within the war-weary public 
about the continuing violence, and the rallies became catalytic rituals 
through which many in Northern Ireland sought to reframe the boundaries 
of acceptable political action and surmount deeply entrenched ethnic and 
political divisions.
The movement also attracted international media attention. Camera 
crews arrived from the United States and European countries to document 
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the movement’s activities. McKeown, Williams, and Corrigan travelled to 
the United States on at least two occasions for television interviews and 
meetings with members of Congress, including Senator Edward Kennedy. 
The Norwegian People’s Peace Prize, organized by Norwegian media, raised 
more than £200,000 for the movement by December 1976, and Corrigan and 
Williams received the 1976 Nobel Peace Prize in December 1977.
Phase Two – Community Politics
The second phase of the movement began in early January 1977 as the leader-
ship organized for the long-term maintenance of the movement and set 
out goals that would fulf il their vision of grass-roots transformation. Com-
munity peace groups had formed during the rally phase, and the leadership 
planned to coordinate them in a bid to create new ‘community politics’ and 
a shared ‘Northern Irish’ identity that would transcend polarized political 
identities (McKeown 1976: 24-25; 1984: 1, 4). In McKeown’s (1984: 189) words:
Our more immediate concern was with the low-level application of these 
ideas in the wake of ‘hot war’ […] Our purpose was to encourage such 
neighbours to take an active interest in the quality of life of their own 
streets and districts, to feel that they had friends in other communities 
busy in the same genuine patriotism, and that together they would defeat 
the deepest law of repression, ‘whatever you say, say nothing’.
To support this programme of grass-roots transformation, a non-prof it 
company and trust were set up to disburse funds to community improve-
ment programmes and small businesses. An ‘escape route’ was established 
to relocate those who wanted to defect from paramilitary organizations. 
At the same time, effort was directed towards establishing a sustainable 
organization to coordinate efforts. The strategy was designed to encour-
age a measure of self-esteem and mutual identif ication among the people 
of Northern Ireland that would eventually erode the sectarian bases for 
continuing violence and establish a social, political, and economic platform 
for self-governance.
However, over time, the movement began to experience diff iculties 
among the leadership and community groups, many of which faltered 
after the rally phase. A train was chartered to take members to a rally 
in Dublin on 18 February 1978, but by then, many had lost interest, and 
the event was not considered as successful as earlier rallies (Walker 1978). 
Concern arose over the use of funds, including the Nobel Peace Prize award 
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to Corrigan and Williams. Controversy also developed over McKeown’s 
prominence in decision-making and the organization’s f iscal strategy as 
limited funds ran short and loans were written off (Deutsch 1977; McKeown 
1984). To demonstrate their faith in the democratic structures that had 
been established and to encourage greater grass-roots ownership of the 
programme, McKeown, Corrigan, and Williams all resigned from the Execu-
tive committee in October 1978. Peter MacLachlan, formerly a prominent 
unionist politician, took over the chairmanship of the Executive.
Framing Non-violent Revolution in a Divided Society
Meaning making has become a central task of the study of social movements. 
Social movements introduce new narratives and discourses that are no less 
important than the demands they make of their opponents. They engage in 
‘framing’ battles as they seek to legitimate new policies and often lifestyles 
and delegitimize those of their opponents. To mobilize participants, move-
ment leaders develop frames and narratives about themselves and their 
opponents that resonate with potential movement members. In their early 
groundbreaking work on framing, Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) describe 
a ‘frame alignment process’ ‘by which social movement organizations (SMO) 
seek to bring the beliefs and attitudes of potential recruits into sync with the 
ideological frame of the movement’ (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; McAdam, 
McCarthy, and Zald 1988: 725). A major element of the process is the creation 
(or realignment) of in-group and out-group identities (Hunt, Benford, and 
Snow 1994: 193-194). They stress that this process of identity formation is 
ongoing and that SMOs must be persistent if they hope to succeed.
However, framing contests take place in pre-existing f ields of collective 
identities, preferences, and interests. The alignment of movement goals with 
pre-existing narratives, discourses, and identities is a particularly important 
challenge (Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008). Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 56-
57) stress the compatibility of the movement’s message with contemporary 
norms and cultural expectations, or the ‘willingness and capacity of the 
entire social formation to absorb, incorporate, or reject the “message” of 
the movement’.
Cognitive dissonance can set in when a movement’s ideological basis or 
praxis4 conflicts with participants’ pre-existing cognitions. As a movement’s 
4 Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 46) def ine praxis as a ‘“packages of ideas” or clusters of issues, 
or, perhaps most ambitiously, as organizational ideologies or prof iles’.
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ideology and frames must compete in a cultural and political space against 
other competing ideologies and norms, we should explore successes and 
failures in these battles of ideas. The relationship between movement praxis 
and the level of integration among movement participants also becomes 
particularly relevant when studying the Peace People’s efforts to reach their 
stated goals of a radical new democracy in a highly segregated society. I 
focus in this chapter on a particular set of non-violent praxes, principled 
and revolutionary non-violence, that served as central ideologies in the 
Peace People movement.
Principled Non-violence
‘Principled non-violence’ refers to an ideology or system of ideas and beliefs 
that accompany and legitimate the use of non-violent civil resistance while 
calling adherents to repudiate violence and encourage pre-figurative collec-
tive action. A brief look at several central elements of Gandhi’s non-violent 
philosophy help illuminate the basics of principled non-violence (Gandhi 
1962, 1967, 1986; Kurtz 2008). For principled activists, non-violence:
– is spiritual or metaphysical;
– is ethically or morally superior to the use of violence;
– should be practiced as a lifestyle;
– can produce new societal paradigms;
– separates the doer (opponent) from their deeds (oppression);
– assumes a oneness among humans.
Principled non-violence is both a strategy and a belief system. Adherents 
to principled non-violence reject the use of violence on moral and ethi-
cal grounds and insist that violence is ultimately more destructive than 
productive. Thus, means and ends become inseparable. Those who advocate 
principled non-violence emphasis its moral and strategic superiority for 
achieving the interests of their group and, ultimately, even their opponents.
Revolutionary Non-violence
The Peace People leadership also called for revolutionary non-violence, a 
praxis that shares many of the fundamentals of strategic non-violent action 
and principled non-violence.5 According to the peace activist, scholar, and 
5 The now familiar distinction between strategic and principled nonviolence should not 
imply that non-violent revolutionaries are without strategy or principles. 
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educator Matt Meyer, ‘Revolutionary nonviolence emphasizes unity among 
radicals and proposes a militant non-violent praxis based on revolution-
ary transformation and mass civil resistance’.6 Meyer (2014) asserts that 
revolutionary non-violence requires careful introspection of structural 
violence, colonial histories, and power structures. And while it might be 
argued that the Peace People side-stepped issues of colonial history in 
Ireland, the leadership felt that an end to violence would be necessary but 
not suff icient. A lasting peace would require root-and-branch transforma-
tion of politics, economics, and social relations through mass organizing 
and grass-roots action.
The organization’s newsletter reveals consistent efforts to express soli-
darity with contemporary activists and movements often associated with 
revolutionary non-violence, such as the Plowshares movement, Movement 
for a New Society, advocates of Catholic liberation theology, and non-violent 
revolutionaries, such as the Berrigan Brothers and Steve Biko in South 
Africa (Meyer 2014). Many of the Peace People were inclined to participate 
in local social work, community development activities, or mass rallies, 
but a revolutionary programme that sought to address global economic 
disparities or authoritarianism in other countries proved elusive and even 
offensive to some.
The Peace People and Principled Non-violence
From the beginning, the main leaders embraced a radical non-violent 
ideology. Betty Williams’ initial efforts gathering signatures for a petition 
protesting the death of the Maguire children expressed a simple desire for 
an end to violence and the dissolution of the IRA. She declared, ‘After such 
a tragedy, we must and will have peace!’ (Deutsch 1977: 6). Mairead Corrigan 
responded boldly to threats by the IRA: ‘We realize that before this is finished 
people may have to die for peace in Northern Ireland. But this only makes 
us more determined than ever, as none of us can think of a better cause to 
have to die for’ (Walker 1976a). Ciaran McKeown soon joined Williams and 
Corrigan and brought a new sophistication to the leadership’s non-violent 
vision. After the rallies subsided, McKeown intended for the movement to 
generate pressure through ‘community politics’ and new power-sharing 
arrangements, but he also envisioned changes in hearts and minds.
6 https://web.archive.org/web/20150808153426/http://beautifultrouble.org/theor y/
revolutionary-nonviolence/. 
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Williams and Corrigan remained the central spokespeople, but McKeown 
(1976) penned the Peace People Declaration and a pamphlet entitled The 
Price of Peace, in which he framed the movement’s potential and long-term 
goals. It is in McKeown’s writings that one often f inds calls to principled 
non-violence, such as those enumerated in the Gandhian template above.
Use of Spiritual, Metaphysical, or Religious Tenets
Northern Ireland is a highly religious region within Europe, and the three 
primary leaders often drew on Christian theology and practice, especially 
Corrigan and McKeown. They spoke in familiar religious terms, and they 
used theological principles to emphasize the importance of non-violence 
and the oneness of humanity. McKeown (1976: 14) wrote, ‘If you believe in 
God, you will already know your own value as a divinely created person with 
the possibility of a divine destiny […] you will know that you must have an 
equal respect and love for his other creatures’. Mairead Corrigan, a devout 
Catholic, often drew on her faith and spoke of love and forgiveness as she 
did in her regular column in the movement newsletter, Peace by Peace.
Non-violence Is Morally Superior
McKeown highlighted the virtue of non-violence and emphasized the 
need for courage to carry out principled non-violence: ‘Both logically and 
emotionally, it takes far more courage to be prepared to die, but never to 
kill, than it takes to be prepared to kill and take your chance on dying’ 
(1976: 3). Courage emerges as a recurring virtue that Williams, Corrigan, 
and McKeown associated with non-violence. In their Noble Peace Prize 
lecture, Williams and Corrigan (1977) contrasted global militarism and 
military expenditures with courageous non-violence:
We know that this insane and immoral imbalance of priorities cannot be 
changed overnight: we also know that it will not be changed without the 
greatest struggle […] And that struggle must be all the greater because 
it has to be an unarmed, a nonviolent struggle, and requires more cour-
age and more persistence than the courage to squeeze triggers or press 
murderous buttons.
In this excerpt, Williams and Corrigan frame non-violent action as cou-
rageous (and diff icult) and imply by contrast that violence is easy and 
cowardly.
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Non-violence as a Lifestyle
Applying non-violent philosophy in all areas of one’s life coincided with 
the movement’s goal of transforming society from the bottom up. Whether 
dealing with domestic conflicts in the home (McKeown 1976: 18) or work-
ing to build the movement, one’s commitment to non-violence required 
continuous discipline. According to McKeown (1976: 3), ‘the genuine pacifist 
is engaged in a battle every day of his life’. In the 20 May 1977 issue of the 
movement’s newspaper, nearly a full page was dedicated to an article about 
the Community of the Ark (L’Arche), a non-violent community in France, 
where,
To become the instrument of non-violence and unity, intelligence and 
affections must be constantly renewed and animated by Truth and Living 
Love […] This is why the members of the non-violent community must 
seek together every day the spiritual strength in which they may f ind 
comfort, surmount their oppositions and live in a practical unity which 
reaches out to every person, even an adversary. (_.1977: 5)
While the Community of the Peace People did not develop communal 
living, the basic principle of daily commitment was consonant with the 
bottom-up transformation of Northern Ireland that lay at the heart of the 
leadership’s programme.
New Societal Paradigms
Advocates of principled non-violence focus not only on the means of non-
violent struggle but also on non-violent ends of more peaceful and just 
economic, political, and social relationships. McKeown criticized Northern 
Ireland’s limited ‘party-political’ system and its inability to provide a 
solution to the Troubles. He felt any sustainable peace process would be 
produced from the grass roots. Only by transforming sectarian impulses at 
the individual and community level could a consensus be built. McKeown 
(1976) also felt the energy of the movement provided an opportunity to 
create an entirely new and unprecedented political system, an ‘optimum’ 
democracy (McKeown 1976: 27). Moreover, McKeown’s transformationist vi-
sion called for a revolutionary new society distinguished by ‘peace culture’:
Those with a deep interest in peace beyond a mere end to violence 
will have a special role in helping to create a ‘peace culture’ which will 
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compete with and f inally replace the received and meekly accepted 
cultural tradition with its violent tones, undertones and overtones. In 
short, we are attempting nothing less than the creation of a new civiliza-
tion (1976: 28).
Campaigns were proposed to reform policies, such as police interrogation 
practices and Diplock courts, and to institute corrective policies, such as 
emergency status for prisoners charged under the Emergency Provisions 
Act. Together, they reflected the call for a new vision of a just future.
Oneness of Humanity and Separating the Doer from the Deed
Principled non-violence is often underpinned by a belief in a fundamental 
equivalence (and sometimes even metaphysical unity) of all humans, chal-
lenging processes of dehumanization that legitimate violence. McKeown 
touched on the oneness of humanity in his recognition of divinity in all 
humans, but more often, he emphasized Western concepts of individual 
liberties that all people share. Corrigan, writing in the Peace by Peace 
newspaper, declared that in the afterlife, ‘I will be judged as a child of the 
universe and on my capacity to love all men of all nations’ (Corrigan 1978: 3).
A universalist position on the unity of all humans that considers 
humanity fundamentally good requires a way to distinguish humanity 
from destructive human behaviour and provide a pathway to atonement. 
McKeown and his successor as chairman of the Peace People Executive, 
Peter McLachlan, agreed that an authentic peace process, and ultimately 
reconciliation, would require involving ex-combatants from all sides 
and differentiating perpetrators from their violent actions in order to 
incorporate them into a new emerging society. As editor of Peace by Peace, 
McKeown published pieces by Gusty Spence, an imprisoned leader of the 
loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force paramilitary, and he foresaw a time when 
those, like Spence who had previously been involved in violence, should be 
released from prison (McKeown 1984: 188).
Aligning Principled and Revolutionary Non-violence with 
Northern Ireland Culture
Why did the movement decline? A complete answer lies beyond the scope 
of this chapter. I propose, as only one factor, that many who participated 
in the rally phase could not fully embrace the revolutionary scope of the 
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programme formulated by the movement’s leadership. McKeown’s philoso-
phy of non-violence constituted not only a set of strategies for achieving a 
conventional political end. He proposed a redefinition of the entire political 
structure and human relations in Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland’s unique historical context, including its divided 
political system and the traumatized collective psyche of the region, gen-
erated both opportunities and constraints for the movement. According 
to Fairmichael (1987: 3), a genuine political vacuum was left in the wake 
of politicians’ failures to establish a power-sharing government in 1973. 
Moreover, the deaths of the Maguire children further dramatized the daily 
violence of the Troubles, evoking a public sense of outrage. Deutsch (1977), 
Fairmichael (1987), McKeown (1976: 11), and McKeown (1984) each noted a 
war-weariness or demoralization hanging over the region that reached a 
critical mass as the Peace People emerged (Deutsch 1977: 24). Unemploy-
ment had risen to record levels, and rates of violent deaths and injuries had 
risen to levels not seen since 1972 (Fairmichael 1987). As McKeown (1984: 
139) describes, ‘Violence was consuming itself, it seemed, and could beget no 
more violence […] A volcano working up from the depths of the communal 
soul was looking for an outlet’. The bold and unconventional responses of 
Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan provided an outlet for a collective 
frustration that had been building.
Even though Northern Ireland’s troubled past provided an impetus 
for the Peace People, the context in which a movement emerges can also 
constrain it. Herein, one f inds an important paradox in the emergence and 
maintenance of the Peace People. The non-violent nature of the movement 
made it appealing to the war-weary citizens of Northern Ireland. Yet, in 
the long run, the extensive commitment to principled and revolutionary 
non-violence proved unsustainable, because the Peace People’s leaders were 
unable to align their non-violent praxis with the culture and experience of 
the people of Northern Ireland.
As Eyerman and Jamison (1991) point out, the ability of movement intel-
lectuals to convey a movement’s ideological foundation is important to the 
movement’s capacity to establish and maintain itself. More importantly, 
a movement’s ideology only has signif icant meaning when the meaning 
is collectively attributed or assigned (Kane 2011). Structural and cultural 
conditions hindered widespread adoption of an elaborate and radical 
programme of revolutionary non-violence and political transformation in 
Northern Ireland.
Ethnonational identities in Northern Ireland constitute important ‘cross-
cutting solidarities’ that can inhibit movement (McAdam, McCarthy, and 
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Zald 1988), and the Peace People drew support from a divided constituency 
harbouring divided loyalties. Consequently, the Peace People’s ideology 
tended to conflict with pervasive local configurations of identity f ields. 
Among Peace People participants, ethnonational loyalties varied in inten-
sity, but they persisted. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988: 704) argue that 
the greater the number and strength of such cross-cutting ties, the less likely 
a social movement will be able to emerge. As McAdam (1982: 49) argued 
when he introduced micro-mobilization processes to the study of social 
movements, ‘It is not simply the extent and speed with which insurgency 
is spread but the very cognitions on which it depends that are conditioned 
by the strength of integrative ties within the movement’s mass base’. It is 
equally true that once a social movement emerges, cross-cutting solidari-
ties may also serve to precipitate its decline, especially when movement 
participants are already culturally predisposed to segregation (Bardon 1992: 
727; Gamson 1995). The principled and revolutionary non-violent ideology 
of the Peace People became problematic as their leaders sought to redefine 
boundaries in Northern Ireland in radically egalitarian ways.
There are surely several reasons for the waning local support and the 
eventual decline of the Peace People during the movement’s second phase. 
These include frayed relationships, f inancial problems, and misconceptions 
regarding the leadership’s international roles (Fairmichael 1987; Walker 
1978).7 However, events during the second phase and appraisals by ob-
servers and participants indicate that the goals of the movement, derived 
from principled and revolutionary non-violence, proved unacceptable to 
a signif icant portion of the movement’s potential supporters. Movement 
participants were constantly confronted with the incongruity between their 
experience and the off icial non-violent vision for the movement. Richard 
Deutsch (1977: 175), who observed and documented the movement, offers 
this ‘critical evaluation’:
In many ways, the Northern Irish were not ready for the ideas of the Peace 
People. They were astonished by the plans, the scope of the program and 
of the thinking behind it. They must make a mental adjustment. They 
wanted peace, almost an immediate peace, a ‘natural’ peace without 
problems and without sacrif ices. Then along came the Peace People and 
overwhelmed them with new thoughts and grandiose projects. Instead of 
bringing ready-made solutions, they asked for an extra effort, a collective 
7 Further scholarly historiography of the movement could expand on Fairmichael’s (1987) 
investigation and serve to elevate these factors in subsequent analyses.
The Peace PeoPLe 217
effort and, above all, a personal effort. And that, no doubt, is why the 
movement has met with so much resistance.
McKeown also found that the commitment of the movement’s leaders to a 
radical philosophy of non-violence proved problematic:
By and large, in our early declarations of purpose, we were benignly 
dismissed as naive idealists, who might be forgiven such aberrations as 
nonviolence, in favour of the excellent promotional job we were otherwise 
doing. It would be much later, as it became clearer that nonviolence was 
the be-all and end-all of our commitment, that benign patronisation 
would give way more generally to irate opposition. (McKeown 1984: 177)
A couple of Ciaran McKeown’s proposals for Peace People action demon-
strate internal disconnects between what Fairmichael (1987: 43) character-
izes as the ‘prophetic’ (or revolutionary) project of non-violence backed by 
the leaders and the ‘quieter project work’ on which others wanted to focus.
First, contention over the treatment of prisoners held under the terms 
of the Emergency Provisions Act presented a signif icant stumbling block. 
Secretary of State Merlyn Rees withdrew ‘special category status’ for 
prisoners convicted of crimes after 1 March 1976. Republican prisoners 
protested this reversal, f irst by refusing to wear prison uniforms and then 
by refusing to use the sanitary facilities and smearing their own faeces 
on the walls of their cells. McKeown proposed that the issue be resolved 
by establishing an ‘emergency status’ for prisoners charged under the 
Emergency Act. Thus, those with extensive sentences established under 
the emergency situation would not be subject to the sentences indefinitely 
once the emergency ended. For McKeown (1984: 250), the prison issue was a 
crucial one on which the trajectory of the conflict could depend. It ‘was the 
very touchstone of our seriousness as a peace movement seeking to work at 
the heart of the conflict’. The Peace People Assembly backed the proposal 
during its conference in October 1978, but for many Peace People, focusing 
on the politically charged prison issues amounted to ‘becoming political’ 
and risked upsetting the reconciliation work with which they were more 
comfortable. Others simply could not stomach extending any sort of relief 
to those they considered convicted terrorists (? 1978: 8).
Others found the international focus of McKeown, Williams, and Corrigan 
too ambitious or distracting. McKeown (1984: 221-224), in particular, felt that 
Peace People groups should be actively involved in solidary relationships 
with other peace groups around the world as an appropriate expression of 
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the unity of humanity. ‘It seemed to me that we could not seriously tackle 
Northern Ireland’s problems with the appropriate non-violent strategy and 
determination, if we did not have a constant, relentless appreciation that 
every human life is sacred: and that understanding dictated an immediate 
and active concern about “Third World” conditions’ (1984: 223) (cf. Lakey 
1973: 75-76). Hazel Senior of the Holywood Peace Group described the dis-
connect over international solidarity in an interview with Rob Fairmichael 
(1987: 39):
Some of our people are very much if I may use the phrase, into nonviolence, 
and this means that perhaps they are just as involved in the non-violent 
aspect worldwide. For others I feel that they’re interested in peace in 
Northern Ireland and that nonviolence might come into their vocabulary 
equally. I think in some ways people regard it as an academic thing.
These sorts of disputes represent a problem with framing and collective 
attribution, an inability of movement intellectuals to reconcile their radical 
non-violent philosophy with participants’ understandings of reality. After 
all, framing is only one part of an interactive process of meaning mak-
ing within social movements as participants experience, interpret, and 
internalize discourses over time from within their own socio-economic, 
cultural, and historical contexts (Kane 2011). As the Peace People emerged 
in a flash of weary frustration at the height of the Troubles and the three 
main leaders assumed such prominent roles, there was less opportunity for 
a more organic development of the movement’s claims.
Conclusion
Collective identities play central roles in both ethnonational conflicts and 
social movements. Conflict, whether violent or non-violent, can deepen 
and polarize ethnonational boundaries, but some movements call for 
realignments of identities and social structures (see Nagle, in this volume). 
Nevertheless, each social movement emerges within its own political and 
historical context, and its praxis competes with other contradictory and 
established identities and ideological commitments. Careful framing can 
take advantage of the malleable nature of identities and introduce new 
models of identif ication that rearrange or transcend normal boundaries. 
However, new models introduced in moments of social movement can also 
prove too radical. To the extent that leaders’ goals contradict or challenge 
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prevailing identities and habitus, social movement organizations will f ind 
recruiting and retaining participants challenging.
The Peace People in Northern Ireland emerged in a society marked by 
deep social, political, cultural, and psychological divisions. Many citizens 
opened to new ideas of reconciliation and social change during the rally 
phase of the movement. McKeown, Corrigan, and Williams envisioned 
an unprecedented, totally inclusive, and non-violent society, a radical de-
mocracy that would arise from individuals deeply committed to principled 
non-violence and aligned with a global network of solidary movements, 
but Northern Ireland presented a diff icult environment within which to 
establish and maintain support for a movement based on a combination 
of principled and revolutionary non-violence, especially once the efferves-
cence of the early rallies faded. The scope of the leaders’ goals exceeded the 
immediate desire for an end to violence and required a reconfiguration of 
world views extensive enough that their programme could not maintain 
broad support. For some, the immediacy of the Troubles trumped inter-
national solidarity, for others their views on justice precluded the call to 
reintegrate ex-combatants, and still others could not reconcile the poles of 
principled and revolutionary non-violence when called on to intervene and 
restructure the political system. These disconnects on matters of policy 
signal a deeper problem in meaning making at the intersection of framing 
and collective attribution.
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 Afterword
Social Movements, Long-term Processes, and Ethnic 
Division in Northern Ireland
Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd
Introduction: Social Movement Theory and Research on 
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland is a deeply divided society. The divisions, however, are 
socially and spatially uneven and their intensity varies over time with 
individuals swaying from relatively liberal and permeable views to deeper 
polarization and back again. John Whyte (1991) documented this for the 
1960s and 1970s and it is still the case today (Ruane 2017). Even at the height 
of communal polarization the division was never complete: there were 
individuals and subgroups who ignored it and seemed immune from an-
tagonism, and local areas where mixing continued in the midst of violence.
The basis of division is also diverse. It has ethnic, national, religious, and 
colonial dimensions and its logic is not reducible to any one of these. It is not 
‘an ethnic conflict’ or ‘a colonial conflict’, and still less a ‘religious conflict’, 
tout court. On the contrary, division persists and polarizes not because of 
one foundational element but because of the entwining of different cleav-
ages in a context of power and inequality. As we have long argued, there are 
historically deep structures of power and inequality within the British-Irish 
archipelago, embedded in institutions and routinized practices in Northern 
Ireland which themselves embody overlapping and intersecting cultural dif-
ferences, and which in turn produce and reproduce communities as emer-
gent entities with richly layered repertoires of opposition (Ruane and Todd 
1996, 2004, 2015). The communities are composite products of successive 
conjunctural confrontations during this long historical process. Contesting 
subgroups within each community may emphasize religion or nationality or 
colonialism, according to their particular ideological standpoint or interest, 
and each reproduces conflict between communities in the process of as-
serting their interests within them. Others – keeping themselves detached 
from conflict for the most part – retain links with those more directly 
involved by family, schooling, and neighbourhood which allows for future 
communal mobilization. If the emergent communities-in-conflict might be 
conceived as ‘ethnic’ communities, they are not ones def ined by descent or 
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by a common and continuous culture. They are rather constituted from the 
whole family of overlapping dimensions of difference, and the meanings and 
identities associated with division are themselves multiple and contested,.
There are structurally based tendencies for the culturally diverse dimen-
sions of difference to converge in a continuity of division. But not all is 
structure or culture. There is also strategic action by individuals, political 
parties, economic and political elites, and groups of different size and level of 
organization. Some of this takes place in and through established institutions 
where – more often than not – it acts as a mechanism of structural and 
cultural reproduction. But there is also collective strategic action that brings 
pressure on the established institutions. The latter is the domain of social 
movements and it is this aspect of Northern Irish society and the Northern 
Irish conflict that engages the attention of Bosi, De Fazio, and their associates.
Starting from a view of ethnicity as an emergent property of social 
practice, Bosi and De Fazio draw on existing social movement theory and 
develop it in new ways. They engage at once with the contingency of move-
ment choices and the unpredictability of movement outcomes, on the one 
hand, and with the underdetermining but nonetheless causally important 
structural conditions, on the other. These latter make some directions of 
collective mobilization more likely than others, and that shape the interac-
tions between competing and conflicting social movements. These may 
generate new identities, interrelations and conflicts, reproduce existing 
ones, or renew older ones.
A range of scholars have highlighted the relational, temporal, and spatial 
situation of social movements, which are themselves rooted in longer-
lasting relations. Movements emerge and gain momentum in conjunctures 
where longer-term processes and unexpected events intersect, giving op-
portunities for change (Della Porta 2013; Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016; Bosi, 
Ó Dochartaigh, and Pisoiu 2015). Unlike the atheoretical event-oriented 
approach of many historians, or the party-system and actor-oriented ap-
proaches of many political scientists, or the synchronic structuralism of 
much sociology, social movement theorists concentrate in a f ine-tuned 
manner on the ways in which actors from outside the mainstream political 
parties mobilize populations into powerful groups with the capacity to 
re-shape the political arena.
One of the key contributions of social movement theory to the study 
of ethnicity lies in its theory-mediated approach to understanding the 
making, unmaking, and remaking of ethnic divisions. It can explore the 
deeper context of resources and opportunities that lead ethnic mobiliza-
tions in unanticipated directions (see, for example, Hoewer 2015; Bosi and 
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Davis, forthcoming). As such social movement theory has a key contribu-
tion to make to the task of situating successive critical junctures within a 
longer-term historical account of how ‘ethnic’ divisions emerge and become 
long-lasting, get unmade and remade. That said, many social movement 
studies focus on short-term, event-oriented processes, framed by middle-
term institutional resources and take the deeper level structural processes 
as givens (Beissinger 2002).
The Northern Ireland case requires scholars to go beyond events and 
the middle-term to look also at the changing structural circumstances 
that condition the emergence and outcomes of social movements. In what 
follows we look at how social movement theory adds to our knowledge of 
Northern Ireland, where it could give still more insights, and where it might 
benefit from further broadening and contextualization. In conclusion, we 
suggest areas and questions where social movement studies might fruitfully 
focus its research.
Broadening Theoretical Perspectives
Recent work by social movement theorists like Della Porta, Bosi, De Fazio, 
and their colleagues represents an opening out of social movement stud-
ies to a broader relational, historical, and, indeed, structural context that 
converges with a historico-structural approach (see, in particular,Bosi, Ó 
Dochartaigh, and Pisoiu 2015; Della Porta 2013). Implicitly, if not explicitly, 
this work rests on a social ontology of practice: in Marx’s terms, humans 
‘make their own history but not under conditions of their own choosing’. 
Historically situated practice over time produces its own constraints – 
institutions, power structures, routinized habitus – which take on a path-
dependent quality conditioning future practice in ways that are very hard 
to undo. From within this broad tradition, social movement theorists have 
emphasized the creative potential of collaborative agency, structuralists the 
constraints on it, and historical sociologists the path-dependent character 
of the processes involved. This is a division of labour where each can learn 
from the other.
From this perspective, the units of analysis – societies, conflicts, parties, 
movements, classes, ethnic groups – are complex entities constituted by 
intersecting global, regional, and local processes, whose properties vary 
with the precise timing and sequencing of the intersections. Rather than 
comparison that generalizes across abstractly conceived variables, or sche-
matic ideal types as in the Weberian tradition, this approach reconstructs 
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complex contextualized unities out of simpler elements and identif ies their 
specif ic dynamic. Comparison comes in – as McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 
argue (2001) – by showing the differential impact of the same mechanisms 
and processes in different sequences and combinations.
For the study of ethnicity, this means a multi-level and multi-temporal 
approach. The very concept of ethnicity is an umbrella one encompassing a 
family of diverse phenomena (Ruane and Todd 2004). If short-term mobiliza-
tion and framing highlights one set of divisions over others, middle term 
institution-building generates a set of routine practices and distinctions 
that makes some framings more plausible than others (Brubaker et al. 
2006), while longer-term structural divisions and power imbalances are the 
context of successive rounds of state- and institution-building. If sometimes 
the result is radical discontinuity in the groups that come into conflict, in 
the Irish case the result has more often been continuity and persistence.
Bosi and De Fazio, and the authors they have brought together, cor-
rectly point out that the coherence and crystallization of ethnic groups in 
conflict is in part a product of successful social movements. They also show 
how these social movements build on and challenge embedded structural 
divisions, often with unanticipated consequences. They show the value 
of studying social movements in a deeply divided society like Northern 
Ireland. As the editors point out, it is a rich case for social movement theory 
that shows characteristics, trajectories, and patterns that are not so evident 
in more peaceful societies.
One of these patterns is the tendency of social movements in divided 
societies to generate continuity as well as change. As is well recognized 
in the literature, social movements may generate new alliances, aims, and 
identities through mechanisms of brokerage, object-shift, and framing, and 
bring change in institutions, power resources,power relations, and networks 
(McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow 2001). But a new social movement may also be 
mobilized to confirm old alliances, aims, and identities and to prevent or re-
verse change in institutions and power relations. Even where it seeks change 
it may do so in a way that reinforces existing patterns and reproduces old 
divisions. The mechanisms by which longer-term patterns are reproduced 
in new contexts are far from adequately understood. The Northern Ireland 
case allows us to explore the social and cultural mechanisms which seem 
to ‘lock in’ division even in new contexts (Wright 1996; Ruane 2012). These 
mechanisms are of signif icance not just for deeply divided societies but 
also for the study of social change more generally, and the ways in which 
continuities are unintentionally reproduced (on institutional change, see 
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Streeck and Thelen 2005; on identity change, see Rumelili and Todd 2017; 
on conflict, see Ruane and Todd 2015).
This means looking more closely at the relationship between movements/
politicians/publics in an effort to explain why some movements did and 
others did not gain support, why some metamorphosed to different aims and 
frames in mid-movement, and why the outcomes differed from the intent. 
This fruitful research agenda could only be increased by contextualizing the 
social movements in longer-term processes, including slow-moving demo-
graphic and power changes and showing how earlier movements at critical 
junctures in the past shaped these processes and redefined their direction.
Contingency, Creativity and Continuity
Bosi and De Fazio rightly point out that the ethnonational conflict and 
violence in Northern Ireland that characterized the period from 1969 to 
1998 was far from determined by underlying structural conditions. And 
yet, it was far from contingent. This is an old conflict and a recurring 
one. Its conditions were put in place by conquest and the imposition and 
enforcement of inequality and maintained and sequentially reproduced 
despite continuing resistance. Settlement patterns, institutional structures, 
communication networks, class structures, and family structures underlay 
the persistence of division and made conflict likely to re-emerge in the 
future. The geopolitical context reproduced these conditions: division was 
a key mechanism through which Britain controlled Ireland.
The role of contingency in what happened in Northern Ireland in the late 
1960s has been well brought out by many of the authors in this volume in this 
and previous works. But ‘pure’ contingency is rare. If conflict and division 
have been underdetermined by structure, agency and contingency have 
operated within structural constraints. For example, Ó Dochartaigh and 
Bosi (2010) point to one of the ways in which the famous People’s Democracy 
march in January 1969 served to crystallize community division for reasons 
that might seem contingent: the marchers slept overnight in the Catholic 
and republican villages of Toome and Bellaghy, rather than the Protestant 
and unionist villages of Castledawson and Knockloughrim. The decision 
was made because of already existing division: widespread, if uneven, local 
Protestant anger at the march meant it might be dangerous for the marchers 
to sleep in Protestant areas. Its outcome was massively to reinforce division 
so that it came to characterize the social movement itself: it cemented 
Catholic networks and friendships, increased the young marchers’ openness 
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to republican repertoires, and precluded local Protestant empathy with the 
students when they were later ambushed at Burntollet Bridge.
This volume takes the interplay of structure and contingency farther. It 
begins with a wide-ranging theoretical article by Bosi and De Fazio, which 
brings social movement theory in a direction that recognizes structural 
conditions while emphasizing their less-than-determining character and 
the need to look at the relational processes put in motion by contingent 
choices. This gives a full role to agency, and the creativity by which social 
movements can produce new processes and unexpected distinctions, while 
also recognizing the constraints on this creativity. A key issue is how, despite 
underdetermination by structure, the old divisions re-emerged. If ‘contin-
gency’ is part of an explanation, the points at which there were alternative 
paths have to be highlighted and why these were not taken up explained.
Ó Dochartaigh (in this volume) is particularly relevant here. He empha-
sizes the bottom-up processes by which inequality is politicized. But he 
also emphasizes the continuity of themes within civil rights and anti-state 
movements over a quarter century. Enduring patterns of horizontal inequal-
ity, power, and state organization (particularly of the security forces) meant 
that successive anti-state social movements – though framed differently and 
with different activists and leaders – regenerated old demands and relations. 
Whether framed in civil rights or republican terms, whether peaceful or 
militarist, whether gathering together supporters on universalist, ethnic or 
republican grounds, and despite the often creative sequential reframing of 
the movements, the unintended consequence of challenge was continuity.
The balance of continuity and discontinuity – as Maney (in this volume) 
reminds us – is not simply a function of the Irish context. International 
processes intersect with civil rights mobilization and counter-mobilization, 
providing models and authoritative framing in the international media. 
These framing processes, themselves developed in a wider conflictual 
context, f ind partial parallels and homologies in Northern Ireland and 
define and strengthen those parallels: they partially create the conditions 
(the change from a civil rights movement framed as universalistic and open 
to one linked to republicanism and framed as particularist and violent) 
that they describe.
The process and outcomes of the civil rights mobilization were affected 
not just by the civil rights movement or the media, nor even by loyalist 
counter-mobilization, but by the political choices made by unionist and 
British governments. These choices were structurally circumscribed and, to 
a degree, overdetermined. They provided the opportunity structure for the 
movements and the incentives for activists to focus their attention on the 
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unionist regime rather than simply its policies, and later to refocus attention 
on the British state rather than simply on the unionist regime. Turner and 
De Fazio’s chapter on unionist Minister for Home Affairs William Craig 
shows that his actions need to be seen in a much broader context. Turner 
and De Fazio show that the actions appear irrational and, indeed, formed 
by ‘ideological and emotional’ responses. Yet, their chapter also suggests 
another hypothesis, that his actions may take on a more rational aspect if 
fully contextualized within unionism. Was Craig intuitively attempting to 
mobilize a wider swathe of unionist support behind the government and 
avoid the splits in unionism that followed – a policy that failed but was far 
from irrational? And was there any unionist governmental response that 
could have reconciled the demands of the civil rights campaign and the 
unionist imperative of saving the unionist-dominated state? Bosi and De 
Fazio (in this volume) imply there was such an option, even it is diff icult 
to articulate how it might have worked out.
Agency and Constraints on Agency
The articles describe the multiple and intersecting social movements 
within Northern Ireland in the last half century. The contest between the 
opposing frames put forward by the different social movements becomes 
more and more striking and compelling as one reads through the book. 
Peace People, socialists, LGBT activists gave alternative cognitive schema 
for understanding Northern Ireland, as did the civil rights movement 
itself. So, too, did movements which worked from the traditional divisions. 
Republican prisoners worked collectively and tirelessly to get their story 
across to the wider public and to control public reception of it: to reframe 
state control as brutal repression, the modern prison system as equivalent 
to Calcutta, and the prisoners as fragile and suffering humans (O’Hearn, in 
this volume). Their local audience was Catholic and nationalist, but their 
methods were general. O’Hearn’s account highlights the contrast between 
their innovative strategy and the rather traditional images they dissemi-
nated (their ‘Don’t Let My Daddy Die’ poster was widely distributed during 
the hunger strikes). Republican feminists were attempting simultaneously 
to mobilize the wider (Catholic and nationalist) society for the republican 
project while mobilizing republicans on feminist lines and highlighting 
issues – LGBT – that potentially would allow later broadening beyond the 
traditional support base (O’Keefe, in this volume). All of this republican 
activity was highly creative.
230 JoSePh ruaNe aNd JeNNIFer Todd 
It was also contested within the movements, and particularly within 
republicanism. The ‘dissidents’ – later framed as those who left the re-
publican fold – were on their own account those who were at the centre of 
republicanism and held to its core views (White and Demirel-Pegg, in this 
volume). The chapters by O’Hearn, O’Keefe, and White and Demirel-Pegg 
show how those struggling within the republican movement used a whole 
range of social movement mechanisms both for the struggle within the 
republican organization and support base, and in addressing a wider public. 
This is a paradigmatic case of within-movement contest and change.
The trajectory of unionist mobilization was very different. It had mobi-
lized a great swathe of the Northern Protestant population at the start of 
the twentieth century. The great Unionist def ining moment was over by 
1921, and its institutionalization in Northern Ireland was well under way. 
The unionist political leadership came out for each year’s ritual celebra-
tions, but it was primarily loyalists – in the Orange Order and the hard-line 
working-class organizations – who participated in the parades and kept 
the engine of unionist mobilization ticking over. The engine was upgraded 
after 1968 in response to the civil rights movement, the IRA’s campaign, and 
the attempt by the British government to establish power-sharing. Their 
mobilization was framed within the achieved unionist order, and intended 
to confirm and harden it against subversion: as Campbell (in this volume) 
notes, they appealed to the past, not just to the Ulster Covenant of 1912 but 
also to the seventeenth-century defence of the Protestant Crown and to the 
(working-class) Apprentice Boys of Derry who shut the gates against the 
Catholic King James (Buckley and Kenny 1995). This was a tradition that 
they repeated as much as remade: there was no loyalist feminist movement 
to challenge loyalism’s internal structure, nor did loyalist prisoners remake 
loyalism on the outside. The young men who joined loyalist paramilitary 
organizations did so because their inherited belief systems and cognitive 
schema were challenged by events and by the intensity and persistence 
of republican violence (Ferguson and McAuley, in this volume). Some of 
them later challenged these ideas. But there was and is less dissent, less of 
a ferment of ideas, in loyalism than in republicanism or nationalism. As 
a movement defending a given power structure, albeit from a position of 
class assertion, there was less room for such debate.
In previous work, McAuley (2016), like Campbell (in this volume), points 
out the processes and habits that led working-class Protestants and loyalists 
to accept their tradition: solidarity, community, history, culture, and con-
flict. He is right that these were weighty motivations. But there were other 
options: those offered by the communists and trades unionists, Labour 
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and Alliance Party supporters, and the range of religious and cultural and 
cross-community activists who lived and organized in these local areas 
(Munck and Rolston 1987; Smithey 2011; Smithey, in this volume). Though 
these groups always provided a counterpoint to the different strands of 
loyalism, they never seriously challenged it.
That pattern seems to be continuing. Working-class loyalists, teenagers, as 
well as those with experience of past conflict, recently remobilized in a loyal-
ist protest against restrictions on the flying of the British flag from Belfast 
city hall (Nolan et al. 2014). The explanation needs to go beyond simply 
working-class loyalism. Rather, the explanation goes back to that earlier 
critical juncture at the start of the twentieth century where unionism was 
crystallized as the dominant force in the north-east of Ireland and organized 
itself politically to ensure its own solidarity and survival. At its core was a 
class contract between the unionist elite and the Protestant working class, 
which integrated the latter into the state and gave them a role in public 
policy. The new political order diminishes that role. The flags crisis marked 
loyalist insistence on maintaining the contract, and the unwillingnessof the 
Unionist Party elites fully to break it (Nolan et al. 2014; Tonge et al. 2014).
This volume shows in fascinating detail the differential patterning of 
social movements in Northern Ireland. The articles take us closer to the 
goal of explaining the diverse logics of mobilization and of success in this. 
If they do not all explicitly problematize the differentiation of choices, the 
uneven success, and the asymmetrical demands and organization of the 
movements, they give us much of the material we need to do so.
Bosi, De Fazio, and their contributors have focused on the agency of social 
movements and of the politicians they address. A further step – although 
this may push social movement theory to its limits – is to analyse the agency 
of the public who receive the competing social movement claims. It is here 
that what is often called ‘ethnicity’ (what we would see as a patterned 
concatenation of highly varying values, beliefs, solidarities, dispositions, 
and interests) weights public choices. In some cases, as in loyalist neighbour-
hoods, the weighting seems strong, persistent, and continuous, although 
this is occasionally disrupted (see Smithey, in this volume; Smithey 2011). 
The dynamic here is one of political as well as intellectual interest.
Cross-cutting Alternatives
There were – and are – alternatives to the varieties of unionism and nation-
alism. Northern Ireland was always awash with social movements, incipient 
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social movements, and attempted movements of all sorts, each proposing 
its own cognitive schema for understanding Northern Ireland and its place 
in the world. Some of these intermittently gained very signif icant public 
support, most importantly the Peace People of the 1970s (Smithey, in this 
volume). There has also been a wide range of socialist movements, some 
cross-community organizations (the Alliance Party), and more recently 
ecological and LGBT mobilization (Nagle, in this volume). There were other 
movements again: Christian and post-Christian networks; the campaigns 
for equal citizenship, to save Ulster from sodomy, for abortion rights; organi-
zations led by Protestant dissenters or by non-violent and non-provisional 
republicans; peace organizations like Corrymeela; community education 
projects like Conway Mill that took a quasi-movement form; music enthusi-
asts – punks – who thought of themselves as forming networks alternative 
to the main division; one-time activists partially retired but ready to join 
new movements (see Mitchell and Ganiel 2011; Finlay 2011).
Nagle and Smithey remind us, in their respective chapters, of the scope 
and potential of these movements, their significant public support, and their 
successes in organizing. Yet, not only did they fail to displace the varieties of 
unionism and nationalism, the most ambitious of them – the Peace People 
– collapsed. Smithey explains the failure: a too ambitious peace philosophy 
framed at a global level that failed to connect with wider public interests 
and expectations. His previous work (Smithey 2011) might suggest a further 
explanation: the lack of (publicly funded) arenas and locales and ritual prac-
tices where this movement might have flourished and gained more support. 
Timing was important: there were fewer opportunities for change in the 1970s 
than in the late 1980s and 1990s after the Anglo-Irish Agreement had opened 
British-Irish relations and the new equality legislation began to take effect.
Smithey and Nagle give us important information about the activists 
in these movements. But we know relatively little about the people who at 
least temporarily showed interest in and support for them, even if they later 
fell away. Were they past unionist or nationalist voters or the politically 
unaligned? Were they ex-civilrighters, or one-time Ulster Workers’ Council 
strikers? Were they new generations wanting something different? Were 
they stay-at-homes or garden centre enthusiasts, previously unmobilized, 
who came out briefly to show their support? Or were they the individuals – of 
every politics and none – who routinely attended political meetings through 
the Troubles and always spoke up? Did those unionists and nationalists 
who privatized out of disappointment, loss of hope of change, come back 
again with a different vision, or did they, when they came back to vote or to 
march, simply return to the positions of the past? How did the support base 
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of these alternative movements differ and did it affect the outcome? Why 
did the intermittent support for some of these movements subsequently 
fall away, and could it have been held onto? Here the new-generation social 
movement theory exemplif ied in this volume has much to contribute, not 
least in showing how the networks formed at one stage of mobilization 
helped or hindered new and alternative movements.
Beyond Social Movement Theory
Social movement theory, as this volume illustrates, can contribute much 
to the analysis of Northern Ireland and other divided societies. It also has 
greater potential: to address issues in general social theory in and through 
its deeper exploration of particular social movements.
It is a truism that periods of social crisis offer unique insights into the 
social world because for a brief moment the veil that obscures its operation 
is pulled aside. The study of social movements offers a strikingly similar 
potential. Social movements involve a deliberate, collective attempt to 
challenge the status quo, to which those who uphold it respond with varying 
degrees of resistance. The manner in which each goes about this can be a 
major source of insight into the workings of the social and political order, 
the functioning of its institutions, the resources and mechanisms of power 
and the interests it serves, the norms, values and aspirations of the powerful 
and the powerless, the values and attitudes of the wider populations.
Social movement theorists typically engage with their subject matter at 
close quarters and often in microscopic detail. They look at what change 
is sought and why; who the activists are and what their background is; the 
choices they make and why they make them; why they pursue this goal 
rather than that one, and why in this way rather than another; how they at-
tempt to recruit support and on what they base their appeal; the responses of 
the power-holders and the methods they use; why some movements succeed, 
or succeed for a time, while others fail, absolutely or by losing their radical 
potential; how much movements achieve and what they do not achieved.
Very often social movement theorists do not go much beyond the empiri-
cal details of the case they study, its immediate societal contextualization, 
and its similarities or dissimilarities with other cases. This is a lost oppor-
tunity. The insights gained from the study of social movements are directly 
relevant to the workings of the social at the highest level of generality: the 
forms of social life, how power operates and when and why it may cease to 
be effective, the different layers of the historical, the manner in which they 
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intersect and converge in the present, the formation and interplay of interest 
and identities, the role of structure and contingency in social life, the role 
of actors in history, and whether they are determining or determined.
Historians go to great length to stress the infinite openness of events in 
history before they happen. Social theorists write of changes over time as if 
the particular and the contingent hardly matter: everything seems already 
inscribed in abstract social forms which presuppose and predetermine the 
outcome. Though they rarely do so, social movement theorists are uniquely 
positioned to break down this dichotomy, not least because this is also the 
enterprise that social activists are engaged in, whether consciously or uncon-
sciously. Activists, too, make decisions on what was possible before and what 
is possible now, what goals it is reasonable to pursue, who can usefully be 
appealed to and on what grounds, what layers of the social to try to tap into, 
whether they are working with or against the ‘grain of history’, whether this 
is a unique historical juncture that can be intervened in, what reference to 
make to the past and how to interrelate it with the present. They are buffeted 
and frustrated by hostile events they did not anticipate, and are quick to 
exploit unanticipated opportunities, knowing that the goals they pursue 
must have deeper roots than what is provided simply by contingent events. 
By reflecting on their actions and outcomes, social movement theorists are 
in an excellent position to engage in the more general debates.
In this context the Northern Ireland case – and the island of Ireland more 
generally – is of exceptional interest, not simply because for more than two 
centuries change has repeatedly been driven by processes of social and 
political and cultural mobilization, but because of the complexities and 
ambiguities of its history. Its divisions are complex composites rather than 
unitary phenomena, both emergent and long-lasting, persistent and always 
in process of being unmade and remade, both underdetermined and, from 
another angle, overdetermined, and open to tracking in temporal sequences 
that are simultaneously long, middle, and short term. In this context, the 
detailed study of particular social movements always involves taking a 
stance on more general historical and wider theoretical issues.
The Northern Ireland civil rights movement and the nationalist mobiliza-
tions that followed invite such reflections on the longer historical process 
and its general theoretical implications. As this volume shows, the civil rights 
movement offers immense scope for social movement analysis. It also invites 
further questioning as to its timing, form, and outcome. That particular 
movement – and Protestant responses to it – can be fitted into a long history 
of Catholic pressure group politics and Protestant responses that goes back to 
the eighteenth century. Was the civil rights movement something truly new, 
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or simply the old in new guise? The question, raised by the actors themselves, 
is theoretically relevant. Successive mobilizations are related to shifts in the 
balance of Catholic-Protestant demographic and economic power (Ruane 
and Todd 1996), but the interrelation of these structural conditions with 
particular events and contingent decisions demands theoretical attention.
Was a challenge inevitable and only the particular form contingent? This 
might explain why a rights-based Catholic mobilization did not emerge in 
(say) the 1920s and 1930s when aggrieved minorities all over Europe were 
protesting and claiming rights, and instead emerged in the 1960s, able then 
to take the example of the 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights Movement in the 
United States. But even this may imply too much determinism. If some 
challenge became likely in the post-war period, might it have been neutral-
ized by political reform? This raises the further question of why egalitarian 
reformist unionism was so weak. The questions are alluded to but not fully 
addressed by Bosi, De Fazio, and the other contributors.
Then there is the question of why the civil rights movement was so quickly 
followed by non-violent nationalist and violent republican mobilizations. 
Were these extensions of the earlier movement, or distinct and separate 
movements that opportunistically exploited the crisis created by the civil 
rights movement and the unionist response to it? Are these entirely separate 
strands – a reasonable conclusion given the tendency of the adherents of 
each to denounce the other – or are they interwoven strands with the same 
structural basis? Or – more plausibly again – would a more differentiated 
structural approach which points to the intersection of class, religious, and 
other cleavages allow us to show the overlapping basis of these movements?
The point of asking these questions is to highlight issues of theoretical 
signif icance which need to be addressed explicitly rather than embed-
ded in implicit assumptions. To answer them requires judgement on the 
 relative weight of different structurally based tendencies, probabilities, and 
degrees of chance. It requires an engagement with fundamental questions 
about the history of the island of Ireland – not least its history of conquest, 
colonization, and religious wars – and the social and political structures and 
communal divisions that emerged as a result of it. This means locating social 
movements in their wider geo-political context and the role of the British 
and more recently Irish states in manipulating opportunities and incentives.
The role of the colonial dimension in the British-Irish relationship is far 
from simple. Has it generated a ‘grain of history’ that has stubbornly asserted 
itself, despite all attempts to block it or circumvent its effects? Or is this 
simply nationalist ideology? Any argument framed in terms of the ‘grain 
of history’ needs to show the mechanisms through which it operates. Here 
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the detailed analyses of social movement scholars are of great relevance. 
Equally, to highlight the more general questions is to encourage social 
movement research to move beyond simple assumptions about the ‘ethnic’ 
agents mobilized or mobilizing, and to problematize the processes by which 
continuities are reproduced. As the new generation of social movement 
scholars explores such movements in their context and spatio-temporal 
relations, they encounter basic questions of social theory and of the ap-
plication of theoretical concepts to ‘actual societies’ including what – if 
anything – it means to talk in terms of ‘Irish society’ or ‘Northern Irish 
society’. The strength of social movement research comes from its detailed 
knowledge of particular cases and particular processes. It is time for social 
movement theorists to bring this knowledge to bear on wider questions.
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